Consciousness in Locke

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Oxford University Press, 2016 - Philosophy - 240 pages
Shelley Weinberg argues that the idea of consciousness as a form of non-evaluative self-awareness runs through and helps to solve some of the thorniest issues in Locke's philosophy: in his philosophical psychology and in his theories of knowledge, personal identity, and moral agency. She argues that perceptions of ideas are complex mental states wherein consciousness is a constituent. Such an interpretation answers charges of inconsistency in Locke's model of themind and lends coherence to a puzzling aspect of Locke's theory of knowledge: how we know individual things when knowledge is defined as the perception of an agreement, or relation, of ideas. In eachcase, consciousness helps to forge the relation, resulting in a structurally integrated account of our knowledge of particulars fully consistent with the general definition. This model also sheds light on Locke's accounts of moral responsibility and moral motivation, and on his theory of personal identity.


Consciousness in the Seventeenth Century
Consciousness in Lockes Philosophical Psychology
Consciousness in Lockes Theory of Knowledge
Consciousness in Lockes Theory of Personal Identity
Consciousness and Moral Motivation

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About the author (2016)

Shelley Weinberg's research interests are in the history of early modern philosophy, especially Locke and issues of consciousness and perception. Her previous work in these areas can be found in History of Philosophy Quarterly, Journal of the History of Philosophy, and Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. She received her PhD in philosophy from the University of Toronto in 2008. She is currently an assistant professor at the University ofIllinois at Urbana-Champaign.