Mr. HÉBERT. The committee will recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

Mr. Secretary, you return.

(Whereupon, at 12:00 noon, the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, April 17, 1962.)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE No. 3 OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D.C., Tuesday, April 17, 1962.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., Hon. F. Edward Hébert (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. HÉBERT. The committee will be in order.

We again have the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower with us this morning to continue the examination by the members of the committee.

However, before Mr. Kowalski begins, I understand the Secretary has a statement which he would like to make at this time.

Mr. Secretary, you may make any statement you desire.

Secretary RUNGE. Mr. Chairman, this statement has been prepared, with respect to the 6-month fillers that were used in the recall, and I hope that it will clarify and explain the situation.

You raised the question yesterday, Mr. Chairman, of the utilization of the 6-months' trainees with particular respect to the number who were called as fillers. I believe I can answer those questions and clear up some misunderstanding which may exist.

It should be recognized that the 6-month training program is not designed to provide fillers as such. Section 262 (a) of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 provides that the President may, under certain conditions, authorize the acceptance of enlistments in units of the Ready Reserve. Section 262 (c) of the same act prescribes that the training of these personnel will be not less than 3 months nor more than 6 months. The principle of enlistment in units applies also to the National Guard.

And I should say that since this 6-month program went into effect, Mr. Chairman, over 400,000 young men have entered that program. The bulk of these people are remaining in units of the Ready Reserve. However, as I will indicate in this statement, a certain number for good and sufficient reason are not able to participate in units, and they make up that 54,000-man pool of 6-month people that are no longer in units.

Under this act, personnel may not be enlisted except for units. As a result, the 6-month trainees in the pool are there only because they have been transferred from units, usually because of incompatability of their civilian employment. In most instances this incompatability is caused by the hours of the civilian employment conflicting with drill periods or movement from the area of their unit as a result of employment.

For the record-in the Army, 74,247 Reserve personnel reported to duty with their unit. Of these, 33,393 or 44 percent were 6-month trainees. To fill out the recalled units to wartime strength, 38,827

filler personnel reported for duty. Of these, 11,671, or 30 percent were 6-month trainees. As a result, 113,254 Reserve component personnel of the Army Reserve and National Guard reported for duty. In total, 45,064, or 40 percent of these were 6-month trainees.

The question has been raised as to why more personnel were not called from the pool who were 6-month trainees. A number of reasons contribute to this. The 6-month trainee is very capable as a basic trained soldier and many of them advance beyond the basic training. However, this period of time is not sufficient to produce an individual in the more complicated skills and the program is not designed with that in mind. In addition, some of the shortages were in the higher grades and it was necessary to go to prior service obligors to secure these grades.

An example of the operation of this factor can be found in the filler requirements of the 32d Infantry Division and the 49th Armored Division. If you will follow the table I have provided to each member, I believe this will be easier to understand.

If you will note this table, at the top of page 2 the 32d Infantry Division has a T.O. & E. strength of 13,787. They had a strength at callup of 9,767.

Of this strength at callup, 4,699 were 6-month trainees, and 5,068 were prior service personnel. These people were in the unit when it reported or called to active duty.

Note that 52 percent were prior service personnel and 48 percent were 6-month trainees.

As a result of this experience mix, when the 32d Division was called, 2,459 6-month trainees were taken, and 1,561 prior service people were required.

But contrast this with the 49th Armored Division, in which they had a higher percentage of 6-month trainees in the division when it went to duty, and a lower percentage of prior service personnel.

There you see the reverse was true in terms of filling the unit.

It required, or they could use, 1,362 6-month trainees, but they required 3,634 prior service people.

Now, I suggest that this, I think, demonstrates my point with respect to relative skills.

I should also say that because one was an armored division and one was an infantry division; I think, generally speaking, the number of technical skills required in an armored division runs higher than an infantry division, and this offsets my point somewhat. But basically, the unit that had the greater number of 6-month trainees in the unit required more prior service people to give it the proper skill mix as opposed to the division that was carrying a higher percentage of prior service people in the first instance.

Secretary RUNGE. In terms of the statement itself, you will note in column 2 the strength of these units when called to duty and the composition of this strength between 6-month trainees and prior service personnel. In the case of the 32d Infantry Division, over half the original unit strength was prior service personnel. It was able to absorb 6-month trainees as well as over half its fillers, as you will note in column 3. The 49th Armored Division, however, had many more 6-month trainees than prior service personnel in its original unit strength. This division required more prior service personnel as fillers in order to meet the skill requirements.

Briefly, the higher the number of 6-month trainees in a unit's original strength, the higher will be its requirements for prior service personnel upon recall.

This does not mean, Mr. Chairman, that the 6-month trainee is not a capable soldier. He is, but he is only as capable as 6-month training will make him, plus the unit training following.

Many of our more highly trained personnel spend 9 months or more in basic training and in school to acquire their skills. Obviously this amount of training cannot be provided in a 6-month program out of which must come 2 weeks' leave and processing time.

I believe all the military personnel will agree with me that the 6month training program is accomplishing its purpose and has added to the Reserve program substantially.

I should like to explain for a moment the ready Reserve mobilization pool. This pool which exists in all the Reserve components is made up of personnel who have a remaining statutory obligation for service. Its purpose is the provision of fillers and replacements. It is made up in large part of personnel with 2 or more years service. In the case of the Army, on August 13, 1961, there were 725,480 personnel in the ready Reserve pool, of whom 61,957, or about 811⁄2 percent, were 6-month trainees. There were 38,827 individual fillers who reported to duty with the Army Reserve component units of whom 11,671 were 6-month trainees. As you can see, the Army called only 5 percent of its total mobilization pool, but called 19 percent of the 6-month personnel who were then in the pool.

Mr. HÉBERT. Thank you very much for the explanation, Mr. Secretary. And I will not infringe upon the committee members in this

I will come back to it later on, since I raised the question. However, other members may want to ask you something.

(The table referred to is as follows:)

Reserve component personnel recalled

tences.

Mr. HÉBERT. I would just like to call your attention to two senYou say, "This does not mean that the 6-months trainee is not a capable soldier. He is. But he is only as capable as 6 months'

training will make him."

Secretary RUNGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. HÉBERT. Now, I could read that to read this way, and it would be just as logical and just as accurate. I can say this does not mean that the 2 weeks' trainee is not a capable soldier.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Six months.

Mr. HÉBERT. No; 2 weeks. I am rereading it to show how logical his statement is. You can't challenge the statement. It is a fact. This does not mean that the 2 weeks'-I am substituting 2 weeks for 6

months-trainee is not as capable a soldier. He is. But he is only as capable as 2 weeks' training will make him. [Laughter.]

Now, that is the logic of the whole proposition, now.

Mr. Kowalski.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have several questions, if I can get the time here.

I think you will agree with me, Mr. Secretary, that it is certainly very important when you reorganize the Reserve components that this reorganization, this realinement, fit into the Active Army struc

ture.

Now, it is my understanding that the Active Army is to be reorganized, at least that is what I have been told, in accordance with the socalled ROAD concept.

I would like to have you explain to us what is the ROAD concept, how far are you advanced in your planning for the reorganization of the Active Army-well, go that far, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUNGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kowalski, the ROAD concept applies to the divisions, the combat divisions of the Army.

It changes from the so-called ROCID divisions, commonly known as the pentomic division, which is a five-battle group organization with supporting artillery and armor related to five battle groups—it changes from that structure to a three-brigade structure with supporting elements. Each brigade will have within it a mix of infantry, armor, or mechanized infantry, depending upon the mission of the unit and where it may be deployed.

The ROAD organization gives the commander of a division or a corps commander the opportunity to change the mix of combat elements within his brigades tailored to the mission. Then it has the supporting elements, administrative and logistical elements, that are similar to the division as we know it today.

The strength goes up-in a typical division the strength goes up somewhat, I think about 1,500 men.

I would say that the primary and principal advantage of the ROAD division is that it gives greater flexibility in terms of the mix, and it reduces the span of control for the division commander from five combat elements to three.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Now, when will the reorganization of the Active Army be completed in accordance with this concept?

Secretary RUNGE. Mr. Kowalski, let me start to answer this way. The two new divisions-the 15th and 16th divisions of the Army; namely, the 1st Armored Division and the 5th Division, mechanized, at Fort Carson, have been put on this basis. And I should say the distinction between infantry, mechanized, and armored is the mix within the brigades of infantry, armor or mechanized. By weighting them one way or the other, you change the general designation of the division.

Those are the two divisions that have been put on this basis.

I can't tell you when the Army, Active Army, will be complete, because the decisions have not been made to put the rest of the combat divisions on the new basis.

Mr. KOWALSKI. Yes, but you are reorganizing the Reserve component, the Reserve specifically, when you know you are going to reorganize the Army, the Active Army? What will this mean: In an