Spain, her most intimate ally, had many, and that she now stands exposed to terrible reverses. From the beginning France has acted against her true interests, in encouraging and supporting this independence."-Trescot, p. 71. The Colonial question will be found as active with Spain at the present day, and will probably determine her course in any negotiations with her. It is to her as cotton and tobacco are to the British and French. Her Colonies were endangered by the doctrines and the proximity of the old United States. Will they be less exposed under the new order of things? Assurances upon this point and concessions may be required more, perhaps, than it is the interest of the Confederacy to grant. On the question of slavery, the Spaniards are our natural allies, and this consideration may, in the event, over-ride every other. We should know how to use our advantages in pressing negotiations.* The proximity of the Dutch West Indies, and the immense capital and commerce of Holland, rendered treaty relations with her exceedingly to be desired. The Dutch were averse to war, and were under English influence. They preferred eventually which would give them the carrying trade, but this suited neither of the belligerents, and they were at once thrown between two fires. England, at the same time, by pressing her claims for efficient aid under the the treaties of 1674 and 1715, and by the imperious tone of her ambassador and cabinet, was alienating very rapidly her allies. The crisis was rapidly reached. As early as 1778 the plan of a treaty was agreed upon with America, between Wm. Lee and Van Berkel, the Pensionary of Amsterdam. This plan was discovered among the papers of Henry Laurens, taken prisoner in 1780 by the British, when on his way to Holland to complete the negotiation. John Adams was selected by Congress to supply the place of Mr. Laurens-but it was not until April, 1782, that he was officially recognized by the Prince of Orange, and not until the following October that a treaty was signed. Mr. Adams plumed himself not a little upon this treaty, and Mr. Trescot speaks of it as "a noble testimonial of the worth of his judgment and the boldness of his patriotism." The result was to the United States of the first importance. It was the first successful negotiation they had conducted since the recognition of their independence, and it weakened materially the position of the British Government; for the defection of the Netherlands was a loss of both moral and physical strength. It not only shut the continent against hope of support, but indicated even more strongly than the armed neutrality a change in the spirit of political combinations, and pointed conclusively to the necessity of a re-distribution of the balance of power so effectually disturbed by England's commercial greatness. It also brought *The Colonies remaining to Spain in America are Cuba and Porto Rico, which together have a population of nearly two million souls; 800,000 are slaves. This is the best estimate that we can make. The commerce of the islands in exports and imports will reach $80,000,000 per annum, and perhaps more. Cuba alone in 1851 showed Exports, $31,341,682 About one-fifth of this commerce is directly with Spain. pay rich tribute to the mother country. The other four-fifths to the United States not merely the moral support of another Government, but the substantial aid of a large and liberal loan. But there was one point of view in which the treaty with the Netherlands was of higher importance than the money with which it replenished a shallow treasury. The United States felt that in this treaty they negotiated of themselves as equals with equals. In the alliance with France they had indeed sacrificed neither pride nor interest, but they were obliged to feel the protecting character of its provisions. Disguise it in what language diplomacy might, the aid of France was bestowed, generously it is true, but to some degree charitably. Now, in the treaty with Holland, they knew that they contributed in no small degree to wider interests than their own. More confirmed in their power, more cognizant of the value of their connection, they felt not only that they negotiated on more equal terms, but that the result of their negotiation had a distinctive value in the eyes of the world. The progress of affairs justified their opinion.-Pp. 89-90-91. After considering the part which the great powers saw fit to act during the performance of the drama of American independence, we come now to the discussion of their conduct in the closing scenes, when the results of so many years of struggles and sacrifices, of daring heroism, and of unswerving devotion and patriotism, were to be realized to our forefathers and their children after them. More than half a century of liberty, security and peace resulted from that contest, and its mission will extend to generations yet to come, though with fire and sword we are called upon to vindicate it. The spirit of '76 lives in the generation which battles from the Potomac to the Rio Grande for the inalienable and imprescriptible rights of self-government, and for the overthrow of tyranny and oppression, whether in the new world or the old. Before the conclusion of the French treaty, the British government made attempts at conciliation by the repeal of the Stamp Act, by conceding the right of taxation, and by the appointment of a select commission to the Colonies. Soon after the signing of the treaty, Mr. Hartly, with the approbation of Lord North, sounded Dr. Franklin on the practicability of an arrangement which, whilst it tacitly admitted the independence of the Colonies, would secure for a certain number of years a truce as a basis of final settlement. One of the conditions proposed was, that America should be absolved from the obligations of any treaties she may have formed with other powers. This condition was in itself sufficient to close the discussion, since it proposed perfidy and involved insult. Franklin replied, "America has no desire of being free from her engagement to France." The affair was no sooner ended, than Spain, naturally affected by her close relation with France, offered mediation. It was, she said, a final offer, and was coupled with the declaration that if unsuccessful, "nothing would remain to his Catholic Majesty but to perform those duties which his alliance with the King of France imposed upon him." M. Gerard, the French Minister, urged upon Congress the importance of sending a representative to Madrid to conciliate and strengthen the Spanish mediation. He said that England, though inclined to reconciliation with France, rejected haughtily the very idea of a formal and explicit acknowledgment of Colonial independence, and he called attention to the stipulations of the French treaty, in which a tacit acknowledgment of independence was admitted as a possible contingency of peace. "France," says he, "foresaw the extreme difficulties which a formal and explicit acknowledgment might meet with. She knew by her own experience in similar contests in which she has been deeply concerned, respecting the republics of Holland, Genoa, and the Swiss Cantons, how tenacious monarchs are, and how repugnant to pronounce the humiliating formula. It was only obtained for Holland tacitly, after a war of thirty years, and explicitly, after a resistance of seventy. To this day Genoa and the Swiss Cantons have obtained no renunciation or acknowledgment, either tacit or formal, from their former sovereigns; but they enjoy their sovereignty and independence only under the guarantee of France. His court thought it important to provide that difficulties of this nature, which consist merely in words, should not delay or prevent America from enjoying the thing itself."-Trescot, pp. 98-9. War between Spain and England followed close upon the rejection of the mediation, but the ministry believing it practicable to adjust the difficulty by separate negotiations, proposed informally through Sir John Dalrymple in May, 1780, "a coalition between all the Colonial powers of Europe, guaranteeing their respective American possessions, making certain concessions to the Colonial legislatures, and providing for a mutual freedom of commerce between these joint owners of the new world." The proposal, though at first very captivating, in the end met with little or no favor. A second attempt at mediation was made in 1781, by the Empress Catharine of Russia and the Emperor of Austria. The former proposed her good offices to England and the latter to France. The court of London at once accepted and desired a Congress to be convened at Vienna. The answer of France was unsatisfactory and evasive. The mediators proposed: "That the reestablishment of peace in America should be negotiated between Great Britain and the American colonies without the intervention of the other belligerents, or even of the two imperial courts, unless their mediation should be formally asked; but that the treaty so negotiated should be signed conjointly with that of the other powers: that the mediators should be certainly informed of the progress of this negotiation, in order to regulate their negotiations with regard to the other belligerents, and both pacifications were to be solemnly guaranteed by the mediating courts and every other neutral power whose guarantee the belligerent parties should think proper to claim. During this negotiation a truce was to be established on the principle of the statu quo."-Trescot, p. 104. Mr. Adams, informed by Vergennes of this overture, elaborately pointed out its difficulties, but concluded that as a representative of the United States he would agree to the Congress, though his insructions prevented his consent to the armistice and statu quo. The Congress, however, proved entirely impracticable for the declaration of England that she was ready to make peace "as soon as the league between France and her revolted subjects should be dissolved; that in all points to be agitated in a future Congress, the dependence of her rebel subjects in America must be preestabilshed, and that this matter must be left entirely to the care of Great Britain." Thus the prospects of peace seemed to be as far removed as ever. Whilst these discussions were in progress, a commission was formed by Congress, with full power to settle a general pacification. It consisted of Dr. Franklin, John Jay, Henry Laurens, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. A more distinguished commission, perhaps in no country or period of history were ever called upon to treat of great questions. They were instructed "to accept the mediation, but to accede to no terms of peace which did not effectually secure the independence and sovereignty of the thirteen States, and in which the treaties with France shall not be left in full force and validity." They were instructed to make the most candid and confidential communications upon all subjects to the ministers of our generous ally, the King of France: to undertake nothing in the negotiations for peace or truce without their knowledge and concurrence: and ultimately to govern yourselves by their advice and opinion, endeavoring in your whole conduct to make them sensible how much we rely on his Majesty's influence for effectual support in everything that may be necessary to the present security or future prosperity of America.-Trescot, p. 110. The British ministry, convinced of the impracticability of securing peace through the proposed mediation, made independent advances to the French minister and the American commissioners, but soon discovered that the allies would not consent to negotiate separately. A change in the ministry caused by resignation and death, was favorable to peace, and Mr. Oswald, as their representative, proposed to Vergennes the renewal of negotiations, in which as a preliminary, his British Majesty would recognize the independence of the Colonies. A bill was carried through Parliament enabling the King to consent to this independence. On the 25th of July, 1782, Richard Oswald was empowered to conduct negotiations with the United States. Mr. Oswald's first instructions involved a very shallow and unworthy attempt to save British pride at the expense of principle, but were held by the American commissioners unsatisfactory, and not furnishing a basis of negotiations. These instructions empowered him to treat of, consult and conclude with any commissioners named by the said Colonies, or plantations, or any bodies, etc., etc., a treaty or truce, &c. Mr. Jay insisted that recognition should be preliminary to any discussion whatever, and Mr. Oswald having consulted his Government, was prepared on the 21st of September, 1782, "to treat of, consult and conclude with any commissioners or persons vested with equal powers by and on the part of the thirteen States of America (naming them), a peace or truce with the said United States." This of course satisfied the demands of the most captious and covered the entire ground. The representatives therefore after protracted discussion, involving many important questions of boundary, etc., were enabled on the 30th of November, 1782, to sign the preliminary articles of the treaty.* The following, taken from one of the London papers. appeared just after the peace. It finely ridicules the great preparation and small results of the war so far as England was concerned: "Gage nothing did and went to pot, Howe lost one town and got another, Guy (Carleton) nothing lost and nothing won, And bouncing Burgoyne caught a Tartar; We shall here quote at length, from Mr. Trescot, in regard to the course pursued by our commissioners in signing without the knowledge of the French Court: In consequence of the temper of the majority of the Commissioners, these negotiations were conducted without the participation and signed without the knowledge of the French court. That this was in direct violation of positive instructions is certain; and it is difficult, even admitting the truth of the suspicions which induced it, to see its advantage. For if the object of France was to combine with England against American interests, they would be surely as thoroughly informed of the progress of the negotiation through the English ministers, as they would in the opposite case by the Americans. It is true that, whether right or wrong, it was calculated to show the world, then watching the negotiations for peace with great interest, that the United States were independent in deed as well as word; that they comprehended thoroughly their own interests, and intended to maintain them; that their gratitude was far from subserviency; and that their place in politics had its own intrinsic value and its special influence. The fact, too, was perhaps significant of a deeper truth, that the alliance with France was at best but temporary, to be controlled, modified, even ruptured by higher and older national necessities. But, without attempting to justify this course, thus much may be said in its extenuation: that, in the first place, it did not change either the relations or obligations of the parties. France could have refused, if necessary, to recognize the terms, and the treaty of 1778 would then have prevented their consummation; while her real ignorance of their nature did relieve her of the necessity of supporting the Spanish claims against the United States, and thus saved her from a position in which she must have failed one and probably offended both. As to the mere violation of instructions, it is a necessity which often presents itself to all agents. Situated as they were, knowing that communication with their government was impossible, compelled to act promptly, and free from the tenor of their instructions to interpret a special limitation into a general advice, they were bound to attend to their country's interest even against their country's commands. In the general negotiation of which their treaty was only a part, as distinguished a diplomatist as Count D'Aranda followed their example. For he consented, in treating with England, to accept the Floridas in lieu of Gibraltar, without the authority of his court, and as he himself said at the risk of his head. And it should be remembered, in fairness to the Commissioners, that if Mr. Jay and Mr. Adams felt some distrust of the French court, they were not entirely to blame. Vergennes had, on more than one occasion, shown a strong disposition to reduce the American ministers in Europe to very subordinate influence. He had undertaken to effect American independence in his own way, and did not like to scatter explanations of his conduct to every minister of the United States who crossed his arrangements at other courts. They therefore very often misunder Thus all we got for millions spent, Is to be laughed at and repent." See Johnson's Traditions of the Revolution, p. 397. The expenses of the war to Great Britian were estimated at £120,000,000 sterling, $600,000,000. (McCulloch.) That of the Colonies reached $135,000,000 specie. The amount of Continental money issued, at a depreciation, to cover the above, was in 1776. $20,068,666 26,426,353 66,965,269 149,703,856 82,908,320 1778. 1779. 1780. 1781. |