lence, and urge us to make the cultivation and exercise of it the supreme pleasure and end of our lives-In order to make this appear more fully, we have only to take a survey of human life, the reverse of what we have already attended to. Injuries are increased by mutual injuries, till at last mutual sufferings oblige both parties to desist: the increase and constitution of human nature give numberless admonitions to forbear; and the hand of every man, and the power of every thing, is against the malevolent. So that, if we suppose a number of beings to be purely malevolent, and consequently to have an indefinite number of enemies, they would first cease from their enmity on account of their mutual sufferings, and become purely selfish, each being his own sole friend and protector; and afterwards, by mutual good offices, endear themselves to each other; so that at last each of them would have an indefinite number of friends, and thus would be indefinitely happy.-This is, in part, mere supposition; but its obvious correspondence with what we see and feel in real life, is a strong argument both of the infinite goodness of God, and consequently of the tendency of all beings to unlimited happiness through benevolence. For the beings whom we have supposed to set out with pure malevolence, could no more rest at pure selfishness, or any other intermediate point, than they could at pure malevolence. And thus the arguments which exclude pure malevolence, necessarily infer that pure unlimited benevolence should be the ultimate object of man. Culture of Benevolence. For 69. In order to augment the benevolent, and suppress the malevolent affections, we should diligently practise all such acts of friendship, generosity, and compassion as our abilities of any kind extend to; and rigorously refrain from all sallies of anger, resentment, envy, jealousy, &c. though our affections are not directly and immediately subject to the voluntary power, yet our actions are; and, consequently, through them, our affections. He that at first practises acts of benevolence by constraint, and continues to practise them, will at last have associated with them such a variety of pleasures, as to transfer a great instantaneous pleasure upon them, and produce in himself the affections from which they naturally flow. In the like manner, if we abstain from malevolent actions and expressions, we shall dry up the ill passions which are the sources of them. 70. With the same objects in view, it will be of great use frequently to dwell upon the preat pleasures and rewards attending on benevolence; and also upon the many evils, present and future, to which the contrary disposition exposes us. For thus we shall likewise transfer pleasure and pain, by association, upon these dispositions respectively; and rational self-interest will be made to produce pure benevolence, and to extinguish all kinds and degrees of malevolence. 71. Frequent and fervent prayer for others, friends, benefactors, strangers, and enemies, has a very great and decided tendency to augment benevolence, and to extinguish malevolence. All exertions of our affections cherish them; and those made under the more immediate sense of the divine attributes have an extraordinary efficacy, in this respect, by mixing the love, awe, and other exalted emotions of the mind attending our addresses to God, with our affections towards man, so as to improve and purify them. Petitions for the increase of our benevolence, and the suppression of our benevolence, have the same tendency.-Again, all meditations upon the attributes of God, and particularly upon his infinite benevolence towards all his creatures, have a strong tendency to refine and augment our benevolent affections.—And, lastly, the frequent consideration of our own unworthiness, our entire dependence upon God, &c. raises in us compassion for others, as well as concern and earnest desires and pray. ers for ourselves. And compassion, in this imperfect probationary state, is an essential and principal part of our benevolent affections. Rules for the Conduct of Men towards each other in Society. PRACTICAL BENEVOLENCE. 72. Having now established the position, that benevolence should be a primary pursuit of men, it follows, that we should aim to direct every action, so as to produce the greatest happiness and the least misery in our power. This is the rule of conduct towards our fellow-creatures, which universal unlimited benevo lence inculcates.-But the application of this rule in real life, is attended with considerable difficulties and perplexities. It is impossible for the most sagacious and experienced to make any very accurate estimate of the future consequences of particular actions, so as, in all the variety of circumstances which occur, to deter mine justly which action would contribute most to augment happiness and lessen misery. Instead, therefore, of this very general rule, we must substitute others less extensive and subordinate to it, admitting of a more commodious application. Whatever rules are laid down for this purpose, it is obvious, that their coincidence must add strength to each; and that when they differ, or are apparently opposite to each other, this difference or opposition must moderate or restrain their application. On the whole, however, the general result will prove the best direction for promoting the happiness, and lessening the misery of others. 73. Hartley lays down the following ten subordinate rules: "1. That we obey the Scripture precepts, in the natural, obvious meaning of them.-2. That we should pay great regard to the dictates of our own moral sense, and to those of others.3. That in deliberate actions we should weigh the probable consequence on each side.-4. That we are not to be guided implicitly by the mere impulse of compassion and good will; yet that great regard should be paid to them in our conduct.-5. That we should place ourselves in the situation of the persons concerned. -6. That persons in the near relations of life, benefactors, dependants and enemies, seem to have, in most cases, a prior claim to strangers.-7. That benevolent and religious persons have, all other things being equal, a prior claim to the rest of mankind.-8. That we should contribute, as far as lies in our power, to the moral and religious improvement of others.-9. That we ought to pay the strictest regard to truth, both in our affirmations and in our promises.-10. That we ought to obey the civil magistrate and the laws of the community." These rules we think truly unexceptionable; and we shall follow the order of Hartley, enlarging on some of them as we proceed. It appears, however, to be desirable, that we first enter a little into the consideration of the necessity of our acting upon general rules of conduct. 74. To show that general rules of conduct are necessary in the present state of human nature, it is simply requisite to answer the question, what would be the state of things without them? We should then be under the necessity of calculating, in every case that comes before us, on what side the good or evil attending cer tain actions preponderates. In fact, our lives would be a series of thought, instead of what they were designed to be, a series of action. A total stop would be put to the business of life, and, instead of regularity and consistency in a person's conduct, we must expect to find nothing but a series of actions, constantly proceeding from no steady principle, and marked with all the features of inconsistency.— But, further, we are led to the same conclusion, when we consider our ignorance of futurity, and the little time and leisure possessed by the generality of men for the investigation of the consequences of their actions. We not unfrequently are unable precisely to trace even those consequences which are immediate and apparent, still less those which arise silently and gradually in the lapse of time. The consequences of our actions may last, when the agents have long ceased to exist as children of mortality. Our actions may influence others; our deviations may produce more extensive deviations, of which we have no knowledge. Perhaps there is scarcely an important action in our lives, the consequences of which are confined to ourselves, or even to our own sphere of observation. Besides, if we were unable to lay down general rules for conduct, and were obliged to decide upon each action as it occurred, it is scarcely possible that we should avoid the influence of heated feeling; and seldom should we possess that abstraction of mind, which would enable us to leave the present out of consideration, and view with calmness and impartiality the tendency of our actions. Innumerable are the cases, in which interest or passion paint in vivid colours the course to which they prompt, and throw into the back ground, and render almost imperceptible, the dangers which should induce us steadily and perseveringly to avoid it : hence, we may lay it down as indispensably necessary, that there should be general rules for conduct, and consequently a deviation from a general rule must of itself be an evil. 75. Yet there are cases, in which the general rule seems to fail of application; in which the immediate consequences are such as benevolence, equally with self-interest, seems to reject. In such cases our inquiry should be, what would be the consequence, if the conduct became general, which, in my individual case, seems to be so favourable to happiness, social or private. And if we have reason to believe that it would be injurious, our belief in the beneficlal tendency of the individual action should be considered as less founded; we should perhaps in all cases, certainly in most, unhesitatingly sacrifice much private advantage, and even the apparent good of others, to consistency in our adherence to what on the whole must be best. We may indeed think that the consequences, which would arise from the general adoption of our individual conduct ought not to be attributed in any way to us; but we should recollect, that if we once break down the barrier, however small the breach, the advantage gained by the enemy is evident. In fact, when once we remove the limits which reason and revelation fix, we usurp to ourselves the privilege of the Almighty, and cannot fail to prove our own weakness. It is on this ground, and with great justice, that Paley considers crimes as deriving their criminality, not so much from the consequences of the individual action, as from the consequences which would result from such actions becoming general. Thus the man, who, by the forgery of a one pound note, may probably render no individual injury worth estimating in the punishment of a fellow creature; and another, who, by the forgery of a large bill, without direct intention, ruins an individual family, are both equally culpable in the eye of reason, and perhaps, as far as punishment is beneficial to others, he who has forged the one pound note deserves greater severity of punishment, because the means of committing his depredation on society are much more practicable than in the other case. But in both, it is not the individual injury sustained that is to regulate the proportion of demerit, but the consequences which would follow the total destruction of commercial intercourse and the mutual confidence. 76. By the application of this important principle, much of the obscurity is dissipated which seems to involve some questions on morals, which are intimately connected with the well being of society.Many of those violations of veracity, for instance, which even benevolence seems to authorize, will appear to be direct deviations from the soundest principles of morality, and consequently to be unauthorized by benevolence, when viewed in their fair extent, however much the immediate consequences may seem to demand them. There is, however, one restriction to this rule, which seems to be necessary, in order to enable us fully to submit to its influence. It is, whether the probability of our conduct being generally adopted be sufficient to counterbalance the advantages or disadvantages which would arise, if such general adoption took place. Let us apply it to the case I have already adduced of the violation of truth. Now it is very obvious that in most cases, in which there is any strong tendency to such violation, it arises from the desire to remove or avoid some ill attending our adherence. Hence the temptation to repetition, either by ourselves or others, will always be sufficiently powerful, if no counterbalancing considerations prevented, to induce us to deviate from truth, and therefore the probability of our conduct becoming general is indefinitely great, and consequently indefinitely strengthens the reasons we draw against such deviations from their ill effects, if they become general. On the other hand, it is obvious, that if all who could afford it gave to the poor to the extent of their ability, the sources of industry would be dried up, and society would immediately fall into such confusion, that if the ideas of punishment were not very enlightened, alms-giving might be deemed a capital crime. Hence we might argue from the general principle already laid down, that we ought not to give at all; and we think Paley defective in appearance at least for having furnished no clue to a solution of the difficulty. It is immediately solved by the restrictive rule which has been laid down; what is the probability that alms-giving will become general, or even so general as to produce the feared effects in a small degree? If this be very small, we have nothing more to do than to consider which is the best direction for our superfluities, and give, with the certainty that our conduct will not become so universal as to render it injurious instead of beneficial. We now proceed, following Hartley as our outline, to consider those rules of conduct, by which we may safely guide ourselves through the intricacies of human life. 77. The first rule is, that we obey the Scripture precepts in the natural obvious meaning of them.-The Scripture precepts are indeed in themselves the rule of life. There is, however, the same kind of difficulty in applying them accurately to particular cases, as in applying the above mentioned most general rule, by means of an estimate of the conse quences of actions. It is impossible in many particular cases to determine precisely the connection of the action with the precept. However, unless it would obviously lead a person to act in opposi tion to some or other of the following rules, it is the safest way, in the particular circumstances of real life, to recollect the Scripture precepts, and follow them in their first and most obvious sense. 78. Secondly, great regard must be had both to the dictates of our own moral sense, and that of others. It is remarked, with great justice, by Dr. Aikin, that, in a mind whose moral powers have been cultivated, second thoughts are seldom the best. The first are the impulse of well regulated feeling, and are produced instantaneously, without attention to all the petty suggestions of self, which crowd themselves in various ways into our minds, and by leading to doubt, and then aided by inclination to disobey, prevent the efficacy of the conscience, and throw a mist over the before clear directions of duty.-With respect to the moral sense of others two motives should induce us to regard its dictates. The one is purely benevolent: we ought not to throw any impediment in the way of the duty of others: the other is, that prudence and humility direct, that we use the experience and the feelings produced by great moral culture as guides of our own conduct. 79. Thirdly, it is very proper, that in all deliberate actions, we weigh, as well as we can, the probable consequences on each side, and suffer the balance to have some influence in all cases, and particularly where the other rules do not interfere, or where they fail of application. But they are generally the dictates of self-interest and pride, to be determined by our own judgments as to consequence, in opposition to rules of duty. 80. Fourthly, the impulse of the more instantaneous emotions of good-will and compassion will not always furnish a sufficient guide; at the same time they ought to have great regard paid to them, lest we contract a philosophic hardness of heart, by pretending to act upon higher and more extensively benevolent views than vulgar minds, or the more feeling sex, &c. Some, however, carry this much too far on the other side, and encourage many public mischiefs, through a false misguided tenderness to criminals, persons in distress through present vice, c. When feeling is thus made the guide of conduct, he who can best play upon the sympathy, and best decorate his tale of woe, will meet with a reward for his ingenuity, due only to modest merit which shrinks from the public view, or at least obtrudes not itself upon our notice. The injury done to society at large by this ill-directed compassion, so generally prevalent, because it gratifies without trouble, is very great indeed; and while we have it in our power to cultivate compassion and sympathy, by the view and the relief of real misery and suffering worth, the desire of such cultivation is scarcely sufficient to exculpate us, when our minds have acquired some degree of comprehension, from the charge of preferring a selfish, indolent gratification to the good of others. To use the words of the elegant Stewart, "the dictates of reason and conscience inform us, in language which it is impossible to mistake, that it is sometimes a duty to check the most amiable and pleasing emotions of the heart; to withdraw, for example, from the sight of those distresses which stronger claims forbid us to relieve, and to deny ourselves that exquisite luxury which arises from the exercise of humanity." 81. Fifthly, the rule of placing ourselves in the several situations of the persons concerned, and inquiring what we should then expect, is of excellent use for directing, enforcing, and restraining our actions, and for producing in us a steady, constant sense of what is fit and equitable.-This rule is so comprehensive, that it may be called the sum and substance of Christian morality. It has been objected by some, that it teaches nothing, for it shows not what justice is: and that it is an improper rule, for we ought not to do to others what we should wish them to do to us, but what we may justly expect them to do to us. But this is no real objection. The object of the rule most probably is, to serve as a criterion of duty which should counteract the im pressions of itself. We never need fear lest we should carry our imaginary substitution to too great a length, and think of what passion or interest might lead us to expect: when not under the influence of passion or interest, it is more than probable that we shall be guided sufficiently accurately. Our only danger is, lest we should not go far enough; that we should admit of this principle, which, if circumstances had been real, ought to have had no place. This rule of duty, says Dr. Reid, comprehends every rule of justice, without exception. It compre. hends all the relative duties, arising either from the more permanent relations of parent and child, of master and servant, of magistrate and subject, of husband and wife, or from the more tran sient relations of rich and poor, of buyer and seller, of debtor and creditor, of benefactor and beneficiary, of friend and enemy. It comprehends every duty of charity and humanity, and even of cour tesy and good manners. He who acts invariably by this rule, will never deviate from the principle of his duty but from an error of his judgment. 82. The word justice, (says Mr. Stewart, in his "Outlines"), in its most extensive signification, denotes that disposition which leads us, where our own temper, or passions, or interest, are concerned, to determine and to act, without being biassed by partial considerations. In order to free our minds from the influence of these, experience teaches us, either to recollect the judgments we have formerly passed, in similar circumstances, on the conduct of others; or to state cases to ourselves, in which we, and all our personal concerns, are entirely left out of the question. Justice operates, first, in restraining the partialities of the temper and of the passions; and, secondly, in restraining the partialities of selfishness, where a competition takes place between our interests and those of other men.These two modifications of justice may be distinguished from each other, by calling the first candour, the second integrity or honesty. The professor's remarks on the subject of candour are very valuable and important; and we deem no apology necessary for laying them before our readers. This disposition, he observes, may be considered in three points of view; as it is displayed in judging of the talents of others, in judging of their intentions, and in controversy. 83. The difficulty of estimating candidly the talents of other men arises, in a great measure, from the tendency of emulation to degenerate into envy. Notwithstanding the reality of the theoretical distinction between these dispositions of mind, it is certain that in practice nothing is more arduous than to realize it completely; and to check that self-partiality, which, while it leads us to dwell on our own personal advantages, and to magnify them in our own estimation, prevents us either from attending sufficiently to the merits of others, or from viewing them in the most favourable light. Of all this a good man will soon be satisfied, from his own experience; and he will endeavour to guard against it as far as he is able, by judging of the pretensions of a rival, or even of an enemy, as he would have done, if there had been no interfer. VOL. IX. ence between his claims and theirs. In other words, he will endeavour to do justice to their merits, and to bring himself, if possible, to love and to honour that genius and ability which have eclipsed his own. Nor will he retire in disgust from the race, because he has been outstripped by others, but will redouble all his exertions in the service of mankind; recollecting, that if nature has been more partial to others than to him in her intellectual gifts, she has left open to all the theatre of virtue; where the merits of individuals are determined, not by their actual attainments, but by the use and improvement they make of those advantages which their situation has afforded them. 84. Candour in judging of the inten tions of others is a disposition of still greater importance.-It is highly probable that there is much less vice, or criminal intention, in the world, than is commonly imagined; and that the greater part of the disputes among mankind arise from mutual mistake, or misapprehension. Every man must recollect many instances, in which his motives have been grossly misapprehended by the world; and it is reasonable for him to allow that the case may have been the same with other men. It is but an instance, then, of that justice we owe to others, to make the most candid allowances for their apparent deviation, and to give every action the most favourable construction it can possibly admit of. Such a temper, while it renders a man respectable and amiable in society, contributes, perhaps more than any other circumstance, to his private happiness. 85. Candour, in controversy, implies a strong sense of justice, united to a sincere and disinterested love of truth. It is a disposition of mind so difficult to preserve, and so rarely to be met with, that the most useful rule, perhaps, to be given with respect to it, is, to avoid the occasions of dispute and opposition. A love of controversy indicates not only an overweening vanity, and a disregard for truth, but in general, perhaps always, it indicates a mediocrity of genius; for it arises from those feelings of envy and jealousy, which provoke little minds to depreciate the merit of useful discoveries. He who is conscious of his own inventive powers, and whose great object is to add to the stock of human knowledge, will reject unwillingly any plausible doctrine, till after the most severe examination; and will separate with pa Rr |