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for you to press for the immediate and explicit declaration of France in our favor, upon a suggestion that a re-union with Great Britain may be the consequence of delay."

This little extract from the secret journals of Congress is very important in showing that the high tone which our revolutionary fathers assumed at times in their public acts, was not supported by their secret feelings and conviction, and that they very fully realized the danger after all their struggles and sacrifices, they might fall short of securing independence. This will give comfort to many who despond now as reverses happen, and will strengthen the argument occasionally advanced, that Europe does not seriously intend that the breach in America shall be healed, but stays her intervention until such time when the parties shall have exhausted themselves, and the cause of the revolution shall have become desperate. In this view, whilst European nations will effect all that is desired, they can do it at the least cost and secure advantages to themselves, that in more prosperous fortunes would be impracticable. It is a dangerous game, however, for them to play, and now, as in the last century, they may find it necessary to abandon, if they have in fact attempted it."

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The Count de Vergennes, unlike Lord Russel and M. Thouvenel, assured the commissioners of "the protection of his court, and that due consideration should be given to what was offered." This is a point in progress which we have not yet had, however unimportant. It was a reception of the rebel commissioners, though informal, which England could not readily forgive, and the refusal soon after by France to deliver up Mr. Deane, on the demand of the British Ambassador, as a rebel subject, was not calculated to allay the prejudice.

It can always be certainly assumed in public affairs, that nations will follow their interests, and when these interests can be substantially promoted, mere sentimentality will give way. It is therefore as proper in 1862, to consider carefully and estimate nicely the weight and balance of interest as it was in 1776. It is as important for us to consider the relation of European States, with the view of ascertaining what their conduct will probably be, as it was for our ancestors, and perhaps in both cases some remissness was at first but natural. France had at the former period been very recently humbled by the loss of

*The exports of the Colonies previous to the Revolution did not exceed £3,000,000, and the value of the imports averaged about £2,750,000 per annum. In 1771 the imports were from

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The commerce of the Confederate States when fairly opened again will reach eight hundred to a thousand million of dollars in exports and imports, which is fifty fold the entire commerce of the Colonies.

her American Colonies, and Mr. Trescot eloquently tells us "her pride found it a bitter reflection that the French flag no longer floated in sovereignty over lands consecrated by the chivalrous courage of Montcalm and illustrated by heoric enterprise of La Salle." She was now employed in nursing her strength and in reconstructing her navy, and Turgot warned against any course which might be the means of "eternizing her weakness by making a premature use of her strength.” A most remarkable paper prepared by the Count de Vergennes, even before the declaration of Independence, was submitted by his master to the consideration of the celebrated Turgot, Comptroller General of France. The memoir and report upon it evidence the selfish spirit which in nearly all cases forms the basis and rule of national action. It was first argued in the report as to the probable results of the contest. Either the Colonies would be conciliated and their demands acquiesced in, or they would be conquered, which would embolden the British Government to make an attack upon constitutional liberities at home. If defeated, that Government might look for indemnities at the expenses of France and Spain, and in the event, conciliate the Colonies by offering them the commerce of the conquered provinces. The success of the Colonies, though regarded upon the whole inevitable, was deemed to be a remote result.

Thus the whole subject was laid bare, and the interests of the infant republic constituted but a feather in the scale with these grave diplomats and dignitaries, who were called upon to decide in a matter of seeming life and death to it. Those in our midst simple enough to make calculation founded upon any other standard than that invoked by the Turgots and Vergennes will receive instruction and profit by the extract Mr. Trescot enables us to give from the elaborate report of M. Turgot. He says:

It appears to me that the event most desirable for the interest of the two crowns will be that England should overcome the resistance of her Colonies and force them to submit to her yoke, because if the Colonies should be subjugated only by the ruin of all their resources, England would lose the advantages which she has hitherto drawn from them, whether in peace by the increase of her commerce, or in war by the use she has made of the forces. If on the contrary, the Colonies reconciling themselves with England, preserve their wealth and population, they will also preserve their courage and desire of independence, and will compel England to use one portion of her forces to prevent their arising anew.

The report advised against a war with England, first because of the existing exhaustion of France, and second because it might afford a pretext for concession to the Colonies in order to gain time and mature the means of offensive action. What was recommended was consistent with the sternly selfish argument which supported it -"prepare for war, and in the meantime give secret assistance to the Colonies, in procuring munitions and money, without abandoning a position of neutrality or furnishing direct assistance."

The American ministers received, therefore, an offer of supplies, but though pressed anxiously by the home Government, by every packet, could make no further advances for many months towards a treaty.

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The authority was even given them to offer the aid of their Government to France, for the conquest of the West Indies, and to Spain for the subjugation of Portugal; but both Governments proved to be immovable. This is the most melancholy and humiliating chapter in the history of the old republic. Says Mr. Trescot:

The negotiation, therefore, dragged slowly; the duties of the Commissioners were confined to pressing upon the attention of the French Ministry the necessity of prompt and public assistance, employing such opportunities as occurred for the supply of munitions, and using their personal influence wherever it reached in correcting false impressions of their country, government and cause. But they evinced as much wisdom in restraining as in acting, until the news of Burgoyne's surrender, which reached France in December, 1777, wrought an immediate and most important change in the conduct of the French court.-P. 39.

A new era happily dawned on the fortunes of the republic, with the success of its armies in the field. The commissioners raised their heads and used bolder language. They were no longer to be humiliated by delays. The intentions of France and Spain must be declared. They received an audience from M. Gerard, and were made the happiest of men by the decision to which the king had arrived.* They were told,

ever;

That after a long and full consideration of our affairs and propositions in council, it was decided, and his Majesty was determined, to acknowledge our independence, and make a treaty with us of amity and commerce. That in this treaty no advantage would be taken of our present situation to obtain terms from us which otherwise would not be convenient for us to agree to: his Majesty desiring that the treaty once made should be durable, and our amity subsist for which could not be expected if each nation did not find its interest in the continuance as well as in the commencement of it. It was, therefore, his intention that the terms of the treaty should be such as we might be willing to agree to if our State had been long since established and in the fullness of strength and power, and such as we shall approve of when that time shall come. That his Majesty was fixed in his determination not only to acknowledge, but to support our independence by every means in his power: that in doing this he might probably soon be engaged in a war, with all the expenses, risks and damages, usually attending it, yet he should not expect any compensation from us on that account, nor pretend that he acted wholly for our sakes; since, besides his real good will, it was manifestly the interest of France that the power of England should be diminished by our separation from it. He should, moreover, not so much as insists that, if he engaged in a war with England on our account, we should not make a separate peace. He would have us be at full liberty to make a peace for ourselves whenever good and advantageous terms were offered us. The only condition he should require and rely on would be this, that we, in no peace to be made with England, should give up our independence and return to the obedience of that Governmenti.-Pp. 41-2.

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On the sixth of February, 1778, nineteen months after the Declara

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*On the announcement of the French treaty, propositions for peace were once introduced into Parliament, which were powerfully opposed by Chatham. "To protract the war (said the peace party), with France as a party to it, would involve an immense expenditure, whilst it could only serve to aggravate the quarrel, to embitter the Americans, and to bring them under the influence of France.". -Hildreth's History U. S., vol. iii., p. 247.

†Diplomat. Corresp., vol. i., p. 356. Commissioners to Affairs, 18th Dec., 1777.

Committee of Foreign

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tion of Independence and nearly fifteen months after the arrival of the first commission in France, two treaties of commerce and alliance were signed; the former adopting very nearly the suggestions of Congress, but the latter differing widely from them. The United States were to be put upon the footing of the most favored nations, and all questions of contraband, prizes and the right of search would be broadly and liberally construed. The alliance was to be both military and political.* It recognized the independence of the Colonies, and provided for a combination of military movements-stipulated for the division of conquests, and that peace should only be made upon joint consultation. It guaranteed the possessions of the contracting parties, and provided for the admission of other powers whose interests should become involved. Canada, and other British Provinces at the North, if conquered, should be confederated with the United States, and France renounced forever the Bermudas, and such possessions as were British before or by virtue of the treaty of 1765. Conquests in the West Indies were reserved to France. Remarking upon this treaty, Mr. Trescot says:

In the whole course of the negotiation which preceded and accompanied the treaty of 1778, the American Government never asked, and the French Government never offered, any peculiar sympathy for republican institutions. As to the character of the new Government, all that was asked was, "Is it efficient to execute its plans, and stable to fulfil its promises?" The statesmen of the Revolution wanted no recognition of their republicanism; that was their affair. They asked only the acknowledgment of their independence; that they felt to be the joint interest of themselves and the nations among whom they claimed a place. The one party, therefore, indulged in no abuse of kings whose aid they needed, and the other felt no antipathy towards a commonwealth by whose commerce they hoped to profit.-P. 51.

The event of these long protracted negotiations, conducted by our fathers, rebukes the restless spirit so often evoked by our recent morti

*The value of the actual military aid given to the Revolution by the French was not great, though the moral aid was most important, and also that which came in money and supplies. When Rochambeau's army departed, however, Congress acknowledged that "they had been greatly indebted to it for the reduction of the enemy's force in this country," and expressed the liveliest acknowledgments to the king for his long services to the cause of independence. (Secret Journals of Congress, vol. iii., p. 268.) These hardy republicans of the revolutionary Congress never dreamed for a moment that they were called upon to war upon "kingcraft," and were as willing to hob-nob with a king as a commoner. Witness their address in 1782 to Louis XIV., on the birth of an heir to the throne:

"Our earnest prayer is that he may inherit with it (the throne) the virtues which have acquired to his Majesty so much glory, and to his dominions so much prosperity, and which will be the means of cementing the union so happily established between the two nations."-Secret Journals, vol. iii., p. 108.

†Sympathy with Americans, as victims of oppression or champions of liberty, had no share whatever (in the action of France). The cardinal principle was what French writers call egoism, pure and undiluted, seeking to fortify itself against the unwelcome preponderance of an arrogant neighbor, by cherishing the germs of discord in his bosom. Count de Vergennes sketches a policy of deception and duplicity, preparatory to a possible declaration of war, whilst M. Turgot clearly inclines to peace, with but a partial violation of the solemn engagement entered into with England.-Works of John Adams, vol. i., p. 307.

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fying failures. Neither the nineteen nor the fifteen months of probation are passed. Long before they shall be, in all probability, the circumstances which dictated action will dictate it again. Interest, commercial necessity, national rivalry, will move the springs and give impulse to the machinery. No other lever is required. Sympathy, fellowship, philantrophy are impotent. "Watch and wait and make no degrading concessions." Let these be the watchwords of the Confederacy.

The effects of the French treaty Mr. Trescot thus proceeds to show:

The practical aid of French arms was the least of French benefits. Acknowledged as equals by the proudest monarchy of the civilized world; supported by an experienced and adroit diplomacy in their further advances into the society of nations; strengthened in their hitherto doubtful contest by fleets and armies from whose flags the traditional glories of Louis XIV. had not yet quite faded; the United States felt themselves invigorated for victory. Nor was this all. The recognition of France involved a war with England; war between England and France was almost certain to extend into a general continental war; and then, as parties without whose preliminary consent France could not, according to treaty stipulations, make any peace, their opinions became at once matter of the gravest concern to all Europe. The question of their independence ceased to be one slow and gradual settlement among indifferent nations.-P. 59.

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War between France and England necessarily resulted from the treaty. In anticipation of it, the latter Government was willing to accede to every demand of the Colonies short of independence, but the overtures received no attention. The time had passed.

We proceed rapidly to consider the course pursued by Spain and Holland at this juncture. The Spaniards had joint interest with the French to humble English pride and restrict English power, and both nations acted very early in giving secret countenance and aid to the Revolution. Spain, however, was too much influenced by the question of her own Colonies to unite with France in open and public declarations. These Colonies might, in a like manner, elude her grasp. Though not averse to an English war, it must be upon other grounds. To use Mr. Trescot's language:

Spain, on the other hand, neither sympathized with the struggle nor rejoiced in any of its probable results. So far as a Colonial rebellion crippled England's force, she accepted it. So far as she might hope to aggrandize her own possessions by the distribution and re-arrangement of a general pacification, she preferred the complication; but except as a means of future diplomatic bargaining, by which she might obtain the Floridas, shut the navigation of the Mississippi, and thus control the Gulf of Mexico, she felt little interest, and made, it must fairly be added, small profession. She declared war for her own purposes, and was ready to use any chance advantage that might aid in achieving them.-P. 66.

Mr. Jay, therefore, found his negotiation at Madrid likely to prove interminable. His able arguments and documents were unheeded. His concessions were rejected. Spain would make no treaty, and the War of Independence was won without it. Fortunately, for a treaty must have given her the freedom of the Mississippi, which eventual American interests would have never tolerated. The Count d'Aranda expresses the Spanish feeling:

"France has but few possessions in America, but she was bound to consider that

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