them together to demonstrate complete prototype systems in calendar year 1976. Before going ahead with full-scale engineering development, we want to demonstrate that the entire system works, what its range will be, and what its accuracy will be.

Senator INOUYE. What is the practical range?

Dr. CURRIE. The range on the short end will be about [deleted] nautical-miles, and on the long end about [deleted] nautical miles, depending upon the configuration. If one carried one of these in a bomb rack of a B-52, for example, one could only make it a certain length and it would have a range of [deleted] to [deleted] miles. If one carries it on the pylon of the wings of a B-52, it would have a range of around [deleted] nautical-miles by incorporating a belly tank. The submarine version will have a range of about [deleted]

nautical-miles.

Now, the two largest programs in the strategic area are, of course, the B-1 and Trident. These are the two large full-scale engineering development programs, and together they account for about 60 percent of the proposed strategic budget of $2.5 billion.

I won't comment explicitly on the Trident program other than to say technically it is coming along well and will meet or better its contract delivery date.

B-1 PROGRAM

In the B-1 program, we have conducted over the last year under the auspices of D.D.R. & E. something called the joint strategic bomber study. It is joint because other parts of DOD, including the Air Force, participated. It has been an extensive study in which the B-1 has been compared with other possible forces, consisting of upgrading B-52's, stretched FB-111's, and so on. They have been studied extensively, and by extensively, I mean it has been probably the largest computer program of its kind in recent years. It has consumed over 5,000 hours of prime computer time. But it has provided some real insights into the B-1.

What it has told me about the B-1 is that in comparing these various equal cost forces that the B-1 is the cost-effective solution if one agrees with the threat that is presented in the late 1980's. I think this puts the B-1 in the proper perspective.

For the threat we have right now, if it stayed statistically the same as right now, then the investment in a B-52, in putting new engines and new wings on a B-52 is adequate. But if one accepts the threat that is projected for the late 1980's, then on a cost-effective basis, the B-1, as costly as it is, appears clearly to be the route to go as compared with a B-52 upgraded force, and particularly as compared with an upgraded FB-111 force.

PROJECTED UNIT COST

Senator INOUYE. Will your further research under this program add to the projected unit cost? The Air Force this morning submitted its statement on the B-1 and predicted what the program unit cost would be. Now you are saying further study will be made; that further research will be carried out.

Dr. CURRIE. Right now the B-1 is in full-scale engineering development. Fiscal year 1976, as a matter of fact, is about its peak year. There

is $672 million in the budget for the B-1 program. There is not yet, however, a commitment to manufacture the bomber. The efforts to be carried out during the next year are involved with extensively testing the prototype airplanes that we do have and doing that engineering which will be needed to pin down the manufacturing costs on an even more solid basis. When we come up to a decision for commitment to manufacturing, we will have this extensive test and evaluation on real aircraft under our belts as well as cost estimates and a reassessment of the threat.

Senator INOUYE. Do you anticipate any major change in development which might affect the cost?

Dr. CURRIE. In my view right now, we have a pretty good handle on the cost, and we are doing everything possible in the program of development to bring those costs down. I do not see them escalating further. Senator INOUYE. You do not anticipate anything major?

Dr. CURRIE. NO; I don't. We have examined this very carefully. I think the Air Force has done a rigorous job. They have taken things out of the B-1 to make it less costly. For example, the inlets to the engines had a very complex variable geometry that varied with speed and altitude. This has all been taken out during the last year. There was a very expensive crew escape module which has been taken out of the production design. These things will reduce the cost, or at least keep the cost where it is now.

COST OF B-1 AS COMPARED TO ANGLO-FRENCH CONCORDE

Now, let me put the cost of the B-1 into a little perspective here. It is a very expensive airplane. It is about the same size as the AngloFrench Concorde. The Anglo-French Concorde has some of the same characteristics. It is roughly the same size and it is supersonic. It costs roughly $3 billion on the part of the French and British Governments to develop their airplane. It will cost us about $3.9 billion to develop the B-1. The cost of the Concorde as nearly as I can ascertain it in fiscal year 1975 dollars is between $45 and $50 million. This is without development funds amortized over the cost. That is just the purchase price with the Governments absorbing the development.

Now, in 1975 dollars, the cost of the B-1 is roughly in that same category. Call it $50 million. Of course, the price in future years will depend on the year in which it is manufactured, the rate of manufacture, and what inflation takes place between now and then. That is why we hear all of these numbers.

I think comparing it with the Anglo-French Concorde puts it in some kind of perspective anyway. Ultimately, of course, it has to be related to the threat. I think the Joint Strategic Bomber Study has provided this insight. And it is a matter of the risk we want to take. If we really felt that the threat wouldn't change between now and 15 years from now, an adequate solution would be to put new engines and new wings on the B-52.

If one thinks the threat will develop, the air defense threat from the Soviet Union, and the submarine threat, then as long as we can continue the B-1 program within its presently projected limits, then it is a cost-effective solution, as expensive as that is.

49-101 O-75 - 3R

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION COMMAND AND CONTROL

I would like to point out a couple of other programs in the strategic area. One is what we call the strategic communication command and control area. This is very critical.

The problem is one of the highest priority in the Defense Department, to get a command and control communications system between the national command authority and our nuclear forces wherever they are in the world, which is impregnable, which is survivable in case of nuclear attack.

So, we have several satellite improvement programs, satellite communications programs, the SANGUINE system which is an extremely low-frequency system to communicate with nuclear submarines which will address this problem.

In general, space systems are constituting an increasingly pervasive and important part of the overall DOD capability. I call your attention to one program called the NAVSTAR global positioning system which will reach for its feasibility demonstration a peak funding next year of about $90 million. It has within its concept the possibilities of not only saving a couple hundred million dollars a year for DOD in navigation systems but could also be used potentially in civilian navigation. Even more importantly, it can revolutionize in the 1980's, the late 1980's, both tactical weapon delivery and strategic weapon delivery.

OTHER STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

Senator INOUYE. What sort of projects would come under your supervision in the command and control area? AWACS?

Dr. CURRIE. NO, AWACS is regarded as a tactical system.

In the Strategic Command and Control area one would be the advanced airborne command post program.

Senator INOUYE. The E-4A?

Dr. CURRIE. Yes; the 747 with the communications equipment. Another would be something called the defense satellite communications system. This communications satellite, there are two of them in synchronous orbit right now that provide a specialized communications system to our forces worldwide. There will be an attempt to make this more and more secure, to make these satellites less vulnerable to physical attack or electronic attack, jamming and so on.

There is a program called AFSATCOM which has transponders on various satellites that the Air Force can use to communicate with its strategic bomber force.

SANGUINE is a proposed system which we will carry on some of the early R. & D. next year, which is a buried system at extremely low frequencies which can survive a nuclear attack and by which we can communicate with the submarine forces.

Those are the kind of things under the strategic command and control.

Obviously it is not tenable to make our strategic forces highly survivable unless we can communicate with them in an equivalent survivable method.

If I may, I would like to turn to the general purpose forces. I have talked about the strategic forces.

GENERAL PURPOSES FORCES

The general purpose forces for conventional warfare, if you will, are becoming more and more important in our overall deterrence posture because, as we arrive at a situation of general strategic nuclear equivalence and parity, then we can turn to our conventional forces for deterrence, and we want that deterrence again to be very strong, to raise the threshold for any conflict, much less nuclear conflict.

Tactical warfare is undergoing a transformation. I think that we hold the initiative in such potentially revolutionary areas, and I use that word in a considered way, such as first shot destruction with precision guided ordnance delivered at a great distance, standoff control of battlefield weapons, night vision, powerful new techniques for surveillance and command and control, and certainly AWACS would fit in that category.

Let me touch on the ground forces as part of this overall capability. Ground warfare in the future certainly will have several characteristics, and several of these one could begin to see in the Middle East conflict of a year ago. The forces will be highly mobile. The armor will be very densely deployed or there will be dense deployment of air defenses. There will be an unprecedented concentration of firepower. Electronic warfare, which had its infancy in World War II, and has been slowly maturing over the years, is now very clearly organic. It has to be regarded as part of our organic capability, and it will be pervasive and sophisticated.

And, as I mentioned, the precision weapon control and targeting capability will be present. We are addressing all these areas.

The XM-1 tank prototype tank program, for example, will come to fruition next year. There will be two U.S. prototypes and maybe a Leopard II prototype modified to meet XM-1 goals. They will be tested against each other. They will present what I would call valid options and we will have to decide whether we go forward or not. They will demonstrate whether we can meet certain technical goals and certain cost goals. Both of these have to be achieved.

In the meantime, while the prototype program is going forward, we do have improvement programs on the assets we do have, the M-60 series of tanks. I just use that as an example of programs in the ground warfare area.

SAM-D is a very expensive but very capable new generation air defense equipment for the Field Army. It embodies in it a technology that I think will be absolutely needed in the 1980 to 1990 time period. It is undergoing a very rigorous program of test and evaluation to test this concept out during the next year before proceeding with the full-scale development of that system.

TACTICAL AIR FORCES

Going from the ground warfare to our tactical air forces, I think clearly we have a superiority, we have an edge in tactical air. But tactical air represents a huge investment by any standard. So that our whole thrust in this area is to use the resources we have more efficiently, both the investment resources we have for future capability and in order to enhance the assets that we have deployed now.

One thrust in this direction, of course, is the Air Force air combat fighter program, the F-16, the turning away from increasingly heavy, complex, sophisticated air combat fighters to a much more specialized, lighter, less costly solution to that problem, so that we can maintain our force levels in the future with constrained resources and, in fact, increase our force level hopefully and decrease the cost of ownership. Another way we can use our tactical air assets, that is the forces we have, more effectively is through a capability like AWACS. AWACS is a controversial program right now, and it is not a very well understood program. Basically, AWACS is a command and control system that is airborne. It has a revolutionary type or radar in it that gives it that capability, but it is not a weapons system by itself. It controls billions of dollars' worth of assets that we have now.

If one can take 1 billion dollars' worth of assets and clearly increase their effectiveness by 20 percent, then that has a value and that is the value that should be looked at in looking at the cost of the AWACS system, and we have addressed it on this basis.

Another way of making our tactical air forces more efficient by using those investments we already have is through precision weapons. We are giving rise to a generation of precision weapons some of which were demonstrated in their rudimentary form in Southeast Asia and others more recently in the Middle East, which will permit extremely accurate surgical delivery of ordnance at a standoff range and therefore make our tactical air forces more efficient, less vulnerable, and hence of more value.

DEFENSE SUPPRESSION AREA

In still another thrust in this area is the whole defense suppression area. Clearly, attrition in modern warfare is extremely high. The Soviets have very powerful mobile ground air defense systems, as was evident in the Middle East war. These defenses must be suppressed. There is a whole series of programs and techniques to use them in suppressing those air defenses. Electronic jamming, antiradiation airto-ground missiles, precision ordnance, and so on. The use of RPV's.

NAVAL FORCES

Let's go on to the Naval forces. One of the many disturbing trends, of course, is the very large buildup in the Soviet nuclear attack submarine force. They are building a very large force.

We, as the Nation who has to keep our sea lines of communication open to many parts of the world for many reasons, view that with concern. So we are providing renewed emphasis to the whole antisubmarine warfare area.

Ship defense is also a critical problem.

Senator INOUYE. You mentioned the F-16 for the Air Force. You have a special category for the Navy. Am I correct in assuming that the Navy has decided upon something other than the 16?

Dr. CURRIE. I should have covered that. The Navy is in source selection right now. It is studying whether a derivative of the F-16 is appropriate for the Navy mission. This selection will be made during the coming month. It remains to be seen. I am not optimistic frankly that a very close derivative of the F-16 will be bought by the Navy.