President Eisenhower expressly addressed the inter-service rivalry question, noting that "the truth is that most of the service rivalries that have troubled us in recent years have been made inevitable by the laws that govern our defense organization." He went on to observe that "these rivalries, so common in the National Capital, are almost unknown in the field. Here in Washington they usually find expression in the Services' Congressional and press activities which become particularly conspicuous in struggles over new weapons, funds, and publicity." President Eisenhower continued, "I suggest that we be done with prescribing controversy by law. I recommend eliminating from the National Security Act such provisions as those prescribing separate administration of the military departments and the other needless and injurious restraints on the authority of the Secretary of Defense. I specifically call attention to the need for removing doubts concerning the Secretary's authority to transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate functions of the Department." This time, however, what Congress gave with one hand, it took back with the other. Under the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act, effective August 6, 1958, Congress granted to the Secretary of Defense the authority "to take appropriate steps (including the transfer, reassignment, abolition, and consolidation of functions) to provide in the Department of Defense for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and operation and to eliminate duplication." So far, so good. But they went on, "However, no function which has been established by law to be performed by the Department of Defense, or any officer or agency thereof, shall be substantially transferred, reassigned, abolished, or consolidated ." until Congress has been given 30 days notice, after which either House could reject, within 40 days, any transfer or abolition of major combatant functions assigned by law to a military department, so long as in the opinion of that House the proposed action would impair the Nation's defenses. O Thus, Congress responded to the President's request that they remove doubts concerning the Secretary's authority for those key management functions. There no longer was any doubt; Congress had constricted the Secretary's authority even further. While Congress had always been chary of granting the Secretary authority to transfer and consolidate functions, it has been even more restrictive when it comes to base realignments and closures. General support for economy in defense spending evaporates when discussions of closing specific bases arise. Furthermore, the pressure must be initiated by OSD, since Congress and the services have a common interest on this question. On the one hand, members of Congress are sensitive The 1977 and subsequent Military Construction Appropriations Acts have required NEPA compliance before funds can be used for closure or realignment actions. In the 1978 Military Construction Appropriations Act, a new section 2687 was added to Title 10 of the United States Code which requires in advance of any closure or realignment action: public announcement and notification to both Armed Services committees of Congress that military installation is a candidate for closure or realignment; NEPA compliance; notification to both Armed Services committees of Congress of a final decision to close or realign, with a detailed justification for the decision, including statements of the estimated fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operational consequences of the proposed closure or realignment; and the passage of a 60-day grace period during which no irrevocable action may be taken to implement the decision. Thus, the stage has been set so that a long period ensues between the time that a base is identified as a candidate and the earliest possible date for implementation. Public opposition, political pressure, and even blocking legislation can occur long before this process can be completed or final decision announced. This historic analysis has not been comprehensive as it focuses primarily on the legislative trail. At the same time, this historic recitation should reveal clearly that the authority of OSD and the Secretary of Defense is no little matter. Perhaps the independence of this Task Force from vested interest in the resolution will be helpful to those who must make the decisions as to the future of OSD vis-a-vis the Congress, the services, the President and the American taxpayer. Congress and OSD Many of those we interviewed are concerned about the trends in defense spending, about the heavy overload in the out years for weapons contracted for, and about the implications of defense spending for the entire national picture. They are worried that, when the out-year costs become clear, there will be massive cutbacks and cancellations, and that much of the money spent in the intervening years will have been wasted. They are further worried about the debilitating effect this will have on the defense industry, where the secondary level of suppliers has become critically weak, largely because of the risks inherent in being a DOD supplier. This is of particular concern to them because many of them seem to regard Congress as representatives of special interest groups, reacting to legislation piece by piece, with little regard for the long-run picture. It is not difficult to understand why Congress wants such a heavy voice in DOD decisions. The defense portion of the 1983 fiscal year outlays will approach 30 percent of the total. But more importantly, almost 74 percent, or about $135 billion of the $180 billion in "Relatively Controllable Outlays" in the entire budget, goes for defense. Congress is keenly aware that defense decisions are not only large in amount, but are also extremely complex with a heavy element of subjective judgment. Every district feels entitled to a piece of the action. This creates a dilemma of staggering proportions for even the most conscientious politicians: on the one hand, the need to choose, among strongly lobbied alternatives, the most cost-effective weapons systems for the overall good of the Nation; and on the other hand, the pressure to make these choices based on the specific impact on their own constituencies. Further complicating the picture is the fact that individual members of Congress frequently have a strong orientation to one or more of the services. Even after 35 years of OSD, Congress continues to deal directly with the services -- and vice versa -- and frequently around OSD. This happens for several reasons: Psychological -- it is easier to identify with the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marines than with OSD. The uniformed services can attract loyalty that OSD does not naturally come by. Furthermore, we in the private sector are well aware of how corporate headquarters are regarded. Budget Congress still approves the budget by service. While the Secretary of Defense has the authority to adjust it to meet conflicting demands, he does not exercise it. The services know who in Congress will fight for their interests. O Home district the presence of a military base in a district builds a loyalty to that service. Divided opinion because DOD does not always speak with one voice, Congress steps in to referee Success so long as the services perceive that they can get more out of Congress than they can from OSD, they will continue to do so. It is the view of this Task Force that the country is not well served by the restrictions that sometimes inhibit the Secretary of Defense from exercising good business and military judgment in the choice of weapons systems and base structure. However, the overall problem is one that cannot be solved by people from the outside, private sector or otherwise. The problems cited by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower still exist. If anything, they are worse in light of the world threat, the escalating cost of defense, and the pervasive feeling of entitlement to the defense dollar. Perhaps it is time for the President and the leaders of Congress to agree to study the possibility of a Modern Agenda for Military Management. It has been 30 years since the Committee on Department of Defense Organization convened for the last thoroughgoing study of overall organization and procedure. OSD and the Services In the course of this Task Force study, hundreds of interviews were conducted in OSD, in the services and other Governmental organizations, with outside contractors, trade associations, think tanks and other knowledgeable observers of DOD. On paper, and in fact, the Secretary of Defense and OSD have enormous authority, even with the limitations that have been cited previously. However, given that the charge to the office is the overall management of the defense structure, it is instructive to observe how that authority is perceived. |