I then asked Mr. Morgenthau how much expense would be involved in this bill and he said he did not have the answer at the present time, but undoubtedly you would give that information, the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of the Navy.

What I am interested in is this: We are asked to vote upon a bill without in any way knowing the amount that may be expended under the bill, and so far as possible, I would like to know what it will be, how much is involved.

Secretary STIMSON. Of course, Mr. Chiperfield, you realize that this bill is merely, under congressional procedure, the authority. Mr. CHIPERFIELD. That is right.

Secretary STIMSON. And we do not have the power to spend a

penny.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. That is correct.

Secretary STIMSON. Until you give us an appropriation for it. Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I understand that perfectly, and that you will, that is, the War Department, will come before the Appropriations Committee and ask for the amount that is needed.

Secretary STIMSON. Yes.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. But I would like to know before I vote on this bill-I would like to be given some idea of what is going to be required. I know conditions may change in the future as needs arise. We cannot know definitely, but surely you people have some idea of what amount is going to be needed. We were told that England could pay for the present program. How much is going to be involved the coming year? You must have some idea on that.

Secretary STIMSON. Did not the Secretary of the Treasury give the figures for Great Britain's aid?

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Yes. They will have sufficient to pay for the present orders, during the coming year.

Now what increase they will have to have; how much it will cost; that is what I would like to get some idea on.

Secretary STIMSON. I see the reasonableness of some inquiry of that kind. I cannot give you the answer this morning. The provisions in the bill, it must be remembered, are that in some instances the articles in question will be returned to the United States. And in other cases, if they do not come back, they will be paid for.

Now, remember this precaution: That it is contemplated that under this bill nothing should be built for the British except equipment which is of a type and quality and quantity useful to the United States. I do not know that that is taken from the bill, but that was the contemplation in the President's plan which this bill is to carry out, and that certainly would be the attitude of the War Department which I happen to be the head of.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Mr. Secretary, here is what I would like to know: If I am correct in my understanding we are going to have a certain executive that will arrange for manufacture, not only of the things that are necessary for our defense, but also for England. And in the first instance we are going to have to say that the President, in his discretion, will arrange for the transfer, as he sees fit.

Now the plan must indicate some place how much is going to be manufactured for the United States, say, for the coming year. And I would like to have some idea as to what the arrangement is going to

cost the taxpayers, and I would like as far as possible to get that information.

Secretary STIMSON. I cannot give it to you.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Thank you very much; that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Secretary, your experience in problems of both defense and diplomacy are unique in this country

Secretary STIMSON. Please begin with questions and not

Mr. VORYS (interposing). We at Yale have always regarded you as a sort of patriarch in both these lines.

Secretary STIMSON. I am glad to be associated with you as an alumnus of Yale.

Mr. VORYS. As I understand, we are to embark upon a new phase of aid to England under this bill and must have the utmost cooperation in return therefor.

Now, the Secretary of State in his statement to us the other day said this, in describing this danger that surrounds us.

The first step in this fatal direction occurred in the Far East, 1931, when Japan occupied Manchuria in contravention of the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and the Kellog-Briand Pact.

Did the British cooperate with you in stopping the first step in the fatal direction?

Secretary STIMSON. Yes; they did.

Mr. VORYS. We have been informed through the years that the British did not implement your protest with reference to the occupation of Manchuria.

Secretary STIMSON. That they did not? Well, I will tell you this: I have written a book on the subject which gives the details of the whole situation, which is a complicated one.

The worst that can be said against them was that someone held back at first, someone in the Foreign Office was a little slow about it. But after that they certainly collaborated very strongly.

Mr. VORYS. If they collaborated to the fullest extent the democracies were not very effective in it.

Secretary STIMSON. They were not.

Mr. VORYS. I did not get the answer.

Secretary STIMSON. They were not, unfortunately. And when I say democracies I mean the democracies, along with the United States, who were in the League of Nations.

Mr. VORYS. And the Nine Power Treaty.

Secretary STIMSON. And in the end, the Nine Power Treaty. Mr. VORYS. Now, since our purpose in aiding Britain, as I understand it, is primarily to preserve the British Fleet for our defense, do you not think that we should have a definite, formal, and binding arrangement as to the disposition of the British Fleet before we embark on this new phase of aid to England?

Secretary STIMSON. Mr. Vorys, that is a fair question, but in that question, however, you must bear in mind all these facts. That question was very carefully considered last summer when we asked for and were given the strongest assurance that one government of a self-governing democracy can give another. But you know-you are a lawyer, are you not?

Mr. VORYS. I was before I was a Congressman.

Secretary STIMSON. You know the limitations of constitutional law with respect to one administration's being bound by another, and the difficulty in making that tie. The same limitation of constitutional parity implicit in a great democracy applies as much to Great Britain as it does with us.

Mr. Churchill gave the strongest possible assurance that his Government could give, and he made it as binding as he could make it. But even if there had been, if you could conceive of there being time enough to negotiate a treaty, and have this put into a treaty, we are dealing with what might happen in war and no document of that sort can be impervious to the dangers of war.

Mr. VORYS. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary STIMSON. Well, that is why we feel that it is important to prevent Great Britain from being brought to the breaking point when they might violate all the law. Any country might violate all law, and that is the argument for the doing of just such things as we are trying to do in this proposed statute, prevent that situation from coming to pass.

You know, and I am sure you feel with me, that very few, if any, nations in the world could show a greater steadfastness among the common people in holding out against the most severe kinds of tests, the most heart-breaking conditions, than the British, and they may continue this summer, autumn, and winter, but the time may come when they will break, and we are trying in this bill to prevent it from coming.

I agree with you perfectly, I mean, on the question of assuring that their fleet will remain for the protection of the North Atlantic Ocean, and I guess that has been in my mind longer than it has in yours; and certainly I do not think we differ on that.

Mr. VORYS. I appreciate that exigencies of warfare may make it difficult or impossible to carry out undertakings, but at the present we have merely the assurance of one administration, as it were, in England, whereas if we had a treaty we might have a legal status which would not be subject to repudiation by another government which would come in England.

Secretary STIMSON. Mr. Vorys, when you look over, as I have had occasion to do, the treaties during the past years which have been deliberately violated by a great many nations you must realize that is the chance of war to which any nation may be brought, and that a treaty would not necessarily prevent it.

Far from this bill, however, being counter to your suggestion, this bill does provide that such quid pro quo as the President deems necessary shall be exacted; and in that sense, if the time came when it seemed that a treaty, for any reason, would be effective and could be made, there could be what you call a quid pro quo.

Mr. VORYS. My difficulty is this, that as you have sketched the international situation, the one vital element in our defense, which might warrant us in regard to our own defense, is the disposal of the British Fleet. And we are asked to embark on that policy without fullest possible assurance by England but to leave it to future negotiations. Secretary STIMSON. No; I did not mean to say that. I said, if it should appear that that would add anything to the assurance that has been given, in the judgment of our people, our country, our President,

it could then be done. But at present I, for one, think that the best possible assurance is to build up, as far as we can, such a defense of the British Isles through the hands of the British and the help of the munitions that we may give them, that they will not be brought to that dire alternative.

And even then, the promise was very broad. It was that even in the last instance the fleet would not be given up, but would be sent over to be based on this hemisphere.

Mr. VORYS. Is that the promise contained in the speech of Mr. Churchill?

Secretary STIMSON. I think so; I am speaking from memory, but I am quite sure that it is.

Mr. VORYS. I wonder if there was any other form in which that promise had been expressed than that which we have learned from the papers?

Secretary STIMSON. There was an exchange of notes, I believe, between the two governments on the subject, but I have not seen them for a long time and I do not have a recollection of it. But my recollection is that the notes were published in the press.

Mr. VORYS. Was that exchange of notes a matter of public information, so far as you recollect?

Secretary STIMSON. I am told it is published.

Mr. VORYS. Have you any idea as to the approximate date?
Secretary STIMSON. The date?

Mr. VORYS. The approximate date of that exchange.

Secretary STIMSON. Why, it was at the time when the destroyer arrangement was made, last summer. I cannot remember what the exact date was.

Mr. VORYS. Now, the threat which comes to us comes, as you stated, from Germany, largely, does it not, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary STIMSON. It comes from the Axis Powers, that is what I stated, and they unfortunately seem to be acting in great harmony.

Mr. VORYS. The manpower of the Axis Powers is far superior to that of Great Britain, is that so?

Secretary STIMSON. Yes.

Mr. VORYS. Is it your belief that there is any way in which a military defeat can be administered to the leader of the Axis Powers without additional troops, manpower, more than Britain can provide?

Secretary STIMSON. Well, I would rather not publicly speculate on that. I am quite willing to admit that the manpower of the British Isles is much smaller than that of Germany. I do not want to admit that a military defeat would be absolutely necessary to the defeat of Germany.

Mr. VORYS. I appreciate the delicacy and the gravity of such speculations, but you and the Congress must indulge in such speculations, publicly or privately if we are to do our duty. And if it would be proper for you to do so, I would be very glad for you to give us your views as to the military situation involved in the final defeat of the powers which you feel are threatening us.

Secretary STIMSON. Well, I am at the service of Congress at all times, barring always my other duties; barring also the fact that I cannot talk freely to you in an atmosphere like this.

Mr. VORYS. Would it be proper to ask you whether that is a question on which you have no further opinion than you have expressed, or whether it is one which you feel is not compatible with the public interest to express an opinion on now?

Secretary STIMSON. I could say this, I believe it is a fact that the British Empire in the last war raised 9,000,000 men. When I spoke before of British man resources, I was speaking of the British Isles. But when you speak of the British Empire, you have got a very much bigger thing. And when you speak of the Commonwealth of Nations, you have a very much bigger thing, and you have got a very much more vigorous thing than some of the elements that are opposed to it, as is being shown by the fighting in North Africa. So I do not like to answer such a question which would express an opinion, or seem to express an opinion, that the military power of Great Britain today is hopeless. It is not, in my opinion, at allvery far from it. I am speaking now of the infantry power. This other nation has got a jump on them, but I saw the British Army fighting in the last year of the last war.

Mr. VORYS. So did I.

Secretary STIMSON. I have no doubt of it. Well, I was attached to it for a month in the last year of the war, and they had been fighting 4 years. They were just getting into their stride; and during that summer and fall until the end of the war, the heavy fighting in nearly all the vital northern portion of the line was carried by the British.

Mr. VORYS. In your opinion again, if it is in the public interest for you now to express it, would there be a possibility of some other collapse or another type of defeat of the Axis Powers? Would that seem now probable as opposed to an ultimate military defeat, or would you not care to express an opinion on that?

Mr. EBERHARTER. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that while the question is a very proper question, I think it should be asked of the Secretary in executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair rules that the Secretary has already expressed his willingness to appear before the committee in executive session and answer all of those pertinent questions. And the Chair

would like to say to the member, if he will refrain from asking the question at this time, I think that would be the proper course to take. If you insist upon it, all right, but I believe the Secretary has indicated his views on such questions.

Secretary STIMSON. I would rather not, Mr. Vorys.

Mr. VORYS. I do not wish to press the question, then.

Secretary STIMSON. If you need any further facts, you do not have to wait for an executive session. Come down to the War Department and you will get all that I can give you.

Mr. VORYS. I certainly do not want to press any question that the Secretary would prefer not to answer here.

The CHAIRMAN. The Secretary has indicated that he would prefer not to answer. Please proceed in order.

Mr. VORYS. Mr. Morgenthau told us, when we asked him, that you would give us the details as to the military aid which would be furnished to Great Britain under this resolution and the policy which would be made possible by this present resolution. Congress has approved a fixed, definite program for the development of a trained