Page images
PDF
EPUB
[merged small][merged small][subsumed][merged small][merged small][subsumed][subsumed][merged small][subsumed][merged small][subsumed][subsumed][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][graphic][graphic][graphic]

APPENDIX D-Continued

Question 8. Has the recent recall of reservists to active duty accentuated the reluctance of certain employers to hire individuals who are associated with the Reserve program?

-

Answer A number of communications have been received by the Department of Defense in which certain employers are alleged to have denied employment or been reluctant to employ personnel who have reserve obligations. The Department of Defense is not in a position to take any direct action to prevent discrimination against reservists in the matter of employment. A number of these communications have been forwarded to the Secretary of Labor requesting the cooperation of the Department of Labor in investigating cases and soliciting the cooperation of business and industry in correcting and preventing discrimination against reservists in employment practices.

It does not appear that it would be appropriate to enact Federal legislation to dictate to private industry or employers as to whom they should employ. However, it does appear appropriate for the Congress to amend current law to declare that it is the sense of the Congress that personnel will not be denied employment because of their reserve obligation or affiliation. It is understood that the Director of the Bureau of Veterans' Reemployment Rights, Department of Labor, has this matter under consideration.

APPENDIX D-Continued

Question No. 9: Provide the Subcommittee with an unclassified statement outlining in detail the emergency circumstances and considerations that justified the recall of reserves to active duty.

Answer: The requirements for the recall of reserve component units and personnel were covered in detail in hearings on Senate Joint Resolution 120 (P.L. 87-117) and discussed in some detail by the Chairman of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives on July 31, 1961 during debate on the resolution. This debate appears on page 13051 of the Congressional Record of July 31, 1961 and a detailed unclassified statement appears in the Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, on S.J. 120. No attempt has been made to reproduce this material in answer to this question. In addition, classified testimony at the time provided some of the details necessary for full consideration of the question. The following paragraphs provide a succinct unclassified statement of the requirement for the recall of reserve component units and personnel.

On July 25, 1961 the President announced to the Nation the extent of the gathering crisis in the struggle against Communist aggression. It appeared necessary to strengthen the active military forces to meet this gathering crisis.

At the time of the recall, the active army had 11 divisions available for immediate employment, and 3 divisions which were training personnel. These latter 3 divisions were not available for early employment. It appeared necessary to have a minimum of 16 divisions available for immediate employment. Consequently, the 3 training divisions were relieved of their training mission and were placed on an accelerated training program to enable their attainment of combat readiness at an early date. This action provided 14 divisions which would be ready for early employment. Two additional divisions were needed to provide the required 16 divisions. These two divisions were secured at an early date through recall of reserve component units and the placing of these divisions on an accelerated training program, providing the required 16 divisions for the active army. At the same time, draft calls were increased, and personnel then on active duty whose tours of duty would have expired, were extended. The latter action permitted concentration on training of personnel who would be utilized to expand the size of the active army on a permanent basis.

Upon the relief of the 3 divisions previously conducting training from this mission, it was necessary to assign this mission to other elements. The active Army was able to absorb a portion of the training requirement by various actions but one new training center was urgently

APPENDIX D-Continued

required. For this purpose, a training division from the Army Reserve was ordered to duty and established a new training center.

Logistic and other support units were required for the army on a priority basis and these could only be secured in the time considered to be available from the reserve components. In considering the units required, note must be taken of the President's comments on July 25, 1961 that the struggle was worldwide. It was necessary to provide support units which had not been maintained in the active army for the possible employment of army elements in a number of theaters of operation. The actions taken were not to meet a crisis in Berlin alone, but to meet the worldwide struggle.

With respect to the Department of the Navy, it was considered necessary to immediately reinforce the antisubmarine capability of the Navy. For this purpose, surface and air antisubmarine units were called, and the destroyers were deployed to both the east and west.

With the build-up for the possible employment of Army forces in several areas of the world, and the increased capability of the Army to deploy divisions in combat, it was necessary to increase the capability of the Air Force to support such operations with fighter support, transport and reconnaissance type aircraft. These were available in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.

In summary, the requirement for the recall of reserve component units of the military forces was caused by the increasing world tensions at the time of recall. The only source of the required units in the time frame during which they were needed was the reserve components. These units were not recalled for training only, but to take their place alongside the other active forces as full-fledged members of the team prepared to defend the Nation.

Question 10. On the basis of information available to the subcommittee, it appears that most of the criticisms of the mobilization of reserves have come from filler personnel. These individuals had not associated with a drill pay unit and, for the most part, had completed two years of active duty.

Has the Department of Defense given consideration to the possibility of recommending administrative or legislative changes which would place drill participation on an entirely voluntary basis for personnel who have completed two or more years of active duty?

-

Answer The Department of Defense has not given formal consideration at Secretarial level to recommending administrative or legislative changes which would place drill participation on an entirely voluntary basis. This question has been considered on numerous occasions below Secretarial level in conjunction with various studies concerning the reserve components.

The material which has been developed within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and in other elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense indicates that such action would be undesirable.

APPENDIX D-Continued

Question No. 11: What monetary incentives would be necessary to insure adequate Ready Reserve drill participation if all statutory compulsion regarding such participation were repealed?

Answer: Higher pay or other benefits might provide some incentive for additional Ready Reserve drill participation, however, it is doubted that sole reliance on such incentives would ever insure adequate voluntary drill participation at the current size of the paid drill strength of the Ready Reserve, particularly the Army.

The law today provides for payment to the reservist of one day's pay for as little as two hours of drill. At the maximum, the reservist drills four hours for one day's pay and if he drills for a full day on the week end he is paid two days' pay. For a week-end drill (multiple drill) covering Saturday and Sunday as utilized by some components he receives four days' pay. Under this provision, the reservist today receives two to four times the amount his active duty contemporary receives for the same period. To increase this amount to that which would provide a monetary incentive for reserve service would probably require, as a minimum, quadrupling the current payment to the lower grade personnel without increasing the amount of time the reservist must devote to reserve drill time. It is doubted that even this payment would insure adequate voluntary drill participation.

It has been estimated that it would be necessary to pay the reservist as much or more than he can make in a civilian pursuit to insure such participation. As an example, one of the greatest problems affecting the reserve components is the maintenance of the required "hard" skills in the technical fields. Those reservists who possess these skills or the capabilities of acquiring the skills are, for the most part, employed in technical skills in their civilian employment. For these skills they are paid relatively high rates and may be capable of demanding and receiving as much as $40.00 to $50.00 for employment during an eight-hour day on Saturday. The reservist in pay grade E4 with over two years' service (a typical pay grade for this group) would at the present time receive $10.00 for the same period (two four-hour drills), approximately equal to the minimum legal wage for unskilled work. Doubling this amount, or paying four days' pay for one day's work would provide him only $20.00. By paying eight days' pay for one day's work he would receive $40.00, still less than he could make in his civilian pursuit. If he accepts the obligations of reserve service he then may be called to active duty involuntarily, while if he remains out of the reserves he will not be called to military service short of a general mobilization.

It is probable that a monetary incentive high enough to maintain adequate reserve strength on a voluntary basis would result in the reservist drawing such an amount that he would be paid for a few drills more than his active duty contemporary receives for full time duty.

« PreviousContinue »