We should realize the economies that can be
achieved through unified control of supply and
service functions.

We should adopt the organizational structure best suited to fostering coordination between the military and the remainder of the Government.

We should provide the strongest means for civilian control of the military.

We should organize to provide parity for air
power.

We should establish the most advantageous framework for a unified system of training for combined operations of land, sea, and air.

We should systematically allocate our limited
resources for scientific research.

We should have unity of command in outlying bases.

We should have consistent and equitable personnel policies.

President Truman then provided an outline of a unified defense department. Included in that outline was a recommendation that, "The President and the Secretary should be provided with ample authority to establish central coordinating and service organizations, both military and civilian, where these are found to be necessary."

President Truman's general plan was introduced as

S. 2044 on April 9, 1946. Agreement could not be reached in 1946. In 1947 a compromise was achieved, and on July 26, 1947, President Truman signed The National Security Act of 1947 (P. L. 253, 80th Congress).

Initially, the Secretary of Defense was designated the head of the National Military Establishment, which consisted of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, together with related agencies. The statute empowered the Secretary of Defense to establish "general" policy and programs and to exercise "general" direction, authority and control.

In 1949 the first Hoover Commission recommended that the powers of the Secretary of Defense be strengthened, that statutory authority previously vested in the services be granted directly to the Secretary of Defense, and that

the Secretary of Defense have full authority, subject only to the President and the Congress, to establish policies and programs.

President Truman incorporated these views in a message to Congress on March 5, 1949. He proposed converting the National Military Establishment into the Department of Defense, while providing the Secretary of Defense with appropriate responsibility and authority to fulfill that enlarged responsibility. He urged that the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to exercise direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense be made clear and that certain limitations and restrictions on his role as head of an Executive Department be removed.

Congress approved amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, and President Truman signed them into law on August 10, 1949. The Department of Defense was created. The Act vested in the Secretary of Defense direction, authority and control over the Department of Defense. was no longer "general."

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The power to exercise direction, authority and control was not without restrictions, however. Another amendment to the Act provided that:

. . no function which has been or is here-
after authorized by law to be performed by
the Department of Defense shall be subtan-
tially transferred, reassigned, abolished or
consolidated until after a report in regard
to all pertinent details shall have been
made by the Secretary of Defense to the
Committees on Armed Services of the Congress.

Since 1949 the case for expanding the management powers of the Secretary of Defense has been made a number of times:

On November 18, 1952, Secretary Robert A. Lovett
wrote to President Truman as his term came to a
close. Lovett suggested clarification and
strengthening of the Secretary's powers, noting
difficulties in asserting authority in the field
of supply, warehousing and issue. He cited, with
approval, reorganization plans in other agencies
under which "all functions of all other offices
of a department and all functions of all agencies
and employees of a department are transferred to
the Secretary of the Department with exceptions,
if necessary. The application of this approved
procedure to the three Military Departments or
the Department of Defense could neatly cure such
questions."

On April 11, 1953, Secretary Charles E. Wilson forwarded, with President Eisenhower's full approval, a report by the Committee on Department of Defense Organization. The Committee had discussed the major problem of organization and procedure with former Secretaries of the military departments, the military chiefs of the services, with civilians who had held high offices in the Department, and other knowledgeable private citizens. Its military consultants were General George C. Marshall, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and General Carl Spaatz.

The Committee Report observed that, "It was not expected in 1947 when the National Security Act was adopted, or in 1949 when it was amended, that the national security organization should be closed to further improvement. While its fundamental practices are still sound, experience indicates that it needs to be amended, and that the organization and procedures of the Department of Defense need to be improved to attain four compelling objectives:

The lines of authority and responsibility within the Department must be made clear and unmistakable.

The Secretary of Defense must be able to
clarify the roles and missions of the
services.

Planning must be based on the most effective use of our modern scientific and industrial resources.

The organization of the Department must be able to effect maximum economies without injuring military strength and its necessary productive support.'

The Committee Report called for statutory amendments to provide the Secretary of Defense with the following tools of sound management:

Clear and effective authority over the entire
defense organization, and control over the
principal personnel, civilian and military,
in DOD;

A system to provide the Secretary with complete, accurate and understandable information on which to base decisions; and

An independent audit of programs and of
efficiency of performance.

On April 30, 1953, President Eisenhower sent to Congress a message transmitting a reorganization plan which would strengthen the authority of the Secretary of Defense along the lines recommended by the Committee on Department of Defense Organization. Aside from the legislative proposal, he noted that he was also clarifying the lines of authority within DOD in order to strengthen civilian responsibility. He underscored the importance of the Secretary's responsibility, noting that:

No function in any part of the Department
of Defense, or in any of its component
agencies, should be performed independent
of the direction, authority, and control
of the Secretary of Defense. The Secre-
tary is the accountable civilian head of
the Department of Defense, and, under the
law, my principal assistant in all mat-
ters relating to the Department. I want
all to know that he has my full backing
in that role.

The reorganization plan that accompanied President
Eisenhower's message became effective on June 30,

1953.

The second Hoover Commission transmitted its
Department of Defense recommendations to Congress
on June 20, 1955. For the purposes of our review,
the most significant recommendation was to estab-
lish a separate civilian-managed agency, reporting
to the Secretary of Defense, to administer common
supply and service activities. Secretary of
Defense Wilson rejected this recommendation in a
memorandum issued in March 1956, in which a pref-
erence for a single manager system was noted. A
few years later Secretary of Defense McNamara did
establish three defense agencies for common
supply and service activities.

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President Eisenhower remained concerned about organization and functioning of the Department of Defense, which he addressed in a message to Congress on April 3, 1958. He covered the steps in the unifying process, which have been cited above, but expressed his concern over continuing constraints:

These various steps toward more effec-
tive coordination of our Armed Forces
under one civilian head have been
necessary, sound, and in the direction
pointed by the lessons of modern war-
fare. Each such step, however, has
prompted opponents to predict dire
results. There have been allegations
that our free institutions would be
threatened by the influence of a mili-
tary leader serving as the principal
military advisor to the Defense Secre-
tary and the Commander in Chief. There
have been forecasts that one or more
of the Services would be abolished.
As a result, the Secretary of Defense
has never been freed of excessive stat-
utory restraints. As a result of
well-meaning attempts to protect tra-
ditional concepts and prerogatives, we
have impaired civilian authority and
denied ourselves a fully effective
defense. We must cling no longer to
statutory barriers that weaken execu-
tive action and civilian authority.
We must free ourselves of emotional
attachments to service systems of an
era that is no more.

President Eisenhower asked for more authority for the Secretary of Defense with respect to:

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more flexible control over appropriated
funds;

distribution of functions within DOD;

control over public affairs and lobbying of services; and

transferring top officers between services, with the consent of the individual.