Findings and Conclusions

The

Presently, only the early development phases (6.1 and 6.2) have visibility across all services, through inclusion in the Defense Technical Information Center data base. only centralized work that is done involves high-risk research programs managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) -- which are basically high-risk projects that the services are reluctant to undertake. However, even this minimal effort at centralization is frustrated, because the services often consider the DARPA efforts to be competitive with, rather than complementary to, their own, and are often hesitant to pick up DARPAinitiated programs for further development.

It appears to the OSD Task Force that a centralized, coordinated effort to disseminate data among the services and the laboratories is crucial. This should provide the operational forces with a better understanding of the potential value and limitations of emerging technologies before committing specific technologies to weapons systems programs. Improved data exchange between the services and the laboratories should also ensure that prior work is fully utilized and will not be repeated.

In the past, some DOD laboratories have continued their development projects through the engineering development phase (6.4), either in-house or through contractors. It appears that this serves only to aggravate the dissemination problem to the point where the ultimate weapons system contractors are obliged to re-engineer for production. It appears to the OSD Task Force that engineering development is not a cost-effective in-house role for DOD research laboratories, and that all development work should be transferred to the services no later than the completion of the advanced development phase (6.3). The elimination of engineering development on the part of the laboratories will result in a substantial decrease in personnel.

Recommendations

OSD 19-1: A coordinated effort between the laboratories and the services will be necessary for DOD to realize the savings estimated herein. We recommend that DOD consider the following initiatives in its development of a program to more effectively integrate laboratory research efforts into the appropriate process.

OSD should monitor advanced development (6.3) and
engineering development (6.4) across all services,
whether the work is performed in-house or by con-
tractors. (Presently only basic research (6.1)
and exploratory development (6.2) are monitored
at the OSD level.)

DARPA should:

Sponsor only technology programs having very
high-risk or multiservice potential;

Transfer advanced development (6.3) demon-
stration programs to the lead service. Joint
service surveillance committees should desig-
nate the lead service.

Service labs should not normally carry out engi-
neering development (6.4) or field service
in-house, but should retain enough hands-on proj-
ect and field contacts to maintain working competence.
Such a decrease in lab activity would result in
cost savings.

Where appropriate, service labs should serve as
consultants and coordinators on component, sub-
system, and support system standardization.

Service lab technology position papers should be
more readily available to DOD bidders and to all
military combat commands.

Service labs should be given broad mission
requirements from the combat commands rather than
specific hardware needs. This would allow the
labs to concentrate on conceptual solutions.

Communications and data exchange programs should
be established between DOD laboratory personnel
and the combat forces they serve, and among the
various services working in identical or comple-
mentary technologies.

DOD laboratory managers should be permitted a
greater role in choosing projects for funding in
the basic research (6.1) and explanatory develop-
ment (6.2) phases. This should result in minimiz-
ing internal project marketing efforts to push
favored programs, thereby reducing costs of bro-
chure preparation, presentations, and other costs
involved in an advocacy role.

Savings and Impact Analysis

Engineering development (6.4) and operational development (6.6) expenditures will total $14 billion in FY 1983. Based on OSD Task Force industry experience, we believe that at least a 5 percent savings, approximately $700.0 million annually, can be realized when the above recommendations are fully implemented. The first-year savings would be about 33.3 percent of the amount possible with full implementation; second-year savings would be about 66.7 percent.

Assuming three years to implement the recommendations, the savings, including inflation, would be:

The Secretary of Defense should direct that research data be more effectively integrated into the acquisition process, and that laboratory research programs be better coordinated and limited as discussed above.

II. ISSUE AND RECOMMENDATION SUMMARIES

B. WEAPONS (CONT'D)

OSD 20: COMMON PARTS AND STANDARDS

Summary Recommendations

The Department of Defense (DOD) should mandate the use, where possible, by all services of common hardware components, subsystems, equipment, and other parts in order to minimize initial acquisition and life-cycle costs. The use of military standards and specifications should be decreased, and not all components included in the end item being procured should be subject to special military standards and specifications.

Financial Impact

$3.3 billion annually

$0.1 billion annually

Potential Savings: Approximately $2.3
billion from increased use of common parts
among all services and $1.0 billion from
decreased application of uniform military
standards and specifications.

Implementation Cost: Annual appropriations
of $100 million for DOD to provide for joint
service development of military hardware or
software having multiple weapon system appli-
cations potential.