Mr. STIMSON. In spite of those facts, although a good many of the things you recited were not facts but alleged opinions expressed by alleged experts.

Mr. JONKMAN. I thought I disqualified myself, Mr. Secretary. Does the authority to transfer or lease articles authorized in this bill carry the implied authority to deliver in our own ships?

Mr. STIMSON. I had not considered it so.

Mr. JONKMAN. Do you know why, for instance, subsection 5 of section 3 on page 3 about extending all these powers gives separate and independent power in the words "to release for export any defense article to any such government" if it is not impliedly authority to deliver in our own bottoms?

Mr. STIMSON. I am informed that that was put in to meet a single and rather exceptional article.

Mr. JONKMAN. In other words, would it not be modifying or qualifying it if it read "to release to export any of the defense articles of war mentioned"-would not that preclude shipping in our own bottoms?

Mr. STIMSON. I do not see that it would. I do not see that your phrase changes it. But maybe I am not as good an interpreter as you. Mr. JONKMAN. Could you give us a definite answer to my question? Mr. STIMSON. I do not see that it does.

Mr. JONKMAN. You do not think it does?

Mr. STIMSON. No.

Mr. JONKMAN. Mr. Secretary, has there been any contemplation of the line of demarcation between the present contractual relations for armaments for England and the lend-lease plan? When will that change from cash and carry to lend and lease take place, in view of the fact that $1,300,000,000 has already been ordered by England from this country for 1941?

Mr. STIMSON. I am unaware of anything in here that changes the present situation so far as that is concerned.

Mr. JONKMAN. In your opinion, those contractual obligations will have to be carried out first?

Mr. STIMSON. I think so.

Mr. JONKMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Bolton.

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Secretary, I have some very simple questions. We learn from the testimony that we have had that the Secretaries did not sit in on the original drafting of the bill. Am I right in that? Mr. STIMSON. I did not.

Mrs. BOLTON. Is that a customary thing that a defense measure should be written without the consultation of the Secretaries?

Mr. STIMSON. Very many defense measures have been framed up here on the hill.

Mrs. BOLTON. By the Military Affairs Committee?

Mr. STIMSON. Without any Secretaries sitting in.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you.

Then, would you tell us whether the provisions of this bill are satisfactory to England?

Mr. STIMSON. I have not the slightest idea. I do not think they have been submitted to any representative of England that I know of.

Mrs. BOLTON. It involves the abandoning of a number of rather essential things on the part of the English if we are to have the decision of the kind of armaments we will build as has been suggested.

Mr. STIMSON. As to the general purposes of the plan, you remember the President made the speech in which he outlined the plan which this bill is intended to carry out. And while I, myself, have not participated in any such discussion, I would not dare to say that something of that sort might not have been discussed by others.

Mrs. BOLTON. With England?

Mr. STIMSON. I do not think with the English Government directly. Mrs. BOLTON. It would seem almost inconceivable that we should set up machinery which would involve England in changing such things as gauges and guns and so on in her equipment, because we wanted to unify or make uniform what was building in this country without her acquiescence.

Mr. STIMSON. This certainly took place, that I can say: The Purchasing Commission and the gentlemen who have come over here to carry on these purchases have represented, as I have heard, to our financial representatives that there would be very great difficulty in carrying out a full defense without some help from the United States. The help was described by one of the previous gentlemen to this committee as a relief in the question of American exchange.

Mrs. BOLTON. England has then not perhaps considered the full implications of her accepting our judgment in the matter of the sizes of guns and similar pieces, has she?

Mr. STIMSON. She what?

Mrs. BOLTON. She would have to accept then what we provide?

Mr. STIMSON. Under this system she would. But there has been, of course, as you undoubtedly know from the press, there has been a great deal of discussion as to the standardization of the equipment. At one time there was great danger that our industrial manufacturers of weapons might be clogged up with the manufacture of weapons which would differ from each other. Conferences have taken place with a view to trying to straighten out and expedite that situation.

Mrs. BOLTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Mrs. Bolton?

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Secretary, your experience in Government service has covered three different administrations, as I recall. You were the Secretary of War under the administration of President Taft, I believe. were you not?

Mr. STIMSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. And you were the Secretary of State in the administration of President Herbert Hoover?

Mr. STIMSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. And you are now serving as Secretary of War in the present administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt?

Mr. STIMSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. Your experience in these various positions has enabled you to acquire a knowledge of both international law and also of the military defenses of our country covering that period of time. And based upon that experience and the responsibility now resting upon you as the minister or Secretary of War, in your judgment, Mr. Secre

tary, is it necessary for the safety of the United States of America to enact this legislation?

Mr. STIMSON. I think it is. I think at least it is most expedient to do so.

Mr. JOHNSON. I was going to ask with reference to the necessity of speed in the enactment of legislation. What is your answer to that? Mr. STIMSON. I think this would very greatly expedite the manufacture of munitions in the various ways which I pointed out in my initial statement yesterday, and possibly in many others it would simplify the entire transaction. It would eliminate a great many of the delays which I have personally seen occur under the present system, and I think it would very greatly help the expedition of our own defense.

Mr. JOHNSON. What about the necessity for speed, if we are to have this legislation, as to its enactment being speedily undertaken? Should the legislation be passed promptly or would a delay be dangerous?

Mr. STIMSON. Mr. Johnson, I cannot state too emphatically the apprehension that I feel as to the possibility of a crisis, which I think even my friends on the right would recognize as a crisis, within the next 60 or, at most, 90 days.

Mr. JOHNSON. Concerning the powers vested in the President of the United States, criticism of which has been made by some of the opponents of the bill, I will ask you if it has not been the traditional history of our country that in concentrating powers of defense to vest those powers in the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and to say now whether this is an unusual method of concentrating powers in one officer?

Mr. STIMSON. It is familiar history, I think, to everyone familiar with the history of the United States, that whenever the United States has actually gotten into war, the President has exercised very greatly increased powers, and the only difference here is that we ourselves have not gotten into war. But we are so threatened with imminent danger that it seems to me in the highest degree wise that we should take all the steps possible in the shape of that same kind of emergency concentration of powers that it is possible to do. It is a much more difficult and slow process today to prepare for war than it was when the weapons of war consisted of muskets and a few smooth-bore cannon. It is an infinitely difficult task now compared with what it was in the days of our grandfathers. And unless we now take all of the steps both as to strengthening and expediting the methods of government and strengthening the methods of manufacture, we will be in a very much worse situation than we could have been in any preceding emergency through which we have ever passed. The times are different, and the only thing that surprises me is that so many of my dear friends and so many of my party associates cannot seem to see it in that light. Mr. JOHNSON. In your judgment, the times are too critical now to play politics with the question of defense of this country? Mr. STIMSON. I am sure I am not trying to play politics.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am sure of that, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Richards.

Mr. RICHARDS. Mr. Secretary, I just want to ask one or two clarifying questions for my own benefit.

I want to get clearly your position in my mind and in the minds of the members of the committee if I can. Now, it has been suggested by my friend, Mr. Mundt, I think, that it would be better that if this legislation is to give extraordinary powers to anyone or any group, that a board should be appointed. I want to ask you if a board were vested with these powers that we are seeking to vest in the President himself, or that the bill proposes to vest in him, would not the constitutional rights and privileges of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy naturally clash with the powers which the board would have through this act?

Mr. STIMSON. They surely would, and I have thought of that proposition long before this bill was thought of or drawn, because I think that same question arises with respect to the clause or restriction which the Congress put upon certain actions in respect to our weapons and munitions in their legislation last summer, where they required a certificate of the Chief of Staff or a certificate of the Chief of Operations of the Navy before the President could do certain things. Now, frankly, I think that is a perfectly bald and simple violation of the constitutional power of the President of the United States. I know from my own observation and knowledge that it is a perfectly bald reversal of the relations which the Congress 30 years ago, or more than 30 years ago, when they created the post of Chief of Staff, intended to have that gentleman occupy. I am familiar with that, because I was very much interested in military legislation at that time. I dislike to refer to personal things, but the reason why I was especially interested in it was that my former law partner was Mr. Elihu Root, who was the Secretary of War, and under whose administration the office of Chief of Staff was created. And I was familiar at that time with the purpose of the War Department and of the Congress when they created that. Historically, there had been a long series of delays arising out of differences of opinion under the old system that had grown up during the long period of peace since the Civil War. In this period we had no Chief of Staff, but we had an independent commander of the Army, a military officer, the President and the Secretary of War. The condition has resulted in such friction between the commander of the Army on the one side, and the President and the Secretary of War on the other, that a condition had arisen which was deemed to be intolerable so far as the efficiency of the organization of the Army was concerned. And it was under those circumstances that the position of Chief of Staff was created with the idea that the Chief of Staff should be what was literally true, a staff officer, and the personal staff officer of the President, always subject to the President's power of removal, as he is today, always subject to the President's own personal power of appointment, to act as the President's trusted military adviser. When Congress undertook last summer to make this trusted staff officer a superior to the President in that he had the power of veto over the President's action, at one stroke it overthrew or began the overthrow of that long-lived and most important reform, and created a situation which might well become impossible so long as an existing Chief of Staff sought to impose that veto power on the President. In addition to that, it was an ineffective condition, because a President who really wanted

to do wrong had only to remove the Chief of Staff and put in a "yes" man.

Mr. RICHARDS. Then, Mr. Secretary, it is your opinion that the vesting of any discretionary power in defense legislation for the successful operation or carrying out of that power, it is necessary to be vested in the President of the United States, no matter who he may be?

Mr. STIMSON. I believe so, completely. And I think that any interference with him is an unconstitutional action. I think that the way to insure careful action is to give the President good advisers and that is what he gets under the present system of the Chief of Staff. But to put such a check on the President or to create a distribution of power, or to take away the power from him, there you overstep the line both constitutionally and as to good, safe administration in the case of

war.

Mr. RICHARDS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I have just this one more question.

I believe you have been the Secretary of War this time for about 8 months?

Mr. STIMSON. No; only 6 months, since last July.

Mr. RICHARDS. Now, from your experience with the President of the United States, the present President of the United States, and your knowledge of his thoughts along the lines of national defense, do you believe that he would take the responsibility of conveying to any foreign power any instrument of war under your supervision as Secretary of War without consulting you and your Chief of Staff?

Mr. STIMSON. I am certain he never has so far, and I have not any idea that he would.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shanley?

Mr. SHANLEY. I pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pfeifer?

Mr. Jarman?

Mr. JARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have just one question.

Mr. Secretary, this matter was referred to several times yesterday, and you attempted to comment on it and you were not given an opportunity to complete your comments. Therefore, I would like to know whether any representative of the War Department ever made the statement that we would have an Army of 1,400,000 by this January. Mr. STIMSON. This January? I never heard it. And I am certain that no responsible officer made that statement. At least, I have never heard so. That is the safest thing for me to say.

Mr. JARMAN. Thank you.

Mr. STIMSON. And it is so out of line with what they have stated to me and what I have heard stated that I do not believe it was stated. Mr. JARMAN. I know what you were trying to say yesterday and I just was trying to get that in the record. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Arnold?

Mr. ARNOLD. Mr. Secretary, I take it that you consider this bill necessary in order to keep out of war; to keep war out of America, and you feel that this aid is necessary to prevent Great Britain from falling. I would further like to ask you if it is not your opinion that sooner or later if Great Britain should fall, we will not only be in this war, without materials, but alone and with our manpower?

Mr. STIMSON. That is my view.