a. Heavy Lift Helicopter Developments The value of the technological option engineering approach is nowhere better evidenced than in this program area. As a result of this approach, plans are to terminate the Army's Heavy Lift Helicopter program prior to full scale development. High cost projections derived from information gained through advanced development have allowed us to make this decision prior to expenditure of any production funds. At the same time the Navy's CH-53E program has progressed to the point where a knowledgeable decision to continue into engineering development is expected sometime early this year. Details of these programs are as follows: Heavy Lift Helicopter (HLH) In September 1970 the Army was designated as lead Service to undertake the Advance Technology Component (ATC) program to seek maximum reduction of cost and risk associated with the major components of an HLH system. The HLH prototype program was added as a modification to the ATC program in November 1972 in order to flight prove the advanced technology components developed under the ATC program. Due to the high production costs involved, the program will not proceed beyond the ATC/prototype phase. llowever, the current technology program will be completed because important proofs of technology can be gained from flight test of a 35-ton payload aircraft utilizing advanced fly-by-wire stabilization and flight control system, a two-point winch-powered suspension system, and composite rotor blades. The original program cost planning estimate of $189.9 million has been revised upward to $218.9 million of which $179 million has been expended. The revised program cost estimate allows for $8.1 million in escalation and provides 95% certainty of not exceeding $220 million for the program. In FY 1976, $19.8 million is being requested in order to complete ATC testing, continue fabrication of a single prototype and complete qualification testing of the XT701 engine to power the prototype aircraft. As in all such programs, there is the risk that the single prototype may be lost in test which would necessarily terminate the program. Due to the decision to not proceed beyond the ATC/prototype phase, the second prototype, which was requested last year, cannot be justified. If successfully demonstrated, the results of the HLH advanced technology program will constitute a solid technology base for future developments, if required. The YCH-53E prototype is now in the preliminary stages of flight test. During testing, the YCH-53E has successfully lifted its design goal of 16 tons, twice the payload of its precedecessor, the CH-53D. Navy Preliminary Evaluation (NPE) Phase I flight test was delayed due to the loss of one of the two prototypes with its instrumentation following a catastrophic failure of the main rotor blade sleeve and spindle assembly during ground test. The cause of the failure has been determined and the second prototype is again flying following a redesign of the sleeve and spindle. NPE Phase I testing is now scheduled for completion in early 1975 and $12.2 million in FY 1975 Phase II funds released for long-lead procurement towards engineering development. The Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council will meet subsequent to NPE Phase I testing in order to determine if full-scale engineering development and release of the remaining Phase II production funds are warranted. RDT&E funds in the amount of $10.5 million are being requested for FY 1976 for the test b. Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS) The UTTAS is being developed to perform Army tactical troop assault and utility missions now performed by the UH-1 series helicopter. It is also being considered for use as a Navy antisubmarine warfare helicopter and Marine Corps assault helicopter. The UTTAS program is a competitive program between Boeing Vertol Company and the Sikorsky Division of United Aircraft Corporation. Both competitors have aircraft flying and the program is essentially on schedule. The initial production contract is scheduled for early in FY 1977. Both contractors should come reasonably close to meeting the airframe design-to-cost goal of $600,000 (FY 1972 constant dollars). Total RDT&E costs are now estimated at $459.1 million, of which $91.9 million is being requested in FY 1976 in order to continue prototype construction. Major cost savings are expected from improved reliability and maintainability and additional studies are underway on cost savings that will be realized as the result of increased productivity. Carrier On-board Delivery (COD) Replacement Aircraft (VCX) c. During FY 1975 the Navy has studied alternative programs to obtain the needed replacement of the aging COD aircraft fleet and announced their preference for a modified S-3A aircraft. The Navy's justification for selection of the costly S-3 variant was primarily based on increased range and speed requirements to meet future contingencies. However, the proposed aircraft is costly, fails to provide the outsize load capability of the existing C-2A, and is not configured for efficient cargo loading. By the addition of longrange tanks, an improved C-2A could be made to satisfy most of the Navy's range requirements. It is anticipated that the Navy will make a firm decision later this year as to which aircraft is best suited to fulfill its COD requirements. The proposed budget provides $3.7 million for the Navy to initiate the preliminary phases of engineering development on the selected aircraft. d. Advanced Medium STOL Transport (AMST) This is an Air Force high-priority competitive prototype program between Boeing Aerospace Company and McDonnell-Douglas Corporation for the design, fabrication, and flight test of an advanced technology STOL transport to provide an option to replace aging C-130 aircraft, and the current STOL aircraft, the C-7 and C-123. Both contractors have capitalized on technology advances in propulsion lift, super-critical wing design, landing gear, control systems, and cargo system design. Both aircraft, which are now in the fabrication stage, offer increased speeds and greater payload to enhance productivity. In addition to being designed to accommodate the Army's outsize cargo requirements which have emerged since the first flight of the C-130 in 1954, the AMST program capitalizes on the technology gains of the last 20 years. These technology advances now permit significant gains in operational capability in a jet aircraft which is designed to achieve minimum replacement cost. The AMST will significantly lower manpower requirements, while offering at least twice the airlift productivity and a STCL-capable response to airlift requests. The Air Force has placed the AMST among its top priorities. Though no decision has been made to go into full scale development, the AMST design-to-cost competitive approach is expected to provide the Air Force with the most advanced tactical transport in the world today at reasonable cost with considerable potential for foreign sales. Program RDT&E costs are estimated at $229.1 million. The requested $85.0 million in FY 1976 RDT&E funds allows continuation of the fabrication and test of two prototypes per contractor with first flight for the Douglas design scheduled for November 1975 and the Boeing aircraft in August 1976. The AMST prototype program is another example of competitive demonstration of new technology in hardware form. The availability of solid cost and cost-effectiveness data before the big expenditures that occur in engineering development provides a solid base for decision on whether to carry the program further. e. CII-47 Modernization The purpose of this program is to reduce operating problems by developing improved components for CI-47 helicopters currently in the Army inventory. The CH-47 has been in the Army inventory since 1962 and will continue to meet the Army's medium lift requirement through the 1980's. The CII-47A and B models, which constitute 51 percent of the fleet, require modernization because of the high operating costs and low operational readiness of these ageing aircraft. The objective of this program is to develop fiberglass rotor blades, integrally lubricated transmissions, modularized hydraulic system components, and other required improvements for better maintainability, reliability, survivability, and safety while reducing operating costs. We have included $10.0 million in the FY 1977 authorization in order to continue this program which was started in FY 1975 with $3.0 milion. RDT&E costs are estimated at $23.0 million thru FY 1977. The CII-47 modernization program is another example of improving existing assets for maximum return-on-investment. f. C-5 Wing Modification In last year's statement, we estimated that C-5 wings could expect a service life of 18,000 to 20,000 hours through installation of structural modifications and changes in operational use of the aircraft. However, these measures have not been as effective in practice as predicted. The fatigue monitoring program now indicates that the service life will be only 11,000 to 16,000 hours. Early aircraft will reach this level in 1979. Therefore, we must now undertake development and test of a new wing structure in order to avoid grounding aircraft. Ongoing fatigue tests and operational experience with the C-5 fleet have shown that the principal aluminum alloy used in the wing structure is more crack-sensitive than originally predicted. New wings therefore must be designed with alloys which have demonstrated greater crack resistance. These facts make it pointless to proceed with the third C-5 fatigue test article as previously approved and funded in FY 1975. With the concurrence of the Congress, we plan to reprogram $21 million from FY 1975 for the design engineering and test of a new wing structure early this year. We have included $22.3 million in the FY 1976 authorization to continue this effort. The development program for the new wing structure is phased to provide demonstration of the design goal of 30,000 hours prior to modification of fleet aircraft. This program will ensure the long term viability of this key element of our airlift capability. Our tactical naval forces are required to provide sea control, projection of power, and peacetime presence in support of U.S. interests and policy throughout the world. The major features of the Soviet naval forces which could severely challenge us are: O A major tactical submarine fleet, which the Soviets are continuing to upgrade by replacing older diesel submarines with nuclear submarines, O A large force of long-range, land-based naval aircraft, which is being greatly improved by the introduction of the Backfire, o A large fleet of surface combatants, which is evolving from a homeland defense force to a true oceanic surface fleet through the addition of aircraft carriers, and O An extensive worldwide surface surveillance and command control capability for coordinated employment of these forces. A factor of significant concern is the worldwide proliferation of sophisticated but simple-to-operate anti-ship missiles, which allow any unfriendly country or group of terrorists to pose a threat to our naval and merchant ships. The current and projected world environment, taken together with the above factors, give highest priority to these specific objectives of our tactical naval forces: O Provide protection of sea lanes for supply of materials critical to U.S. industrial and defense needs, о Assure that sea transport resupply to a NATO war can be achieved without unacceptable losses, о Provide carrier-based aircraft reenforcement in direct or indirect support of a NATO war, о Provide a flexible naval response in crisis situations, including a credible defense against preemptive attack. Our R&D efforts are focused on these objectives. Their significant features are discussed below, grouped by the military function they perform (Fleet Offense, Ocean Surface Surveillance, Fleet Air Defense, and Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare). 1. Fleet Offense The Fleet Offense mission area includes those weapon systems required to destroy enemy ships and submarines, to conduct amphibious assaults, to support U.S. and allied troops and forces ashore, to conduct tactical strikes against land targets, and to inhibit the movement of enemy commercial and military traffic. This mission area also includes Naval Vehicles and Mine Warfare Systems. The absence of an all-weather anti-ship missile capability for our air, submarine, and surface forces limits their ability to destroy enemy surface combatants and shipping from ranges which minimize risk to our attacking forces. The offensive anti-ship missile reach of Soviet surface combatants can be offset only by attack aircraft operating from our carriers. llowever, to be effective against high-value Soviet ships, these aircraft must penetrate into their defensive missile envelopes, a high-risk undertaking. Introduction of all-weather HARPOON and daylight (electro-optical) CONDOR missiles will offset this tactical imbalance by providing a standoff capability for our air, surface, and submarine forces. CONDOR has completed development and is scheduled for introduction into the fleet in 1977. The electro-optically guided CONDOR successfully completed its operational evaluation in 1974. This air-to-surface missile demonstrated truly remarkable performance. The CONDOR operator in the launch aircraft can both guide the weapon during its mid-course phase and make final corrections to the precise aim point of the missile. Accurate delivery of the weapon through low ceilings was demonstrated. The ability to communicate with the missile during its flight also allows the delivering aircraft to fly away from the targeting area as the missile proceeds to the target. In the test, the delivering airplane was remote from the target at the time of impact and the missile impacted accurately. This outstanding precision allows the operator to select a particularly vulnerable point on the target. He can also confirm that his target was hit. We are planning to inventory the CONDOR in limited quantities for use against high-value targets where both precision delivery and the ability to stand-off far from the enemy's defenses are required. In engineering development firings conducted to date, HARPOON has achieved outstanding success against targets of the size of destroyers and patrol boats, at various ranges. Some of these successes have been in the presence of various types of electronic countermeasures and passive decoys. Although HARPOON has remained within its development cost and schedule goals, preliminary information indicates that production costs will be higher than expected. We are conducting a review of this program to assess the causes of the cost growth and to find ways of reversing this trend. $19.9 million is required in FY 1976 to complete development of HARPOON and Encapsulated HARPOON. To insure that technological momentum is maintained within our only all-weather anti-ship missile program, we plan $3.0 million in FY 1976 to initiate technology to support future HARPOON missile improvements. The two-fold objective of this program will be to avoid technological obsolescence in the HARPOON missile and insure the availability of production modifications when needed. We are also continuing to investigate the feasibility of developing a tactical variant of the Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) which would provide a long-range offensive reach from an air, surface, or submarine launch platform. The tactical variant is a hybrid missile composed principally of airframe and control surfaces from the SLCM and propulsion and guidance technology from HARPOON. To exploit the long range of this missile, we must insure that our airborne and surface surveillance systems are capable of detecting and identifying an enemy target and locating it with accuracy sufficient to acquire and guide the missile to its target. Studies to define the total surveillance-to-impact system for the Tactical SLCM have been initiated and will be completed in FY 1976 to permit a decision on full scale development in FY 1977. FY 1976 funding for the tactical variant is included in the SCL program. We are now conducting operational tests of the 8-inch Major Caliber Gun which will extend further the offensive capability of our surface combatants, principally against shore targets and in support of our Amphibious Forces. We have in development a triservice 8-inch guided projectile which I have described previously, and we expect to begin development in FY 1977 of an extended range 8-inch guided projectile which will extend the offensive reach of the gun to minimize the exposure of the firing ship to hostile fire. |