17 Military salaries only (including USNR, USMCR, etc.)

2/ Includes civilian salaries

1/ Military salaries only (including USAF Reserve, Air National Guard, etc.)

I. INTRODUCTION (CONT'D)

B.

THE MANAGEMENT ROLE OF OSD:

CRITIQUE AND PROPOSALS

The National Security Act of 1947 created an integrated structure to formulate national security policy. Military restructuring was initially intended to bring about unification of the armed forces through the exercise of control and direction by the Secretary of Defense.

After 15 months as the country's first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal said in a summary report, "The mere passage of the National Security Act did not mean the accomplishments of its objectives overnight." The findings of the President's Private Sector Survey (PPSS) Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Task Force led to the conclusion that it has not happened over 35 years either.

During the OSD Task Force study, debate has raged in Congress, in the media, and throughout the country concerning the appropriateness of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget. It has been sniped at from many directions.

One facet of the debate seems clear. Those who criticize agree only on their criticism of the aggregate cost, rather than specific programs or bases. Those who defend choose to do so in the aggregate as well. Discussion of specifics rarely leads to consensus.

The dilemma of chaos can be illustrated clearly by the following excerpt from the Washington Post on February 2, 1983:

Committee Chairman John G. Tower

• released

a letter to colleagues asking them for military
activities that could be eliminated in their
home areas to help reduce defense spending.

In a Dear Colleague letter, Tower said he found
it "intriguing" that "in one breath Senators
will argue for reductions in defense, and then
in another breath will argue just as strongly
that such reductions should not be made in
programs located in their states.

"to

"I would invite every Senator," Tower wrote,
give me a list by March 1, 1983 of any defense-
related project in his or her state where a
reduction of expenditures could be made because
such expenditure is not essential for national
defense."

Laughter broke out in the crowded hearing room
at the Dirksen [Senate] Office Building as Tower
outlined his proposal.

Laughter comes all too easily if we accept the implicit assumption that this is the system whereby defense priorities should be set. But it is gallows humor, since we also recognize that far more than a grain of truth underlies it.

At least in theory, the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the President, should be able to assess the relative priorities of defense needs and choose those marginal programs, bases and personnel that should be eliminated, should an aggregate reduction of the Defense budget prove necessary. We recognize that this theory may fly in the face of the realities of the democratic process. But the existence of these political realities does not diminish the validity of the theory. Since the theory and the realities will be in constant tension, we deem it necessary that the two sides be fairly balanced.

It is the conclusion of the OSD Task Force that the ability of the Secretary of Defense and OSD to appropriately represent the views of the Administration is encumbered, in significant measure, by DOD's organization and structure.

OSD is encumbered by statute, by tradition, by so-called "political realities," and even by failure to utilize the full powers that are vested in it.

Background

Almost all of the problems addressed in the 40 issues comprising this report have been recognized for many years. Only a few of our recommendations are truly innovative.

In order to get a broad range of perspectives on the management problems we observed, we interviewed a significant number of incumbent DOD officials. We also discussed these concerns with former DOD officials: former Secretaries of Defense, former Deputy Secretaries, former Service Secretaries, and former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). We also interviewed other knowledgeable persons within and outside of Government. We sought out their ideas on management and organization problems and, in turn, used them as sounding boards for our then tentative recommendations.

Those whom we interviewed told us that OSD is, in many respects, a prisoner of its history.

Historical Analysis

From the earliest consideration of unifying the military establishment, the authority or potential authority of the Secretary of Defense has been controversial. During World War II, the separate War and Navy Departments had been only slightly coordinated by Joint Committees for certain field commands and by civilian emergency agencies.

Following World War II, the War Department argued for a single defense department, while the Navy argued against it. When hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs seemed to be unable to reach an early solution, the President stepped into the fray.

On December 19, 1945, President Harry S Truman sent a message to the Congress proposing a Department of Defense, saying in part, "One of the lessons which has most clearly come from the costly and dangerous experience of this war is that there must be unified direction of land, sea, and air forces at home, as well as in all other parts of the world where our Armed Forces are serving. We did not have that kind of direction when we were attacked four years ago and we certainly paid a high price for not having it."

After delineating the problems of the pre-World War II organization structure and stating that further studies of the general problem would serve no useful purpose, President Truman presented nine reasons for unification:

We should have integrated strategic plans and a unified military program and budget.