Colonel LINDBERGH. That has been one of my concerns, sir, from the time that this war was first considered. I believe that negotiation becomes more and more difficult and the British position more and more desperate. That is one of the reasons I believe in a negotiated peace.

Mr. JOHNSON. You are not, then, in sympathy with England's efforts to defeat Hitler?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am in sympathy with the people on both sides, but I think that it would be disadvantageous for England herself, if a conclusive victory is sought.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think you are evading the question-not intentionally; but the question is very simple, whether or not you are in sympathy with England's defense against Hitler?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am in sympathy with the people and not with their aims.

Mr. JOHNSON. You do not think that it is to the best interests of the United States economically as well as in the matter of defense for England to win?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir. I think that a complete victory, as I say, would mean prostration in Europe, and would be one of the worst. things that could happen there and here.

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you think the fall and the destruction of the British Empire would menace the United States in her defense against attack?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not seriously.

Mr. JOHNSON. Not seriously?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. It would be just a small matter?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe this Nation is in itself impregnable, sir, if we maintain reasonable forces.

Mr. JOHNSON. If the representatives of the Army and Navy-and I understood you to say a little while ago you deferred to their judgment on matters with which they are familiar-if they thought it was dangerous to the United States for the British Navy to fall, would that change your opinion?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Most of the representatives of the Army and Navy that I know, sir, are not of that opinion.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think we have had some contacts with some of those representatives that are of that opinion, Colonel Lindbergh. Colonel LINDBERGH. I am sorry, sir; I disagree.

Mr. JOHNSON. You think the United States has no interest whatever in the outcome of the war?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I did not say that, sir. I believe we have an interest in the outcome of the war.

Mr. JOHNSON. On which side?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In a negotiated peace; we have the greatest interest.

Mr. JOHNSON. Peace is in the future. I am talking about a contest that is going on now. You do not think we will be affected by the result of the war one way or the other?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I think we are very much affected by the result of the war.

Mr. JOHNSON. Which side would it be to our interest to win?
Colonel LINDBERGH. Neither.

Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I think he has already answered the question very fairly.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state, Colonel, that if you think you have answered the question, you may say so, and let it go at that.

Mr. JOHNSON. I have finished, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eaton

Mr. EATON. Colonel Lindbergh, you have given us a very illuminating discussion of the possibility of an invasion of this country. Our main problem here is a bill which has been presented to us ostensibly for the aid of England. What are your views, if you care to express them, on the provisions of this bill? Are you in favor of it or opposed to it, or what?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir; I am opposed to this bill for two reasons. One, I think it is one more step away from democracy and the democratic system. And the other one is that I think it is one step closer to war, and I do not know how many more steps we can take and still be short of war.

Mr. EATON. Divorcing the question of our aid to England from the provisions of the bill, are you in favor of our continuing to aid England to any extent?

Colonel LINDBERGH. That is a very difficult question to answer, sir. I think that our aid, aside from the Neutrality Act originally, has brought us closer to war. I believe it has added to bloodshed abroad. I do not believe it will prove to have much effect on the outcome of the war. So that I was, and am still, opposed to our having left the provisions of the Neutrality Act. I am still inclined to believe that our encouragement of the waging of this war in Europe will not have very much effect on the outcome; that it will increase the hatred against us in Europe, in every country, bar none, when the war is over; and that it will have added to the bloodshed in Europe without much constructive result aside.

Mr. EATON. So that, logically, you would be willing now to drop all aid to England and let the devil take the hindmost?

Colonel LINDBERGH. This country having taken a stand that aid would be given to England, I do not believe we can justify simply dropping the position we have taken. I do believe that we should endeavor to bring peace to Europe and not encourage war in Europe. I believe that is possible for us to do, if we desire that.

Mr. EATON. Will you indicate the steps that we could take toward peace under present conditions in Europe?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am not prepared to indicate what steps we should take. I should say that the first step is to create among our people a desire for peace in Europe. And I believe that when people fully understand conditions in Europe and what this war is leading to, peace will be desired.

Mr. EATON. Colonel Lindbergh, of course, our people are nearly unanimous in their hatred of war, and that rests upon the soundest of reasons. The democratic system is impossible of continuance except on a basis of peace. It is the incarnation of the peace principlethe democratic system of life-in my judgment. But we have the announcement of Mr. Hitler and his echoes in Japan and Italy that they propose now to create a new world order not a European order, but a world order-and they propose to do that by force. And they

propose, when they have crushed the world by force, to place one race their race in control of the rest of us who will then be the producing slaves in the interests of our owners and superiors. Under those circumstances how can we possibly begin negotiations for a peace, unless Mr. Hitler has a change of mind, if he ever does have any change of mind?

How can we?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe, sir, that no matter what is desired in Europe and in Asia-and that I do not know-we are strong enough in this Ñation and in this hemisphere to maintain our own way of life regardless of what the attitude is on the other side. I do not believe we are strong enough to impose our way of life on Europe and on Asia. Therefore my belief is that the only success for our way of life and our system of government is to defend it here at home and not attempt to enter a war abroad, which is already in a position where I think it is of great doubt that we could have much effect upon it.

You

Mr. EATON. Now that we have settled the problem of a negotiated peace, I would like to ask you a little about our aviation. mentioned an aviation force of 10,000 planes.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Fighting planes.

Mr. EATON. How many?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Ten thousand fighting planes, in units.

Mr. EATON. Was it your understanding that the President wanted 50,000 fighting planes?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I am not sure, sir.

Mr. EATON. Was he sure?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Pardon me?

Mr. EATON. Was he sure?

Colonel LINDBERGH. I do not know.

Mr. EATON. You do not know?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No, sir.

Mr. EATON. Neither do I. Now, in your estimation, would the fall of Britain in this war or the victory of Germany affect the United States of America as to its security and its prosperity? Would it make any difference which one of them won, so far as we are concerned? Colonel LINDBERGH. Whatever happens in Europe or even in Asia is bound to make a difference to us, I have no question of that. What I do question is that we are able to have very much effect upon what does happen there. As far as our security is concerned, as I have said, sir, I do not believe any combination of powers can invade this hemisphere militarily, if we are adequately prepared.

Economically I would prefer to let someone else answer that question who has had more experience.

Mr. EATON. I was going to ask you that.

Colonel LINDBERGH. I personally have very little worry about the effect, economically; but I am not an economic expert.

Mr. EATON. But you have worry about it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Very little.

Mr. EATON. Very little?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Very little; yes, sir.

Mr. EATON. Would you give us the recipe for very little worry? Colonel LINDBERGH. I believe this hemisphere, sir, and this Nation,

are well able to care for themselves economically and militarily.

288128-41-25

F

Mr. EATON. Even in a devastated world?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Less advantageously in a devastated world, and that is why I am against this war continuing longer than is neces

sary.

Mr. EATON. I just have one more question, Colonel. You have made a study of the German aviation resources. Have you any definite information as to the aviation resources of Germany at this time? Colonel LINDBERGH. No definite information; no, sir.

Mr. EATON. When you were there, in numbers, what did they have in fighting planes, and so forth?

Colonel LINDBERGH. My estimate-and it was only an estimate; it could only be under those conditions-in 1938 was that the Germans had facilities for building at least 20,000 planes per year at that time. I should say that has increased several fold. But that is an opinion. Mr. EATON. Fighting planes?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Twenty thousand of all types at that time. Mr. EATON. And how long would it take us to overtake that productive capacity?

Colonel LINDBERGH. With that productive capacity projected forward, sir, as it probably has been, it would take us several years. Mr. EATON. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge Kee

Mr. KEE. Colonel Lindbergh, I understood you to say in your prepared statement and I think it was a very splendid one-that in your opinion a force of 10,000 airplanes maintained would be sufficient to guarantee the safety of this country against invasion; is that correct?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; that is correct. I would like to bring out there, sir, that that is plus reserves. That would mean approximately double the number of planes in existence, and, of course, that is exclusive of training planes.

Mr. KEE. The fact that you stated is that the force which should be maintained would include "plus reserves"?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEE. You also stated that industrial plants or facilities sufficient to maintain that force should be also sufficient?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Sufficiently flexible; yes, sir.

Mr. KEE. You have just stated that when you were in Germany, they had the ability to manufacture at least 20,000 planes a year. It would not be necessary for us to maintain an industrial plant capacity that Germany had in order for us to maintain a force of 10,000 planes?

Colonel LINDBERGH. No; that is right.

Mr. KEE. Do you not think, Colonel Lindbergh, that this country should have at least the facilities to produce as many planes as any other country?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not unless we intend to invade other countries, sir. The German production was preliminary to a major war, and as far as the defense of this country is concerned, I should say that 10,000 planes in service squadrons would be adequate to defend our security.

Mr. KEE. You differentiate, then, between the building of planes for invasion or aggression, and building them for defense, as I understand it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Yes, sir; and also taking into consideration our geographical position. I would like to point out there, if I might, sir, that 10,000 fighting planes in squadrons would be many times the number that we now have, of thoroughly modern aircraft.

Mr. KEE. Knowing as you do, and as you have just stated, that Germany at the time you were there had facilities for the construction of 20,000 planes a year, and that they have multiplied those facilities many times over, and having in mind the aggression for which those planes are being manufactured, with that menace existing in the world today, do you not think we should do something to meet it?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Not with the type that are being built there, sir. Those planes are being built for European attack. They are incapable of flying across to this country. They are not of a type that would be fit for an attempted invasion. I should say that 10,000 planes here would be very adequate to meet the present production of war planes in Europe.

Mr. KEE. Colonel, we understand, of course, the difficulty of flying 3,000 miles across the ocean. Please, for our information, tell us what part modern airplane carriers might possibly play in an invasion of this country.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Airplane carriers, sir?

Mr. KEE. Airplane carriers.

Colonel LINDBERGH. They could, at high expense to themselves, take part in raids on our cities, but on war-time standards it would be ineffective.

Mr. KEE. Just explain in what manner they would be ineffective. Colonel LINDBERGH. The total number of aircraft that can be carried by the airplane carriers in existence today would not be enough to affect our military position in this country, even though they were used in raiding this country; and the losses to those carriers and to those planes would be high. I would like to state, in support of my argument that the number of planes being used against England today is many times the number that could be carried on all the aircraft carriers in the world, and they are based within an hour's flight, in many instances, of the British shores.

Mr. KEE. You mean that in 1 hour's flight, Germany is sending across to Great Britian today more airplanes than could be carried by all the airplane carriers in the world?

Colonel LINDBERGH. Germany is sending more planes against Britain

Mr. KEE. In what length of time?

Colonel LINDBERGH. In raids, than could be maintained by all the aircraft carriers in the world; not in one raid.

Mr. KEE. Not in one raid.

Colonel LINDBERGH. Over a period of days.

Mr. KEE. Certainly. Now, I understand, Colonel-you should know; you have flown over the route-that from a point on the coast of Africa to a point on the coast of Brazil, it is only about 1,800 miles. Colonel LINDBERGH. That is right; and about 1,600 miles from the Cape Verde Islands; yes, sir.

Mr. KEE. You spoke about recommending to some Government officials or agency the advisability of acquiring airplane bases for the United States in South America; for what purpose did you recommend

that?