The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has ruled on that question.

Mr. MUNDT. The Chair has ruled that question out of order?.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; that question is out of order.

Mr. MUNDT. I was just trying to interpret his phrase this morning about "fifth column"

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). The Chair must insist upon the regular order, on demand of the committee, and the gentleman will kindly proceed in regular order.

Mr. MUNDT. All right. Mr. Secretary, Congress as you know, of course, is prohibited by the Constitution from making any appropriations for national defense which will cover a period of longer than 2 years.

Secretary STIMSON. I am well aware of it.

Mr. MUNDT. Consequently you would have no objection to a limitation of that kind.

Secretary STIMSON. I would have no objection.

Mr. MUNDT. I want to ask you one or two general questions about your interpretation of the Pact of Paris, because I have spent considerable time-not nearly as much as you, I know-in considering that pact; and I want to ask you, first of all, if it is correct that the interpretation which you quoted yesterday in response to interrogatories of the gentleman from New Jersey, that that does not have the weight of international law. The Secretary stated that it was their opinion, but I want to make the record clear on that point.

Mr. STIMSON. It was an interpretation adopted at a meeting of the international association and does not purport to be the act of another legislative body. But I ask you, Mr. Mundt, to remember that international law has grown up out of just such resolutions and just such expressions of opinions of expert jurists as that was. And it was a very important statement.

Mr. MUNDT. I am not denying it is important. I simply wanted to have it clearly in the record as to the Secretary's evaluation of whether or not he felt that it carried the dignity of international law, because as he knows and as we know, the delegates were not authorized delegates of any nation.

Mr. STIMSON. They were not public officers of any nation, but they were authorized members of that body coming from different countries. Mr. MUNDT. At that conference Mr. Fred H. Aldrich, of Detroit, Mich., was one of those representing the United States. That is on page 42; you have the volume there which I have. It is the fourth edition reporting the 1934 Conference of Budapest. At page 42, Mr. Aldrich's statement is there, in which he says

Mr. JOHNSON. I object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection sustained.

Now, let us go

Mr. MUNDT. The Secretary quoted from that. The CHAIRMAN. Objection sustained, Mr. Mundt. ahead and let us proceed. You can ask any question, but this idea of reading from books, and so forth, is out of order. You can ask him any question you want to pertaining to it, but do not let us go out of order.

Mr. MUNDT. It is a section 12 words long.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Ask your question, if you want to.
Mr. RICHARDS. I would like to move that we recess until 2:30 p. m.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, what is your pleasure?

Mr. STIMSON. My pleasure is to, if possible, get back to my desk as soon as possible. I had hoped I would be able to. I did not think it was possible we would take 3 hours when I came back here this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. We are in sympathy with that, Mr. Secretary, but certain charges have been made and certain things have been said. We have tried to allow the members, the ladies and gentlemen on this side, to have all of the time that possibly can be given to them, and if the members of the committee will proceed in order and not try to read statements, we will proceed.

Mr. STIMSON. Frankly, I would rather sit through, if you can.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think it is asking a little too much of you, Mr. Secretary. You have been here now since 10 o'clock and you see we have not even finished all of the Republican side and the Democratic side has not asked a single question. But if a lot of statements and various reports are read, we will never get through. So the Chair rules the question out of order.

How much more time do you think you will be, Mr. Mundt?

Mr. MUNDT. So far as I am concerned, I have concluded for the present.

The CHAIRMAN We will recess until 2:30 p. m.

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. I wish to announce that the committee has scheduled to hear Secretary of the Navy Knox at 3:30 p. m., so will the members try to proceed with their questions so that we can hear the Secretary of the Navy at that time?

Mr. Jonkman?

Mr. JONKMAN. Mr. Secretary, in your opening statement on page 3, in the last half of the last paragraph, you state as follows:

The munitions of defense can and will be distributed in accordance with strategic conditions which obtain at the time of the distribution. Those who are interested primarily in the defense of this country and this hemisphere will be the ones who will make the plans for distribution-namely, members of the American Government. Naturally, our conduct at such times will be governed by the interests of the defense of this country. Far from being a surrender of our rights to other interests, however worthy, the provisions of this bill make it possible to place in American hands this important power and responsibility. I think you said before the recess to Mr. Mundt that this power and this responsibility of the management of the strategy of disposing of articles of defense in this bill will lodge in the President of the United States; is that correct?

Mr. STIMSON. That ultimate power, I think, will lodge in him. Somewhere this bill speaks of the President-I am reading now from the paragraph of the bill marked section 3, "The President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government," and so on, to do so-and-so. That is the provision I had in mind when I used the words you just read from my statement. The President has the ultimate final authority and ultimate decision. Mr. JONKMAN. That is, to determine that strategy?

Mr. STIMSON. To determine, I would say, the general strategy. But evidently the bill contemplates what is necessarily the fact, that is, that he has to leave the details, after having laid down the broad principles, to the heads of the two respective departments who are concerned with defense.

Mr. JONKMAN. That is readily understood, but he will exercise the ultimate power of that strategy

Mr. STIMSON. Undoubtedly.

Mr. JONKMAN. Now, will you say, Mr. Secretary, that the sale, loan, or transfer of these articles of defense means that the sale, loan, or transfer of these articles of defense contemplated by this bill are necessary to prevent the defeat of Great Britain? In short, is this bill necessary to prevent the defeat of Great Britain?

Mr. STIMSON. In my opinion, I think that it probably is.

Mr. JONKMAN. Then, would it not follow that the President of the United States would have the power and responsibility to determine officially and decide on the strategy of defeating the Axis Powers! Mr. STIMSON. I think that follows to some extent.

Mr. JONKMAN. In other words, he would be the chief strategist and commander-in-chief of the allied armies?

Mr. STIMSON. No, no, no. That is going further so far as our defense of this country is concerned. He is seeking to preserve the British Government from such a defeat as would deprive it and us of the part which the British Fleet is now playing in the North Atlantic. Now, he is not trying at all, and it does not follow from this at all, that he is trying to carry on the strategy of the defense of Great Britain.

Mr. JONKMAN. Does not that necessarily follow from the premise? Mr. STIMSON. No; it does not at all. It does follow that he is trying to prevent such a defeat, such a disastrous defeat as would result in the change of the control of the Atlantic Ocean, but it does not mean that he is trying to shape the form which the strategy of the war would otherwise follow. And I do not intend from my first answer, as to what you said in your first question, to indicate that at all, and it must have been evident from what I had said before that that was so.

Mr. JONKMAN. Mr. Secretary, if the President has the power and responsibility to determine the strategy of distributing these munitions of war, after all does he not then control the final authority and decisive strategy of the war for the defense of Great Britain? Mr. STIMSON. I think not.

Mr. JONKMAN. You say you think not?
Mr. STIMSON. I think not.

Mr. JONKMAN. Would you be sure?

Mr. STIMSON. I give you my best answer.

Mr. JONKMAN. If the President occupied that position, would not

the American people have inherited the war?

Mr. STIMSON. If he did what to the war? Inherited?

Mr. JONKMAN. If the President occupied that position.

Mr. STIMSON. They would have inherited the conduct of the war

so far as it affected the defense of this country.

Mr. JONKMAN. In other words, you understand what I mean-does not this bill inevitably lead us into war?

Mr. STIMSON. I do not think that it does.

Mr. JONKMAN. There was some controversy a year ago or so about the difference between weapons of offense and weapons of defense. I presume that condition has been obviated and all weapons would be considered the weapons of defense in this instance?

Mr. STIMSON. Well, I have heard that question which you mention for the last dozen years.

Mr. JONKMAN. It is largely academic?

Mr. STIMSON. I think it is very largely academic, but I will not say wholly so. I think that possibly a great step in making it academic was when the French entrusted themselves to the kind of weapons of defense which were situated in the Maginot Line.

Mr. JONKMAN. In other words, I think we would agree that under these circumstances all weapons that might have been considered weapons of offense would be considered weapons of defense?

Mr. STIMSON. I want to understand what your ultimate question is. If you are asking me whether I do not believe that the best defense usually is what military men speak of as an offensive defense, I think I would agree.

Mr. JONKMAN. This act gives a definition of a defense article. It says any weapon, munitions, aircraft, vessel, or boat. Can you say where there are any implements of war either on sea or on land that are not comprehended in that definition?

Mr. STIMSON. I was going to say it was an oversight if there are. Mr. JONKMAN. Then, is it not true that when section 2 of article III provides that the President may, if he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose to any such government any defense article, is it not true that he could so dispose of everything that is being produced under the appropriations made by the Congress during the year 1940, to the amount of 17 billion dollars without another nod from Congress or another dollar of authorization or appropriation?

Mr. STIMSON. I think that the same reply that I made before to similar questions applies here. I think that conceivably that interpretation could be made on it and I have given you already the answer which has to be made. That is, that no President would ever exercise the power in that way.

Mr. JONKMAN. Of course, that is without question.

Mr. STIMSON. Your answer is as you gave. I will leave it to you. Mr. JONKMAN. Then your answer is that would probably be true? Mr. STIMSON. No, no.

Mr. JONKMAN. It is the plain language of the statute?

Mr. STIMSON. Only if he thought it was in the interest of our defense.

Mr. JONKMAN. Absolutely. Of course, you understand, Mr. Secretary, we are trying to find out from those who either drew the bill or were consulted in the drawing of the bill what they intended by it, and that is why I am asking you these questions. In other words, those who have drawn the bill would be better able to interpret it than others by reading it.

Mr. STIMSON. Please do not make it appear-I do not think it would be a fair thing if you do so by virtue of the construction you have just

mentioned that it was the intention of those who drew the bill that the President could transfer everything that the United States had. Mr. JONKMAN. Very true. But is it not just as reasonable to assume that he would be assured of that power to that extent if he needed it? Mr. STIMSON. If he thought that that would defend the United States, if he could possibly say so, he might do so. And I want to say-and I say it with the utmost emphasis-that the government or law which is so constructed that you cannot trust anybody will not survive the test of war.

Mr. JONKMAN. Under that construction, is it not also true that he could sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of all of our munitions factories?

Mr. STIMSON. He could dispose of "facilities," whatever that includes.

Mr. JONKMAN. And is it not true that he could turn over our entire Navy?

Mr. STIMSON. I have answered that question a dozen times.
Mr. JONKMAN. I would like to have the answer here.

Mr. JOHNSON. I object to that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The objection is sustained.

Mr. FISH. If a Member of the committee did not hear an answer, I think it is only fair that he be permitted to ask it so that he may hear the answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly he has, Mr. Fish, and he has answered that several times already.

Mr. JONKMAN. I am willing to read the answer later in the record. Could he turn over the Panama Canal?

Mr. STIMSON. Would it bother you if I take the time to see whether that rather enormous proposition is comprised in this bill? I do not think that could, by any imagination, be put into the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Eaton wanted to know if he could turn over the Washington Monument.

Mr. JONKMAN. That, Mr. Chairman, I object to.

The CHAIRMAN. That is Dr. Eaton's question, please. That was not my question or my idea.

Mr. JONKMAN. Mr. Secretary, do you consider the so-called emergency or crisis at this time to be more acute than it was in September or October of 1940? What I mean by this is, at that time it was considered by military experts that Hitler had better than an even chance to cross the Channel. And it was also said if he did not do it before the winter stormy weather came, he would not have very much of a chance again. And as a further consideration, in those months Italy was considered a powerful ally of Germany. That is another point which has been largely exploded since that time. What is your answer to that?

Mr. STIMSON. Have you finished your question?

Mr. JONKMAN. Yes.

Mr. STIMSON. Your question was whether that is my opinion? Mr. JONKMAN. Whether you considered the emergency or crisis as acute now as it was then.

Mr. STIMSON. I consider it much more imminent.

Mr. JONKMAN. In spite of those facts?