on the basis of the span of control; i.e., the number and the highest level of personnel reporting to that supervisory level.

Our survey indicated that the DOD organization contained a number of units which duplicated the structure and function of other units. Many organizations perform similar functions in OSD, in each of the staffs supporting the Services Secretaries, and again in the staffs reporting to the Service Chiefs. We interviewed a number of managers who argued persuasively that "the staffs reporting to the Service Secretaries are anachronisms, left over from their days of Cabinet rank. They communicate up to their counterparts in OSD and down to their counterparts in the service organizations. They translate DOD policy into appropriate terminology and publish the policy for use in their service. They often impede efficient, economical operation. We could eliminate them entirely, strengthen OSD's staffs to communicate directly with the staffs reporting to the Service Chiefs, and never miss the Service Secretaries' staffs at all. In fact, it would tighten the overall organization to eliminate the Secretaries' staffs, and ask the Secretaries to use the service and OSD staffs."

The following are some outstanding examples of duplication of effort:

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There are large Manpower and Reserve Affairs
organizations in OSD reporting to the Secretary
of Defense; again in the Service Secretariats,
reporting to the Service Secretaries; and then
again in the services, reporting to the Chiefs.
Among top managers, there was a widely held belief
that these responsibilities should be assigned
largely to the Service Chiefs. Then, the Manpower
and Reserve Affairs unit in OSD could be reduced
drastically, keeping only the minimum organization
needed to deal with DOD-wide issues, such as the
all-volunteer force and compensation matters.

Throughout the acquisition system in DOD, there
are major overlaps of functions in OSD and the
services which make the process of acquiring major
weapons systems both more costly and more time
consuming than necessary.

There are people performing legislative and public
affairs functions in OSD, the Service Secretari-
ats, and in the staffs reporting to the Service
Chiefs. The organizations in the services tend

to focus their attention on the specific needs, programs or activities of their particular service. We found that in many cases, the individual services maintained more extensive lobbying or public relations efforts than OSD. While this may be good for the particular service in the short term, activities which tend to focus on individual services create inter-service issues or conflicts which are often counter-productive to the accomplishment of DOD's mission. President Eisenhower also addressed this subject in his message to Congress requesting reorganization of DOD in 1958, using these words:

a principal outlet for service
rivalries is the public affairs and
legislative liaison activity within
each of the military departments .
Surely everyone will agree that per-
sonnel charged with such duties should
not seek to advance the interest of a
particular service at the expense of
another, nor should they advance a ser-
vice cause at the expense of overall
national and defense requirements. We
do not want defense dollars spent in
publicity and influence campaigns in
which each service claims superiority
over the other and strives for in-
creased appropriations or other
Congressional favors.

I have directed the Secretary of
Defense to review the numbers as well
as the activities of personnel of the
various military departments who
engage in legislative liaison and
public affairs activities in the
Washington area. I have requested
that he act, without impeding the flow
of information to the Congress and the
public, to strengthen Defense Depart-
ment supervision over these activities
and to move such of these personnel
and activities as necessary into the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Now, 24 years later, we still find active legislative and public affairs organizations in each of the services. Beyond the negative effects of

these overlapping organizations, this suggests that it is almost impossible to eliminate a function in DOD. One senior official told us, "The organization in DOD is like a starfish: it regenerates lost parts."

We found no clear insight or emphasis on long-range planning of organization structure. We asked organization analysts in OSD what the ideal organization should look like to fit the functions DOD performs. The response: "Whatever the current Secretary wants." We asked how organization planning was done and how change was accomplished. The response: "Functions can't really be eliminated. We don't really change much; we just move the blocks around. We're prevented from really changing by external forces."

Further, there appeared to be no good process in place for organizational self-analysis, which would increase the awareness of a need for improvement in structure.

The net result of these structure problems is an organization that breeds all of the typical problems of a bureaucracy: slow response, unclear reporting lines, major overstaffing, and too much internal bickering over who should do what.

Recommendations

Throughout this report are recommendations that will strengthen the ability of OSD to perform consolidated functions for DOD and its services at considerable cost savings. Defense agencies or new consolidated operations are recommended or could be considered for many issues:

Beyond these specific issues, our analysis of the problems of the weapons acquisition process in Issues OSD 15 through OSD 23 has led us to suggest consideration of a major overhaul, leading perhaps to the consolidation of this process in OSD. This recommendation is outlined in detail in Issue OSD 15.

While the consolidation of responsibility for the acquisition process would be a major undertaking, it would solve many of the problems that have been outlined in this chapter. It would also transfer to OSD activities that can best be addressed by civilians, freeing up military leadership for purely military functions. It would enable Congress to look to a single source for comparative information on weapons alternatives, and it would assure evenhanded treatment of contractors.

Finally, in terms of overall organization of DOD and in light of the problems that surfaced in the course of the OSD Task Force study, we have several proposals to make:

We recommend the creation of a Defense Executive Office to include the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. If the Secretary of Defense deems it appropriate, the Under Secretary for Policy could also be a member of the Defense Executive Office.

We recommend the designation of an Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (a new position) separate from the Research and Engineering function, which would continue to be under the direction of the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering.

We recommend that the DLA report to the proposed
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.

We recommend the elimination of the staffs reporting to the Service Secretaries and the transfer of any functions which cannot be eliminated to OSD or to the staff of the appropriate Service Chief.

The proposed DOD organization chart and the existing chart, both in simplified form, are illustrated on pages 40 and 41.

Many large private sector organizations, recognizing that the burden of coordinating a large complex enterprise is beyond the capability of one or two people, have created Offices of the Chief Executive. Placing top DOD officials in a coordinating role with the Secretary of Defense will strengthen the DOD-wide decision-making process, provide better representation of individual service views at the top of the organization, establish a base from which to achieve better unified decisions and actions among the services, and relieve the span of control problem of the Secretary of Defense.

The

The designation of an Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition will provide a separation of two organically separate disciplines and spread an enormous work load. need for an Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition seems apparent under current circumstances, but would be all the more necessary if the recommendations contained in Issue OSD 15 were implemented.

We believe that in aggregate, these recommended changes in organization structure would significantly improve DOD's operation by:

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providing more and broader leadership at the top of the organization;

providing an organizational framework which will work to enhance, rather than inhibit, unified decisions and actions;

reducing staff and thus saving money and improving efficiency;

separating line and staff functions for maximum effectiveness;

reducing spans of control to reasonable operating levels; and

recognizing the clearcut distinction between the acquisition function and the research and engineering function.

Specific recommendations concerning the organization of JCS are beyond the scope of this Task Force's charter. It should be pointed out, however, that many respected military and civilian leaders believe that it is timely to consider options for JCS reform. (See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hearings before the Investigation Subcommittee, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, April-August 1982.)