NATIONAL DEFENSE National Needs Statement: To meet these national defense needs, the budget proposes $128.4 billion in budget authority for 1979. The major defense components of this total are: strategic forces, $9.8 billion; The following table lists major programs for the Department of Defense in greater detail. Total outlays for national defense are estimated at $117.8 billion for 1979, an increase of 9.4% over 1978. To carry out the missions addressed to national defense needs, the budget makes the following proposals: Maintain the current basic force structure and increase real • Strengthen our ability, in conjunction with allied forces, to repel any attack launched against NATO nations. • Maintain supply levels for U.S. forces sufficient to sustain them in combat at least as long as opposing forces can be sustained. • Increase the firepower and mobility of the Army and Marine infantry divisions to provide greater flexibility to respond to threats outside the NATO area. • Continue efforts to modernize naval forces through the con struction of new ships and extensive overhaul of others. • Identify and pursue efficiencies that reduce the costs of defense without diminishing military capability. Department of Defense Military.—National defense needs are met primarily by the military programs of the Department of Defense. Total obligational authority for these military activities is projected to rise from $108.3 billion in 1977 to $116.8 billion in 1978 and $126.0 billion in 1979. Outlays are estimated to increase by 9.4% between 1978 and 1979. The 1979 defense increases include allowances for civilian and military pay raises of $2.4 billion. Total obligational authority --- 108.3 116.8 126.0 1 Excludes R. & D. in other program areas on systems approved for production. The combat and support capabilities of our military forces, compared to the capabilities of our potential opponents, determine whether or not a military balance exists and whether our fighting power is sufficient to deter attack. Soviet defense spending has increased by about 3% per year in real terms. These increases have enabled the Soviet Union to achieve nuclear parity with the United States and to acquire conventional military power comparable to that of the United States. However, in the present international environment, the most important measure of relative military strength is the balance that exists between the United States and its NATO allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies on the other. The defense efforts of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations have shown little growth in the past decade. At the same time, our NATO allies have increased their defense efforts at an annual rate of 2–3% in real terms. Our military forces and our alliances will at all times be kept as strong as is necessary to deter attack. Clearly, however, peace based on a balance of terror is precarious. Therefore, the United States is conducting negotiations with the Soviet Union and other nations on a wide range of agreements to reduce military forces and weapons and reliance upon force in international disputes. U.S. policy seeks to reduce stocks of nuclear weapons and limit their spread, to ban all nuclear weapons tests, and to control nuclear proliferation. We seek further agreement with the Soviet Union on limitation of strategic weapons. At the same time, we seek the cooperation of other weaponsproducing nations in reducing the sale of arms and slowing the spread of advanced weapons technology throughout the world. In negotiations with the Soviet Union we also seek agreements to prevent an arms buildup in the Indian Ocean, to continue peaceful use of space, and to prohibit chemical, biological, and radiological warfare. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—MILITARY [Proposed total obligational authority; in billions of dollars) 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 January 1977 budget------------------------- 122. 1 134.4 144.8 155.7 165.9 January 1978 budget------------------------- 116.8 126.0 137.2 /48.6 160.5 The defense levels proposed for 1979 provide prudent real growth in our defense capabilities but are considerably more moderate than those proposed last year at this time by the previous administration: $8.4 billion lower in 1979 and $7.6 billion lower in 1980. Additional real growth is made possible by savings proposed in training and in overhead and support activities. Proposals in this budget would: • reduce military personnel end strengths (that is, year-end headcount) from 2,069 thousand in 1978 to 2,049 thousand in 1979, and civilian personnel end strengths from 912 thousand in 1978 to 905 thousand in 1979, largely by reducing headquarter staffs and other support organizations; further reduce indirect-hire foreign nationals; • eliminate inequities and unnecessary differences between services in officer promotions, separations and retirement, and achieve a better match of the work force with job requirements; • reduce the amount of time that military personnel spend in formal training activities, and the overhead costs of training; and • reform the mechanism for setting blue-collar pay rates. Strategic forces. The primary mission of the strategic forces is to deter a nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, and other nations whose survival is vital to our security. These forces must be capable of damaging an aggressor so severely in a second-strike retaliatory attack that no nuclear power would dare initiate a nuclear attack on us. Our strategic forces also strengthen deterrence against nonnuclear attack. The Strategic mission is carried out by maintaining essential equivalence between United States and Soviet strategic capabilities. The United States uses three separate types of strategic forces-landbased missiles, submarine-based missiles, and aircraft armed with missiles and nuclear bombs-each possessing formidable capabilities. These forces have differing survival and attack characteristics, thereby presenting different challenges to an opponent attempting to counter them. If one force should begin to become vulnerable, the others prevent any strategic instabilities from occurring while the vulnerability is being remedied. Major proposals for the strategic forces in this budget, including portions funded in the research and development program, are: • continue competitive development and procurement of air launched cruise missiles for deployment on B-52 bombers and explore the possibility of using other aircraft as cruise missile carriers; • continue development of the M-X intercontinental ballistic missile, which is to have improved accuracy and payload, and could be deployed in a mode less vulnerable to attack; • continue development and testing of the B-1 bomber, though with no plans for production, and initiate studies of future strategic bomber requirements; • procure the eighth Trident submarine and associated ballistic missiles to continue updating the sea-based strategic forces; • continue research and development on ballistic missile defense systems as a hedge against possible future abrogation of the antiballistic missile treaty; • improve strategic command, control, and communications sys tems; and • conduct research and development to improve satellite surveillance, reduce satellite vulnerability, and develop an antisatellite capability. General purpose forces.—The mission of general purpose forces is to deter or counter aggression at levels below strategic nuclear conflict. Most of our general purpose forces are oriented toward the defense of NATO. This includes most of our Army land forces and Air Force tactical air forces. Some of our Naval and Marine forces are required to keep the sea lanes open and insure security on the flanks of NATO territory. This budget reflects the U.S. commitment, made in conjunction with our NATO allies, to improve NATO capabilities. Budget authority requested for Army weapons and equipment increases 18% from 1978 to 1979 in real terms. Budget authority requested for Air Force procurement related to NATO also increases. The U.S. defense effort supports and is supported by allies throughout the world. Our combined efforts are designed to maintain deterrence by assuring that existing forces are in a high state of readiness, are prepared to respond rapidly and effectively to challenges, and are well supplied. Budget authority of $46.8 billion is estimated for 1979 for general purpose forces, compared to $41.5 billion in 1978. This increase will be used primarily to strengthen the capability of the general purpose forces designated for the defense of NATO. In an era of strategic nuclear equivalence, it is vital that NATO's conventional forces be sufficiently strong to act as an effective deterrent to attack by conventional forces. We and our allies are committed to increasing conventional military capabilities in Europe. Active U.S. forces available for a European conflict include 16 Army divisions, of which the equivalent of 5% divisions are deployed in Europe, and 26 wings of Air Force tactical aircraft, of which 8 are deployed in Europe. In 1979, $6.6 billion in budget authority is proposed to provide increased levels of modern Army equipment to enable U.S.-based divisions to deploy more rapidly and to sustain combat for longer periods. This is an increase of $1.3 billion over 1978. Specific proposals include: • initial production of the new XM-1 tank, which is superior in mobility and armor to any tank currently in use in the world; • purchase of better fire control systems and increased quantities of more effective antiarmor munitions, in order to improve artillery capabilities; |