Reserve Divisions. Which specific Divisions in the Guard and Reserve were to be deployed almost as rapidly as our Active Divisions, under previous planning? Compare the readiness proposed at the time the reduction to 13 Divisions was made and the current readiness posture proposed in the fiscal year 1976 Budget. Answer. It was initially intended to place reliance on high readiness reserve brigades to take up the slack caused by reducing the active Army to 13 divisions, until such time as the reserve divisions could deploy. We programmed these brigades to be ready in [deleted] days or less following mobilization. [Deleted.]

Our analysis indicated limitations on reserve unit readiness which cannot be overcome quickly or easily. [Deleted.] We continue to search for ways to improve the readiness of Reserve Component divisions, and while there are no panaceas apparent we are making progress. In the interim the Reserve Component divisions are scheduled to deploy about [deleted] after mobilization and must be considered as a hedge against prolonged war. However, we believe reserve battalions and brigades can contribute significantly through affiliation with active divisions. Affiliation improves readiness and training, and we believe that affiliated reserve battalions and brigade size units will be able to deploy with the active divisions with which they are affiliated. A significant portion of several of the 16 active divisions will actually be reserve battalions and brigades.

Chairman MCCLELLAN. Would you provide a comparison of the old 21⁄2 war strategy and the planning with respect to where the 16 Divisions in the Army would be used and the current 11⁄2 war strategy-both with 13 Divisions and 16 Divisions?

Answer. We would emphasize that the relationship between a two and a half war, or a one and a half war, or a one war strategy have never been precise. Under the two and a half war strategy, the U.S. maintained minimum forces for a NATO contingency and a minor contingency, while having the forces to meet a major contingency elsewhere, such as in Northeast or Southeast Asia. When we talked about a two and a half war strategy, we did not have all of the forces to pursue it: witness the very substantial expansion of the U.S. Army after 1965 when we put almost half the pre-war force which allegedly was capable of dealing with over two major conflicts, into Southeast Asia. We must recognize that there is a shortfall between our fiscally constrained force structure and the goals against which we measure it. We should also realize that when the 21⁄2 war strategy was enunciated we had a decisive strategic nuclear advantage. Since that time there have been significant quantitative and qualitative changes in both Warsaw Pact and NATO forces, and there have been new interpretations of our forward defense strategy in NATO.

As we have stated, we believe that our budget force of 16 active Army divisions-partially structured with reserve units-is the minimum we need in today's environment, measured against our goal of being able to deal simultaneously with one major attack and one minor contingency. The employment of our forces would vary according to the situation presented and would be dependent on where the major attack and contingency occurred, in what order they occurred, the lag between them, and the amount of warning received.

Chairman MCCLELLAN. You refer to three factors in planning Army division structure the ratio of force to space, the need for a reserve, and attacker/ defender ratios. Yet your presentation nowhere actually describes the particular inputs used in determining the calculation that 19 active duty divisions would be required for prudent risk. Using the three factors mentioned in your statement, would you show the computations used in obtaining 19 divisions and 16 divisions? Answer. The determination of force levels is, of course, not a simple matter of identifying and quantifying a small number of variables and then making a few calculations to arrive at an answer. Methods of estimating requirements rely on many variables each of which has uncertainties. Among these variables are the size and timing of the threat, the degree of allied participation assumed, and the measurement of the force combat capability represented by many different weapons systems. Additionally, these factors interact in ways that are difficult to simulate. Consequently, numerous calculations are made using a number of different methods and the results are then reviewed and compared. Ultimately, it is the analysis and judgment of experienced people operating in a fiscally constrained environment that set the force levels we request.

[Deleted.]

Based on these and many other analyses and the requirements for forces else where in the world, we believe that our fiscally constrained force of 16 Army

and three Marine Corps active duty divisions and eight Army and one Marine Corps reserve divisions represent the minimum required for a prudent level of risk.

26-WING STRUCTURE IN AIR FORCE

Chairman MCCLELLAN. What would be the proposed composition of a 26-wing structure in terms of aircraft? Compare this to the existing 22-wing structure. Answer. The following table depicts the current and anticipated 26 organizational wing force structure for active Air Force fighter and attack aircraft. Important changes in structure which occur are:

1. Phase out of A-7s, F-105s, and some F-4s from the active force.

2. Introduction of A-10 close air support aircraft, and a Hi/Lo Mix of F-15 and F-16 air superiority aircraft.

3. The current number of 26 under equipped (equivalent to about 22 fully equipped wings) organizational wings is maintained, while the number of UE aircraft grows in order to fully equip the 26 wing structure.

Chairman MCCLELLAN. Is the Air Force to increase the number of wings by four within existing manpower resources, or will an increase be made in manpower authorizations as the number of wings increase? How much of an increase is to be proposed in manpower?

Answer: The Air Force plans to increase the number of aircraft in its tactical fighter force wings without an overall increase in the USAF military manpower ceiling. This would be accomplished through a combination of the following: the newer aircraft being introduced into the tac air structure (F-15s, F-16s, and A-10s) generally require less manpower per aircraft than the aircraft they replace (F-105s, F-4s, and A-7s); and anticipated manpower reductions in other mission areas are expected to absorb any increased manning in the tac air area without exceeding the Air Force's current overall manpower levels. The Air Force already has a 26 wing organizational headquarters structure. Therefore no increase in wing headquarters manpower will be required.

ATTACK CARRIERS

Chairman MCCLELLAN. Explain why there are 13 carriers and only 12 active wings. Would you explain how many carriers are allocated to each of the four missions on page III-41-42 of the classified statement.

Answer. With the intense fiscal and manpower pressures on the Defense Program, some reduction in the size of the carrier force and carrier air wings is unavoidable as our older carriers and aircraft reach retirement age. To provide a dedicated air wing for the 13th carrier we would have to increase aircraft procurement. There are not enough acceptable aircraft with service life remaining available in the active Navy force to equip the 13th carrier on a routine basis, but these assets could be readily available from the Navy Reserve or from the Marines. Obviously, Reserve forces could not man and maintain a carrier in a combat ready condition.

With our planned reduction in forward deployments we believe 12 carriers are sufficient to meet routine peacetime forward deployed commitments. However, we do see the requirement for 13 carriers to respond to contingency deployments. If the contingency required the presence of Navy aircraft afloat

and Marine aircraft ashore it would most likely be a contingency justifying reserve mobilization, in which case a Naval Reserve Air Wing could deploy on the 13th carrier. If the contingency was not serious enough to warrant mobilization, the carrier could be employed as a platform for a task-organized Marine Aircraft Group.

With respect to mission allocation, the four functions in the classified statement do not constitute a full spectrum of naval missions to which our general purpose naval forces might be applied. The allocation of carriers to various types of operations would be highly dependent upon the detailed operational situation-particularly the disposition of the threat.

ASW MISSIONS

Chairman MCCLELLAN. You indicate that the U.S. anti-submarine warfare problem is not in the number of platforms, but rather modernization of platforms and sensors. Yet, your planning envisions a gradual growth to 70 ASW aircraft squadrons and 93 attack submarines-with potential increases outside the program period. Would you explain what the actual requirement in terms of numbers of aircraft/squadrons and attack submarines actually is?

Answer. The Defense Report noted that current and projected inventories of ASW aircraft and submarines are adequate for the ASW task. We do not foresee major increases in ASW force level requirements. Instead we are gradually replacing old platforms with new ones and improving the sensors and weapons of those vehicles which have sufficient service life remaining to justify such modernization. For example, rather than buying larger numbers of attack submarines and increasing the number of forward ASW barrier stations we plan to operate, we calculate that an equal or greater effectiveness improvement, at much lower cost, will result from equipping our PERMIT and STURGEON-class submarines with the new BQQ-5 sonar which is being installed on the LOS ANGELES-type submarines during initial construction. It is true that our submarine force level rises during the program period, but this merely reflects a return to the required level of about 90 submarines. In reducing below that figure during the current period-e.g., by retiring diesel submarines before nuclear replacements are delivered-we are incurring a measure of risk. We have judged this risk to be acceptable in view of the need to free funds for modernization of the submarine force. Any deviations from the 90-submarine level in the outyears [deleted] are minor and subject to change as retirement dates are refined.

With respect to ASW aircraft, the situation is more complex since a variety of different types are involved, As is shown in Table 5 of Appendix D to the Defense Report, the increase in total ASW aircraft of all types is very slight during the program period (five aircraft in a total inventory of about 850). There are some significant changes in type and mix both within the program period and later, but such variations generally stem from replacement of older models with newer, more capable aircraft at rates and schedules which differ by aircraft type. For example, we plan to continue buying P-3C aircraft at a modest pace to replace P-3A/B aircraft in the active force and to transition P-3A/Bs to the reserves where they will replace obsolescent P-2s on less than a one-for-one basis (P-2 squadrons have 12 aircraft while P-3 squadrons have only 9). In this case, overall force capabilities will be improved by increases in unit effectiveness even though numbers of aircraft will actually decrease.

Throughout the program period the overall force level and mix of ASW aircraft is considered adequate for the aircraft share of the ASW mission. Our current estimate of requirements for the middle to late 1980s is as shown below:

This future requirements estimate is, of course, subject to revision based on new intelligence or changes in priorities, but at present it is the basis for our modernization and procurement planning. The increase of [deleted] aircraft in

the early 1980's (over the [deleted] aircraft average in the program period) is primarily attributable to greater requirements for destroyer-based (LAMPS) helicopters as more surface combatants capable of operating LAMPS aircraft enter the fleet.

U.S. FORCES IN THAILAND

Chairman MCCLELLAN. Provide the number and type of forces planned for Thailand, fiscal years 1973-80.

Answer. Our end fiscal year strengths for 1973 and 1974 were 42,000 and 35,000 respectively. We presently have a military authorization of approximately 27,000 personnel in Thailand. Our current force includes eight tactical fighter squadrons, one AC-130 gunship squadron, one RF-4 squadron, [deleted] B-52's, 4 U-2's, 3 P-3's, 2 DC-130's, and various support aircraft such as C-130 airlift and CH-3. HH÷43, CH-53, and HH-53 helicopters. It is the intention of both the Royal Thai Government and U.S. Government to continue the reduction of our forces in Thailand.

WAR RESERVES

Chairman MCCLELLAN. Provide an analysis showing where increases in various war reserves are being proposed for the first time in FY 1976 and the various amounts by appropriation.

Answer. War reserve stocks of equipment items are integral portions of the overall acquisition objective for such items. As such, equipment is normally not procured specifically as "war reserves," but is procured as part of the procurement of shortages to acquisition objectives. While there are shortages in fiscal year 1976, it is not practicable to separately identify specific procurements as filling war reserve requirements, nor it is appropriate to categorize them as "first time" procurements in fiscal year 1976. War reserve stocks of spare and repair parts are similar. That is, they do not represent "first time" procurements in fiscal year 1976 in that every fiscal year's budget has contained funds for this purpose in both procurement appropriations and stock funds.

The fiscal year 1976 funding request for war reserves of spare parts in the appropriation Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, contained within the Spares and Repair Parts line item, is significantly larger than in previous fiscal years as we attempt to improve our readiness posture by filling substantial deficiencies in this area. For example, $331.5 million is requested in fiscal year 1976 compared to only $33.9 million in fiscal year 1975. Stock funded repair parts are in a similar situation in that we have asked for a fiscal year 1976 appropriation of $326.8 million to procure war reserve stocks compared to $17.1 million programmed for such procurements in fiscal year 1975. However, it should be recognized that no appropriation was requested for this purpose in prior fiscal years because stock funded war reserves were procured with available stock fund cash and that fiscal years 1974 and 1975 were not representative of typical years for this purpose because an extreme shortage of cash has precluded normal war reserve procurement.

Chairman MCCLELLAN. What remedial action is being proposed for the U.S. production base in the various sectors of the economy? What is the projected five-year cost? (III-66, classified)

Answer: The following remedial actions are in the process of implementation or are being proposed by the Department of Defense to expand or improve the responsiveness of the U.S. production base.

a. In cooperation with industry and other government agencies, increased emphasis and funding support is planned for the DoD Manufacturing Technology Program. This program is designed to develop or improve manufacturing processes, techniques, materials and equipment to provide for timely, reliable and economical production of Defense material. To support the drive to reduce production costs of Defense systems and to increase U.S. productivity through application of program results within the civilian economy, substantial increases in funding support are planned for the program in FY 1977-81. The present level of DoD funding for this effort is approximately $88 million annually. It is proposed to increase this to approximately $250 million annually by FY 1981.

b. To reduce weapon systems costs and leadtimes and to obtain the technological advantages of modern production facilities, action has been initiated to modernize government-owned production, repair and maintenance facilities.

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c. The Department of Defense proposes to develop incentives that will encourage private investment in modern, more efficient production resources and thus increase the productivity of the U.S. production base, and reduce unit costs. d. In cooperation with industry and other government agencies, action is being proposed to alleviate shortages of the strategic and critical materials that would limit full production of the U.S. production base in time of an emergency.

e. Since we are largely dependent on in-house facilities for munitions production, a major program to upgrade government-owned munitions facilities has been initiated which will make the base more responsive and cost-effective. The projected cost for this program through fiscal year 1980 is approximately $2.4 billion.

f. The Department of Defense, in conjunction with other appropriate government agencies, proposes to initiate industrial base studies in various sectors of the economy that will be designed to identify production bottlenecks and to determine appropriate corrective actions. The objective of this proposed program will be to expand or improve the responsiveness and efficiency of the U.S. production base.

SUPPORT TO OTHER NATIONS

Chairman MCCLELLAN. Cite examples over the past two years where the U.S. has refused sales of military equipment to foreign customers where "regional security or other U.S. interests" would be adversely affected. (III-67, classified) Answer. The Department of Defense does not keep records of specific FMS purchases requests which have been turned down. There are a variety of considerations which could cause denial of a request. The Department of State provides guidance for denial of requests for foreign policy reasons. The criteria for most denials is examination of the nature of the weapon involved as well as legal and foreign policy considerations. This necessitates interagency consultation regarding sensitive requests, and denials of requests normally are made after such consideration.

Foreign nations do not welcome a formal denial of a purchase request which they perceive as valid. Therefore several techniques are employed to signal in advance of any formal request what the position of the USG is likely to be regarding a potentially sensitive sale. The objective of these techniques is to reduce the number of occasions where the USG must issue a formal denial of a prospective purchase. Among these techniques are:

a. Foreign diplomatic or military representatives inquire, informally and discreetly, regarding releasability of equipment if doubt exists regarding approval of a formal request.

b. USG policies on releasability are made known to foreign countries. Sometimes this policy receives wide publication, but sometimes it is furnished discreetly only to representatives of the country involved.

c. Commercial requests for export licenses needed to demonstrate products overseas sometimes are denied because of objections by either the State or Defense Departments. Knowledge of this provides a signal to the prospective purchaser that a purchase request would be denied.

AID TO HANOI

Chairman MCCLELLAN. Provide estimates of the value of aid to Hanoi FY 68 to date. In this analysis, you may include separately the value of transporting the goods to Hanoi, as long as the value is in local (not U.S.) currency, i.e., priced at the rates actually paid, not imputed paid by U.S. dollars. Describe some of the larger items being provided by category, and estimate the amount of aid provided Hanoi in each category.

Answer. In response to this and similar questions concerning comparative support to North and South Vietnam, an interagency working group was convened in order to arrive at the best estimate of total communist assistance to North Vietnam. The memorandum which has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency is reprinted below and includes detailed data for the period 1970-1974. Information prior to 1970 is considered too sketchy to provide a meaningful estimate of communist assistance to North Vietnam.