war, is providing for the defense of the North Atlantic, and we are vitally interested in that defense.

Mr. FISH. Is it not rather cowardly of us, if England is fighting our battle, not to go into the war?

Secretary STIMSON. I am not going to pursue this line of argument. We are not concerned with it in this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished, Mr. Fish?

Mr. FISH. I am through, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eaton?

Mr. EATON. As a mere layman, I feel I cannot add anything to the general confusion which has been created on this subject so far this morning. But there is one question that is very fundamental, in my opinion. We have at this present moment two great forces arrayed against each other in the world, one the force of despotism, the other the force of democracy. The chief democracy now engaged in active combat is Great Britain and the other one, standing behind Great Britain, is the United States of America. We are assisting Great Britain and have had her pay so far 100 cents on the dollar for all assistance rendered, and we are assisting Great Britain on the ground that if Great Britain falls, then we will be attacked.

Now, under those conditions I would like to ask the Secretary, if they are fighting our defense, is it giving away anything for us to help Great Britain?

Secretary STIMSON. I do not think it is, sir, if we help them effectively.

Mr. EATON. My leader here, Mr. Fish, wants to know if this is our war. I would like to ask you if this is not our war, what are we doing here today? What is all this fuss about armies and navies and airplanes? What is it all about? Up to that point does it not seem that this is our war?

Secretary STIMSON. It is.

Mr. EATON. Then I wonder why it is necessary to follow so many rabbit tracks and not stay on the main line. So I would like to ask just one question with reference to this bill. I am in favor of all aid to Great Britain in the interest of defending this nation from inevitable lonely conflict if Great Britain is defeated. Now, that being so, the thing that worries me in this bill is that it is apparently adopting the totalitarian method of placing all power in the hands of one man. Is that, in your judgment, absolutely necessary?

Secretary STIMSON. I do not think that we will adopt all of the totalitarian methods; no, sir. I do not think so. But experience has shown, in the life of this Nation, many times, that to defend ourselves against war or the danger of war, it is necessary temporarily to concentrate our means of self-defense and make them more effective than we are accustomed to do in time of peace. And that is all, as I understand it, that we are trying to do today.

There is one thing that has been brought up, that I should like to mention here, if I may move into the cerulean atmosphere of international law. I notice that in some of the things which Mr. Fish has mentioned, in speaking about war and nations being at war, and that in some of the questions that were asked of Mr. Hull yesterday, there was brought out the matter of whether or not it was an act of war for us to do certain things in the defense of Great Britain. Mr. Hull answered it by a good, common-sense statement, as reported in

the press, that the actions of the Axis Powers had so torn up international law that it had reduced us-I am speaking roughly, I am not trying to quote the Secretary-it had reduced us to the law of self-defense. But I want to put on record the fact that we do not have to go even that far. We do not have to say that we depend only on the law of self-defense, although that is the fact that stares us in the face.

Even if we should assume--which is not the fact that international law still existed today, after these attacks on it by the Axis Powers, then even under that international law as it stood before these hostilities in Europe began we would be rightfully authorized to act with regard to what it has been proposed do do in the defense or in the assistance of Great Britain. That is a thing which has not been understood, because the original fountain of the change has been so comparatively recent.

This country was one of the authors of one of the greatest changes in international law that has ever taken place when it was in 1926 and 1927 and 1928 the initiator of what has been called the Pact of Paris, or the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Now, it has not been recognized, even by us, by these Houses of Congress here that were the parents of it, what a vital change was made in the system of international law by that action. However, the international lawyers all over the rest of the world and in this country have recognized this important change, and I want to bring before this committee what they have found.

You will remember that that great treaty, the Pact of Paris, was joined in by some 63 nations. We joined it. Great Britain joined it. France joined it. Germany joined it. Italy joined it. Japan joined it. All the Axis Powers did. They all agreed to renounce war and they agreed in the second provision of that agreement that they would never seek the solution of any controversy except by peaceful means. Now, as I say, that treaty was ratified, I think, by practically the unanimous vote of the United States Senate-by practically a unanimous vote. It was instigated by our Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg, and has been known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

Now, when these troubles began to arise, when these lawless nations thereafter began to make attacks upon the fabric of international law, the oldest and the most authoritative body of the international law in the world, the Association of International Law, a European organization, met in 1934 to consider what the effect of such an attack as Japan had made upon China would be, or as Mr. Hitler was even then threatening, on Austria. They had a meeting in Hungary. I might say that the membership of that association is composed of the most distinguished international lawyers from all over the world; Americans, British, Frenchmen, Germans, Scandinavians, Italians, Japanese-all of them. And they considered what the effect would be of an attack in violation of the Kellogg Pact by one signatory upon another, and what effect it would have upon the rights and redresses of the other members of the great family of nations which had entered into that treaty under international law. And the conclusions which they reached are the most authoritative statement of international law on that subject which, so far as I know, has ever been published. And this is what they said, and I would like to have it on this record very carefully so that when our friends say that to help Great Britain at

LEND-LEASE BILL

FRIDAY, JANUARY 17, 1941

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10 a. m., Hon. Sol Bloom (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will kindly come to order. We will resume with Secretary Stimson.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY L. STIMSON-Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Tinkham is recognized.

Mr. TINKHAM. Mr. Secretary, before proceeding to cross-examination, I would like to read a statement on the front page of the Washington Post this morning, and ask you to comment upon it. The article says:

Two clauses in the administration's "lend-lease" bill were written with the express purpose of giving the President power, if England falls, to buy the British Navy, to allow the British warships to operate from American ports, and to place orders for war materials in Canada, the Washington Post learned yesterday.

Further, the clauses were so written that the United States could acquire the remnants of the French Navy, if the Vichy government could ever be persuaded to risk the possible consequences of such a transaction.

The language of the bill was intentionally drafted so that the President, providing the Vichy government cooperates, could remove a threat from the Caribbean by buying the French aircraft carrier Bearn and light cruiser Emile Bertin, now lying in the harbor of Fort de France, Martinique.

And it is suggested that officials provided that information. What have you to say upon that?

Secretary STIMSON. I have only this to say, that I never heard of such a suggestion until I read it in the Post this morning.

Mr. TINKHAM. Do you consider that under the very broad wording of the bill, those things could be done?

Secretary STIMSON. I have not considered it in that light. I consider that suggestion as one of those rather fantastic and preposterous suggestions, such as the one that the President might, under this bill, give away the Navy.

Mr. TINKHAM. Is there anything that is fantastic under present conditions?

Secretary STIMSON. I do not understand the question.

Mr. TINKHAM. I say, is not everything fantastic under present conditions as you see them

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Secretary STIMSON. NO——

Mr. TINKHAM. And any suggestion possible?

Secretary STIMSON. No. I certainly think that everything is not fantastic. I tried to point out yesterday some dangers that I think are very real.

Mr. TINKHAM. Those who want to see, of course, anything, can usually see it, if their mind is looking in the direction of fear. Now I would like to know whether you helped to draw this bill?

Secretary STIMSON. No, sir.

Mr. TINKHAM. Was it entirely and completely drawn when it was submitted to you?

Secretary STIMSON. I think I saw it before-well, a few days before the bill was introduced; but that was all. I think I saw a draft; I am not sure it was the same bill.

Mr. TINKHAM. Were there any changes made after you first saw it? Secretary STIMSON. I do not know.

Mr. TINKHAM. Did you have any suggestion of any changes? Secretary STIMSON. I did not consider the bill critically enough, to answer your question.

Mr. TINKHAM. May I ask you what you think of the policy of the United States putting all of its resources, short of manpower, behind any country in the world which is attacked-what you think of that general policy?

Secretary STIMSON. I think that is another one of those questions which is so wide that for me to try to answer it would not help in the discussion of this bill. I think I have expressed my approval of putting the power of the United States, or the resources of the United States enough behind Great Britain to try to preserve the British Navy.

Mr. TINKHAM. What I would like to know is this. With the President's address to Congress, and the wording of this bill, it seems to me the policy implicit in that address and in the very broad wording of this bill is that we are to put our resources behind any country that is attacked; and if that is true, I am asking you whether you think that is a sound American policy

Secretary STIMSON. I never heard him state any proposition as broad as to put the resources of this country behind any country that was attacked.

Mr. TINKHAM. I think that is implicit in the President's address to the Congress, but, if you think not, let me put it this way.

Secretary STIMSON. I think you misunderstand me. I have never heard of his attempting to put the resources of this country behind any country that was attacked, but only behind those countries, as this bill states, whose defense is vital to the defense of the United States. Now, that is not "any" country.

Mr. TINKHAM. That means that any country the President wants to say, or with reference to which the President wants to say, its defense is vital to the defense of the United States.

Secretary STIMSON. I do not think that is a fair statement, Mr. Tinkham.

Mr. TINKHAM. Well, if you think China is included, of course, as a country whose defense is vital to our defense, we have got to put all of our resources behind her except manpower.