Mr. IGOE. Judge Swayne was impeached by the House, but was acquitted in the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. And the point involved in that case was the fact that while a railroad was under his charge in a receivership he made use of the railroad for the purpose of shipping horses over the railroad, and had free passes and had a special train, and things of that kind, while the railroad was in the hands of a receiver and, as such, was in the hands of the court. That was the charge.

Mr. WELTY. He used a private car and attached it to a train. That was one of the charges.

Mr. GOODYKOONTZ. The phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors " has never been construed as being limited to actual crimes and misdemeanors. It involves the matter of moral turpitude and questions of the ethical code, and all sorts of things along that line.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of those judges were convicted?

IMPEACHMENT OF WILLIAM BLOUNT.

Mr. WELTY. I have that here. If the committee desires, I can go into the details of each one of these cases. The first case that came up was that against Senator Blount, of Tennessee. He was charged by the House in 1797, but he was tried by the Senate and the Senate expelled him, and then they finally held that they could not impeach him because he was not a civil officer of the United States at the time.

IMPEACHMENT OF JOHN PICKERING.

The next case was the case against Judge Pickering. He was convicted, and the two charges were, first, disobeying the law in releasing a ship in attachment without requiring bond, and being intoxicated while attempting to perform his official duties. He was convicted by the Senate.

IMPEACHMENT OF SAMUEL CHASE.

The next case was that of Samuel Chase, in 1804. There were three different subjects under which he was impeached: (a) He had been guilty of misconduct to the prejudice of defendants during trial; (b) he had attempted to induce a grand jury to find an indictment; (c) for being intemperate in his charge to a jury. The result was an acquittal in the Senate. I do not know what the vote was. I tried to get the vote, but I did not have time.

IMPEACHMENT OF JAMES H. PECK,

The next case was that of Judge Peck. He was charged with abusing his power in sentencing an attorney to 24 hours' imprisonment and suspension from the bar of his court for 18 months for writing and publishing a moderate criticism of one of Judge Peck's decisions. The result was acquittal. This is the case where Daniel Webster voted to convict him because of misconduct.

IMPEACHMENT OF WEST H. HUMPHREYS.

The next case is that of Judge Humphreys, in 1862. He was charged (a) with making a public speech declaring the right of secession, (b) with conspiring to oppose the United States Government by force, and (e) in unlawfully acting as judge of the Confederacy. The respondent made no appearance, and trial proceeded during his absence. The result was conviction.

IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON.

The next case was in 1868, against Andrew Johnson. There were 11 articles against him, charging him (a) with the removal of Secretary of War Stanton in violatiton of the so-called tenure of office act, (b) in attempting to induce a general of the Army to violate a law, and (c) by attempting to bring Congress into contempt and reproach by speeches. The result was acquittal. They lacked one vote of having the necessary two-thirds.

IMPEACHMENT OF WILLIAM W. BELKNAP.

The seventh case was against William Belknap, Secretary of War under Grant's administration. He was charged in 1876 with accepting a portion of the profits of an Army post tradership from a post trader. There was no statutory crime. The Military Committee informed him that unless he resigned he would be impeached, and he resigned two hours before the impeachment proceedings were brought by the House; and then the Senate acquitted him because of lack of jurisdiction. President Grant accepted his resignation, and he no longer being a civil officer was acquitted.

IMPEACHMENT OF CHARLES SWAYNE.

The next case was that of Charles Swayne, and here is an enumeration of the charges: (a) He had rendered false claims against the Government in his expense account; (b) that he had appropriated to his own use a railroad car in possession of the receiver appointed by him and on account of improper expenditure incident to the improper use of this car; (c) that he had resided outside of the district in violation of a statute; (d) had adjudged certain parties to be in contempt of court and imposed heavy fines and prison sentences without warrant of law. The result was acquittal.

IMPEACHMENT OF ROBERT W. ARCHBALD.

The next case was that against Judge Archbald, in 1912. He was impeached on 13 different articles, and the substance of those articles was: (a) For being interested in transactions and sales of coal mines with railroad companies who had cases in his court; (b) because he heard matters not in open court and permitted himself to be influenced when off of the bench; (c) attempting to procure financial favors from litigants who were successful in his court; (d) acceptance of $500 from the bar for a pleasure trip; (e) the appointment of a rail

road attorney for a jury commissioner; (f) general misbehavior as a judge. They found him guilty.

Mr. IGOE. Do you recall how many specifications there were?

Mr. WELTY. I think there were 12 or 13 articles of impeachment against him.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose they were voted on separately?

Mr. WELTY. Yes, sir; every one of them was voted separately. I am sorry I have not the record here. The record shows conviction, I judge, on two-thirds of the articles.

Mr. GARD. Without desiring to influence your method of presentation, but just for myself as one member of the committee, I would be pleased if you would give me and the committee your statement of the evidence, if you have any, on the first charge you have made—

For neglecting his official duties for another gainful occupation not connected therewith.

Just make a statement and if you have any such evidence on that tell us what it is.

Mr. WELTY. The contract that I submitted to this committee showing that he is to receive $50,000 for performing the services enumerated in that contract. That would take all of his time, because I think it takes all of the time even of the advisory committee of baseball, the subcommittees. If it takes all the time of these subcommittees, it will take the time of himself, and he has appointed since then his secretary at a salary of $7,500, a young lawyer in Chicago.

Mr. GARD. Tell me this: Can we base a charge of impeachment on what we may think is going to occur, or are we limited to what has occurred, showing a neglect of his official duties?

Mr. WELTY. What has occurred, and what you can reasonably presume will occur if he discharges his duties faithfully under that contract. The next charge is for using his office--

Mr. GARD (interposing). Is that all you have on the first one? Do you want to submit the contract and the possible relation between his contract and his duties as judge in support of the first charge?

Mr. WELTY. Yes; and that was my purpose in showing the number of cases on the docket; over 3,700 cases on the docket at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. You said his salary was $50,000. You mean to say $42,500?

Mr. WELTY. No; the salary under the contract was $50,000, but he refused to accept the $50,000 because he was receiving then from the Government of the United States, from the people, for performing the duties of district judge, $7,500, but the contract provides for $50,000.

Mr. IGOE. Is there any statement that this $7,500 was generously remitted.

Mr. WELTY. No; with the exception of Judge Landis's statement. Mr. BOIES. Do you know the situation with reference to this young man's case, whether he was indicted or whether it was after conviction that he said he should not be punished because he was underpaid by his employers?

Mr. WELTY. No; I have made no study of that case, because I have had my hands full in studying this one case.

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. It must have been after conviction, because he said he would suspend sentence.

Mr. BOIES. It looks to me like that is more serious than the case of the judge who released a vessel without demanding a bond.

Mr. IGOE. In that connection, the young man in that case may have indicated he would enter a plea of guilty because the Supreme Court has ruled expressly, recently, that a judge has no power to suspend sentence, and that is why this committee has been trying to put through a probation law. The Supreme Court in the Killetts case issued a rule on Judge Killett at Detroit because after sentencing a man to three years he suspended the sentence.

Mr. BOIES. I think it is a mighty bad thing for a Federal judge to say to the world to-day that a man should not be punished for a crime because he might be underpaid.

Mr. CHRISTOPHERSON. He just deferred sentence. That is what he did in that case.

The CHAIRMAN. He was simply put under bond in some way so that he would appear later on for sentence.

Mr. YATES. You started to say he was appointed in 1905?

Mr. WELTY. Yes, sir; the office was created by Congress on March 5, 1905, and he was appointed on March 18, 1905, because of the congestion of the docket there. If the committee will just be patient with me I will try and hurry through. In this case against Judge Archbald, the late Congressman Sterling, who was one of the managers of that case and appeared before the Senate, said-I am only going to read one paragraph:

The decisions of the Senate of the United States, of the various State tribunals, which have jurisdiction over impeachment cases, and of the Parliament of England, all agree that an offense in order to be impeachable need not be indictable, either at common law or under any statute.

I have made a search of all the law I could find and it agrees with the statement of the late Congressman Sterling who was one of the managers

Mr. YATES (interposing). What are you reading?

Mr. WELTY. I am reading from the arguments in the Archbald case. Mr. YATES. Page what?

Mr. WELTY. Page 83.

Now, I want to hurry with this because I realize that all I can give and hope to give the committee is simply a few of the points of law which I have found.

Mr. GARD. We do not want the law; we want the evidence you have. I think some of us are fairly well versed in the law of impeachment by reason of experience, but we would like to have the evidence on your charges so that we may later apply the law.

Mr. WELTY. The second charge is

For using his office as district judge of the United States to settle disputes which might come into his court as provided by the laws of the United States. As I read here from the Baseball Magazine, and their own contracts and their own statements, the baseball associations were in trouble at that time and the matter, I think, was then pending-I am not so sure, and I am not going to make this as a positive statement, because I have not had time-in the Federal court in Chicago. You might know that better, Governor, than I do. I do not know about that. Another case was pending here in the district court. Mr. GARD. What was pending in the district court in Chicago? Mr. WELTY. The baseball trouble.

Mr. GARD. The indictments against some of these individual players?

Mr. WELTY. No; the trouble between the different leagues. Mr. IGOE. Is there any litigation now pending in the district court?

Mr. WELTY. No; the matter was settled by this agreement.

Mr. IGOE. I understand that, but was there litigation actually pending in the district court at Chicago when he entered into this contract?

Mr. WELTY. I said I was not positive.

Mr. IGOE. Was there any litigation involving these baseball clubs or leagues pending in the district court at Chicago? Mr. WELTY. Not there; it was pending here. Mr. IGOE. I am trying to find out if there was

Mr. WELTY (interposing). That was pending between the Baltimore team and the other teams here.

Mr. IGOE. I understand that, Mr. Welty, but I understood you to say, I may have misunderstood you, that there was litigation pending in the district court at Chicago, involving these clubs.

Mr. WELTY. No; not as I know.

Mr. IGOE. Then let us have the record clear on that.

Mr. WELTY. Yes. The only matter in Chicago, as I said, was the threatened lawsuit, as the Baseball Magazine said, and they simply settled these matters by coming together and by his becoming the arbiter.

Mr. WALSH. There was no way in which this Baltimore case could come into his court.

Mr. WELTY. Yes; it would go into the Federal court.

Mr. WALSH. No; you say into his court; that it might come into his court.

Mr. WELTY. Yes; that very case. That is what I say. If you will remember, I tried to give you a statement from the Baseball Magazine of December where it spoke about the differences there and that they were likely to result in a lawsuit in Chicago, and the matter was being settled by making Judge Landis the chief arbiter.

Mr. IGOE. Now, Mr. Welty, right there, are there any cases pending or were there any cases pending in the State courts, civil cases, which might be removable to the Federal court of which Judge Landis was judge at the time this contract was made?

Mr. WELTY. So that you will understand, these cases had not gone that far. They had not been filed in any court yet.

Mr. IGOE. Had litigation been threatened?

Mr. WELTY. Threatened, yes; that is a good word.

Mr. IGOE. What proof have you of that?

Mr. WELTY. I read it from the Baseball Magazine.

Mr. BOIES. And you say there were cases pending in the Federal court in some other district?

Mr. WELTY. In the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia there was a case pending where these very organizations that hired him and entered into the contract with Judge Landis were fined $240,000, and the case was pending unreversed at the time he accepted this employment as chief arbiter in this illegal combination.

Mr. IGOE. They had already been fined by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for violating the Sherman antitrust law.