In such a juncture, there are thousands disposed to hold the Administration responsible for looking abroad too confidently, and as a necessary result, of making inadequate preparation at home. This is not altogether just. At the opening of the war there was not an individual in ten thousand, North or South, who did not believe, from experiences of the past, from the great interests that were to be promoted, from well known European antagonisms, that recognition was almost a matter of course. The Yankee press and Yankee writers at home and abroad told us this. The tone of the foreign journals foreshadowed it. Commercial interests involved seemed to render it imperative. King Cotton, the entire South had been taught to believe for the last third of a century, ruled the world and would be obeyed. A few formalities only had to be gone through with and the work was done. We well remember that when the first commission was nominated to Europe, the opinion prevailed everywhere that it was of no importance who were selected. Diplomatic tact, skill or experience were of no moment. Any clever gentlemen would answer to affix their names to documents which would almost be found ready prepared and awaiting their signatures. Thus stood matters in the early part of last summer, and the public sentiment, which was then so strong, instead of giving way with the delays that ensued, grew stronger as reports were brought in of victories in Virginia, and reached its culminating point, on the happening of the Trent imbroglio.* Is it not unfair to censure the Government for yielding to and acting upon this sentiment? It was a reasonable and just one. Those who are in control of affairs, even when the ablest and the best, are but men like their fellows, are influenced by the same traditions, the same instincts, the same bias of education and experience. Their means of information may be greater, but in the instance before us, it happens that the information strengthened the conviction. It is not our purpose at present to enter into a vindication of this Government. That will do for the future. The point is not so much to know now how we have been brought into our unhappy position and who is responsible for it, but how we shall soonest be extricated! People and government are alike deeply interested in this. We want armies; we want navies; we want transportation, provisions, supplies, nerve, courage, patience, endurance, patriotism, and unalterable determination to perish or be free! With these the cause is safe, whatever its past *It is wonderful that our people should have been So much deceived in this affair. Our knowledge of Yankee character should have taught us to expect nothing except the unconditional and humiliating surrender, after all their boasting in and out of Congress, to John Bull, whenever he might see fit to make his demands at the mouth of the cannon. It was not so in the earlier days of the Republic. Imagine Mr. Madison, Mr. Webster or Mr. Calhoun called upon to prepare such a pusillanimous letter as that of Mr. Seward to Lord Lyons. Death would have been preferred by either. The Yankees with characteristic bravado threaten future revenge for this humiliation, but it remains to be seen if it can ever be inflicted. omissions or mishaps, and without them the handwriting is already on the wall.* The purpose of this article is to contrast the early diplomatic experience of our young republic with that of the old government when it occupied the same position, and there will, no doubt, be found much to comfort and assure us in the parallel. We have before us a little volume entitled "Diplomacy of the Revolution," from the pen of a very enlightened and able gentleman of South Carolina, Wm. Henry Trescot, who was at one time Secretary of Legation to London, and more recently assistant Secretary of State to Mr. Buchanan, and whose ready talents we are sorry not to find again in the diplomatic service of the country. This work, together with some volumes of State papers and the several histories of the times, will furnish the material of what may follow. The Congress of 1776 no sooner determined upon independence than it attention was turned to foreign alliances. The statesmen of that day were less influenced by the actual fact of the weakness of the Colonies in population and resources, than by broad and comprehensive views of a future, in which they seemed, as if by prescience, to behold a mighty nation rising into power and sweeping from the St. Lawrence to the Gulf. There was a difference of opinion among these statesmen, as we find a difference of opinion to exist among the statesmen of our own times, in regard to the policy to be pursued. Some of them, and Dr. Franklin led, thought that "a virgin State should preserve the virgin character, and not go about suitoring for alliances, but wait with decent dignity for the application of others."† Others argued and argued wisely that "to send ministers to every great court in Europe, especially the maritime courts, to propose an acknowledgment of the independence of America, and treaties of amity and commerce, is no more than becomes us, and is our duty. It is perfectly consistent with the genuine system of American policy, and a piece of respect due from new nations to old ones."+ It *Those who employ themselves in active warfare upon the Administraton, are misguided if in this they expect to promote the fortunes of the Confederacy. is not a time for wrangling and discussion. With the enemy striking at every assailable point, and his great armies penetrating the country, patriotism requires that individual feelings should give way, and that all unite in a generous and cordial support to the authorities. Their interests and ours are the same, and there can be no doubt of their earnest desires and efforts to do the best for the interests of the country. Grant that they sometimes err, we may inform them, correct them, but always in the spirit of brotherhood and devotion. Hostility and abuse must only weaken them and us. It cannot remove the men who are in power. If removed it is not clear that we have better. Nothing but the most harmonious councils and the most heroic devotion to the great cause among the lowest and the highest, can carry us through the perils and trials which are at hand, and save the liberties and honors of the people. Shall we not exhibit these? † Franklin's letter to Lee.-Trescot, page 16. Adams to Franklin.-Trescot, page 17. BOUND APR 1958 There were not a few who believed that European Colonies, setting up for independence, could find little or no encouragement from nations having Colonial establishments. To these Mr. Adams replied, confining himself to France. The exultation of Britain, by her recent naval triumphs and the acquisition of Canada, etc., must be revolting to the feelings of Frenchmen. The rank and consideration of France were at stake. The dominions of France in the West Indies and the East Indies were at the mercy of Great Britain, and must remain so whilst North America belongs to Great Britain. Interest cannot lie. The interest of France is so obvious, and her motives so cogent, that nothing but a judicial infatuation of her councils could restrain her from embracing America. Thus it will be seen that the statesmen of the revolution reasoned and argued much the same as it is reasoned now. Surely interests which were then thought sufficient, would be regarded tenfold more so now, and the apathy and inaction of those who are so much interested must be ranked among the problems of history. Mr. Adams, who led in the discussions of 1776, did not believe that it would be politic to enter into entangling European alliances, and thought that entire neutrality should be stipulated in all future compacts. It could never be our interest to see either France or England humiliated or destroyed, and a union with either would only place us in a position alike subordinate and mortifying. His views were condensed in a note made during the progress of the debate. 1. "No political connection (with France). Submit to none of her authority; receive no governors or officers from her. 2. "No military connection; receive no troops from her. 3. "Only a commercial connection-that is, make a treaty to receive her ships into our ports; let her engage to receive our ships into her ports; furnish us with arms, cannon, saltpetre, duck, steel, &c." This was assuming high grounds. It evidenced apprehension that the cause would in effect be lost in changing one form of dependence for another, and evidenced too a degree of assurance in carrying through the revolution without external aid, which bordered upon temerity. One cannot but admire the heroism of the suggestion, (though it proved in the event impracticable and gave place to other councils,) when the then condition of the country is considered and the power and resources of the enemy. A little more of the same "back bone," to use a vulgar expression, is necessary now, for of a certainty the circumstances which surround us are, in every respect, more favorable than those which surrounded the mother republic. As our ancestors were, however, in the sequel forced to give way, materially, in their expectations and demands, it is not improbable that the same exigencies may await our own future. We should, at all events, be well prepared for them. Whilst it is the duty of our people to meet the struggle like men, relying upon their own arms and the justice of their cause, even to defeat and death, the path of duty will be equally clear, should the hour of dire necessity come. If slavery must be their fate, there will be something at least in having the choice of masters. The mere suggestion will be sufficient to develop a meaning which is too painful to be amplified, and which, if we do our whole duty, will have no cause to be carried out.* With the project of a treaty upon this restricted basis in their pockets, three commissioners repaired to the Court of Versailles, and At the opening of the Revolution the population of the Colonies was, (Whites, 2,303,000 1775 Slaves 500,000 Total, 2,803,000 The population of the Confederate States, This includes Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri, which have given us much aid, and cannot, at least, be considered as a source of any strength to the enemy. They require greater force to be kept in check than they furnish to his armies. Without these States we have a total population of over nine millions. It is a problem, if we cannot better fight the numbers of the enemy, which are less than two to our one, than could our fathers fight the British! Proximity in the one case will not more than compensate for excess of strength in the other. We have too the advantages of a vast and thinly settled country, which our ancestors enjoyed, and a country which can be supported from its own resources, which the enemies cannot very long. The South exceeds the North in military aptitude and in the use of arms, as did the Colonists the mother country. The cause too of hearth and home is always stronger than that which nerves the invader. Our blacks being the productive force, represent a like force which must be kept at home by the enemy to till his soil. They must be counted as part of our available forces for defence. The population of the Confederate States in 1860 was as follows: Miss'ppi, 3,016,064 9,011,767 Kentucky, 930,223 332,530 Maryland, 599,846 87,188 687,034 Deducting Maryland, Missouri 354,699 436,696 791,395 and Kentucky, 1,058,352 661,586 331,081 992,667 Total United States, 1860, 31,429,891 Excess United States, Confederate States! 19,402,060, or once and a half the population of the Considering Missouri, Kentucky and Maryland as neutral, or affording strength to neither party, the population of the United States will be to that of the Confederate States in the proportion of a little over two to one. By the census of 1850, the white male population between the ages of fifteen and forty constituted twenty-two per cent. Upon this ratio, supposing (as is the fact concerning the increase since 1860) that we have now 6,000,000 whites, exclusive of the three border States, our effective male military force between the ages of fifteen and forty reaches 1,320,000. Most assuredly this number can and ought to be brought immediately into the field, under some well devised system of conscription, and it on the last day of the year 1776 were admitted to an audience by Count Vergennes, Minister of Foreign Affairs for France. The commissioners were Benjamin Franklin,* Silas Deane and Arthur Lee, and the Congress evinced its sagacity by selecting from among the ablest and most distinguished men which the continent had produced, whose reputation had reached Europe long in advance of them. The first commissioners were authorized to concede nothing more than that in case of war between Great Britain and France, the United States should not assist the former, with men, money, ships or other contrabrand articles, and they were instructed to stipulate that France should not invade or possess New Britain, Canada, the islands, etc., as these were reserved for future alliance with the Confederacy. If France should get possession of any British Colony, its trade to the United States should be as free as between France and the United States, etc., etc.† Instructions so stringent were, however, not seriously expected to be carried out, since it was obvious enough that they offered to France a very one-sided bargain. The boon of free trade, the only one conceded, was but a trifling offering from a nation which was but in the infancy of its resources, was covered with armies, was struggling for existence, and might at any moment be overwhelmed. Such trade, in the present condition of the Southern Confederacy, is a very different affair. Secret instructions were given to the commissioners to waive certain points, and they were told: "It is highly probable that France means not to let the United States sink in the present contest, but as the difficulty of obtaining true accounts of our condition may cause an opinion to be entertained that we are able to support the war in our own strength and resources longer in fact than we can do, it will be proper will be adequate for all the demands which can possibly be made upon us by the Yankee Government. It will still leave for purposes of agriculture the entire black rural population of nearly 4,000,000, and nearly half a million of white males over forty years of age. If arms cannot be found for the entire force, pikes will be a good substitute, and the valor of our men will, in the event, be abundantly supplied from the armories of the enemy. A million of men in such a cause, and with such a country to defend, must be invincible. Why are they not in the field to-day, and when will they be? *Mr. Adams never ceased to sneer at Dr. Franklin. He says (Works, vol. 1, 664): "I am not ignorant that most of his positions and hypotheses have been controverted. * • He had abilities for investigation, but after my acquaintance with him in Congress, &c., his excellence as a legislator, a politician or negotiator never appeared. "No sentiment more weak and superficial was ever avowed by the most absurd philosopher, than some of his, particularly one that he procured to be inserted in the first Constitution of Pennsylvania, and for which he had such a fondness as to insert it in his will." The †Our ancestors attempted an offensive war, but gained nothing by it. movement upon Canada was a failure. They had to come out of this Revolution without that desirable acquisition. A people deficient in the means of military preparation and supplies, and without a navy, cannot be powerful in offensive war, though irresistible at home. |