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These proposed rates are designed to obtain the traffic of an oil company which purchases the compounds from a Milwaukee manufacturer and resells them to foundries in Oklahoma. The vehicles used by Barbour have a capacity of 1,000 cubic feet and can transport 20,000-pound loads. The foundries generally do not have facilities for storing or using large quantities, and their purchases range from 8 to 30 drums, weighing 490 pounds each. The rates would apply in connection with the respondent's transit rules which permit of partial unloading at intermediate points, and would meet the commercial needs of the shipper. Barbour has been granted authority to transport "truckloads" only. In Rates and Rules-Barbour Transp. Co., Inc., 34 M. C. C. 87, we called this respondent's attention to a conflict between its authorized operations and those it held out to perform under a so-called mixed-truckload rule, which permitted shipments on one bill of lading to be delivered to not more than five consignees, and condemned the rule as a holding out to perform in unauthorized operation. There is no substantial evidence concerning the transit rules, and none with respect to respondent's method of operation thereunder. We express no opinion, therefore, with respect thereto, but for the purposes of this proceeding assume that respondent is transporting truckload shipments.

On steam or internal-combustion engines, the proposed rates are $1.07 and $1.09, minimum 16,000 pounds, to Wichita Falls from Chicago, 994 miles, and Milwaukee, 1,068 miles, respectively. The proposed description of the articles on which the rates would apply is as follows: "Engines; Traction or tractor, steam or internal combustion, and/or parts, There is some doubt, because of the punctuation, as to the kind of engines embraced within the description. When this matter was called to the attention of the representative of Barbour at the hearing, he stated that the proposed rates were intended to apply only on set-up tractors and tractor engines (but not automobile engines) and parts therefor. The discussion herein will be confined to rates on such articles. The present rates of Barbour, the bureau, and the rail carriers from Chicago are $1.04, and from Milwaukee are $1.21, $1.34, and $1.07, respectively, minima 18,000 pounds on the motor rates and 20,000 pounds on the rail rates. The first-class rates of all these carriers to Wichita Falls are $2.61 from Chicago and $2.68 from Milwaukee. The present rates of $1.04 and $1.07 are based on 40 percent of first class, and the Barbour and bureau rates from Milwaukee are approximately 45 and 50 percent, respectively, of first class. The tractors referred to of record each weigh approximately 5,300 pounds, and not more than three can be loaded in the vehicles normally used in transporting this traffic.

For the first 9 months of 1941, Barbour operated 950,791 truckmiles, of which 810,798 were with revenue loads and 139,993 were without revenue. Total operating expenses for this period were $132,140.96. Based on these data, it contends that its average cost is 13.9 cents a truck-mile, and that the rates proposed would yield reasonably compensatory revenues. These operations were conducted on an average with 18 tractor-trailer combinations, of which 5 tractors and 8 trailers were owned by Barbour and the remainder were leased. Approximately 21 percent of the mileage traversed was with wholly owned units, 64 percent with owner-driver units, and 15 percent with trailers owned by the respondent and drawn by leased tractors. Barbour's rates of remuneration to the owner-drivers are now the subject of an agreement entered into between it and a labor union. At the time of the hearing, Barbour was paying these drivers for their labor 2.75 cents or 3 cents a running mile (the record is not clear as to the exact amount), and 7 cents a loaded mile and 3.5 cents an empty mile for the hire of a tractor-trailer combination. In addition, the costs of public-liability, property-damage, and cargo insurance, State mileage taxes, workmen's compensation insurance, social security taxes, and lodging and meals for the owner-driver while operating equipment under lease are borne by respondent. The ownerdrivers provide their own gasoline and oil, repair and maintain their equipment, and sustain the depreciation costs. The costs of operation of the owner-drivers are not of record. An average cost will change with the period selected because of variations in the factors of volume of traffic, operating ratio, and perhaps allocation of nonoperating expense. For example, in Rates and Rules-Barbour Transp. Co., Inc., supra, the same respondent showed an average operating cost per mile of 14.07 cents for the first 6 months of 1941 based on 617,854 miles operated. There has been a substantial increase in operating costs of motor common carriers since January 1, 1942. In addition, some of the proposed rates are joint rates, as, for example, on the engines from Milwaukee to Wichita Falls, and the costs of operation over the connecting lines are not of record.

Barbour introduced in evidence an exhibit, based on excerpts from the Commission's statistical reports of numerous class I motor carriers for 1940, which purports to show that the average truck-mile costs of such carriers during that year in the central, midwestern, and southwestern regions were 20, 20, and 19.7 cents, respectively. It contends that its cost is lower than the average of other motor common carriers, because it transports truckload shipments only. Barbour compares the revenues under the proposed rates with those under certain rates maintained by bureau carriers from and to points within the

territory under consideration on butter, canned goods, animal feed, empty containers, and other articles, subject to minima ranging from 12,000 to 18,000 pounds, which, based on highway distances of 365 to 1,277 miles, yield truck-mile revenues ranging from 6.5 to 17.4 cents. These comparisons are of little value in establishing the reasonableness of the rates in issue, as no evidence was submitted respecting the nature of the operations of the carriers referred to, the transportation characteristics of the articles mentioned, or the volume of movement under the rate instanced.

Revenues per truck-mile under the proposed rates on the compounds, based on minimum loads of 20,000 pounds, would range from 15 cents to El Reno, Okla., to 16.8 cents to Picher, Okla., and on the tractors, based on minimum loads of 16,000 pounds, would be 16.3 cents from Milwaukee and 17.2 cents from Chicago. The rates on the compounds appear to be unreasonably low.

We find that the rates proposed have not been shown to be just and reasonable except as applied to tractors. This finding is without prejudice to the establishment of rates on the compounds 10 percent higher than those herein proposed; and of the rates proposed on steam or internal-combustion engines under a commodity description which properly describes the articles herein shown as intended to be moved under such rates. An order will be entered requiring the cancelation of the schedules, and discontinuing the proceeding.

42 M. C. C.

No. MC-C-323

SOUTHERN SPRING BED COMPANY v. BASSETT FURNITURE TRUCKING COMPANY, INCORPORATED

Submitted December 24, 1942. Decided March 31, 1943

Rate charged by defendant motor common carrier on a shipment of metal couches and compressed bed springs, from Atlanta, Ga., to Asheville, N. C., found to have been inapplicable to the extent applied on the couches and unreasonable to the extent applied on the bed springs. Applicable rate on the couches found unreasonable. Complaint dismissed.

E. L. Hart for complainant.

R. S. Cooper for defendant.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

DIVISION 3, COMMISSIONERS MILLER, PATTERSON, AND JOHNSON BY DIVISION 3:

Exceptions were filed by complainant to the order recommended by the joint board, and defendant replied thereto.

By complaint filed December 17, 1941, Southern Spring Bed Company, a corporation, of Atlanta, Ga., alleges that the rate charged by Bassett, Va., on a shipment consisting of 73 crates of bed springs, compressed, and 6 packages of metal couches, knocked down, weighing 9,256 pounds, from Atlanta to Asheville, N. C., which moved on April 29, 1941, was inapplicable in violation of section 217 (b) of the Interstate Commerce Act, and unjust and unreasonable in violation of section 216 of the act. We are asked to determine the applicable or defendant, Bassett Furniture Trucking Company, Incorporated, of reasonable rate and to award reparation in the amount of the difference between the charges collected and those found lawful. The Commission is without power to award reparation under part II of the act. W. A. Barrows Porcelain Enamel Co. v. Cushman M. Delivery, 11 M. C. C. 365. Consideration will be given herein only to the issues of applicability and reasonableness. Rates will be stated in amounts per 100 pounds.

At the time the shipment moved, the defendant, under authority of a pending application filed under the "grandfather" clauses of the act, held out to transport furniture and other commodities from Atlanta to Asheville, Salisbury, and other points in North Carolina. Subsequently, it was denied authority to operate between Georgia and

the North Carolina points. There is no evidence of record indicating the route over which the shipment moved, but, in view of its small size, complainant assumed that it was included with other freight in a vehicle destined to Salisbury or High Point, N. C., or other points then served by the defendant, and therefore that the shipment moved over the reasonably direct route, U. S. Highway 23, to Asheville. Defendant was a party to Agent Cooper's commodity tariff MF-I. C. C. No. 80, which named rates on metal furniture from Atlanta to a number of North Carolina points other than Asheville, and on other commodities from Atlanta to Asheville. No specific commodity rate, however, was named in the tariff from Atlanta to Asheville on the articles included in the shipment here considered. Charges were originally collected at a rate of 52 cents, which was the applicable rate on metal furniture to High Point, but subsequently defendant presented a bill for undercharges, based on a rate of 75 cents, which was the applicable column 60 (60 percent of first class) rate from Atlanta to Asheville. The claimed undercharges were paid by complainant. The rate of 75 cents is referred to hereinafter as the rate charged.

The complaint alleged that the applicable rate was the rate to High Point of 52 cents, which should have been applied on shipments destined to Asheville under an intermediate-point rule hereinafter referred to, but, at the hearing, complainant took the position that a rate of 50 cents, applicable from Atlanta to Salisbury, should have been applied on shipments to Asheville under the rule.

The intermediate rule on which complainant relies provided that from any point of origin or to any point of destination served by carriers parties to the tariff, from or to which rates were not named in the tariff, the rate from or to such "intermediate" point would be the same as the rate from or to the next more distant point from or to which rates were named therein. This was subject to a note providing for the application of the class rate to or from the unnamed point where this would result in a lower charge than under the commodity rate to or from the next more distant point. Commodity rates to and from Asheville were named in the tariff, although none were named thereto from Atlanta on the commodities included in the shipment. The intermediate rule therefore was not applicable. Summit Grain Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 109 I. C. C. 763, and Iron and Steel Articles, Minimum Charges to Dover, Ohio, 21 M. C. C. 35.

On exceptions, complainant contends that the principle followed in the reports just cited has no application here, because, as we understand its argument, the tariffs there considered contained specific commodity rates, whereas defendant's tariff named rates on miscellaneous classes of traffic from and to many different points. Complainant relies on Standard Oil Co. v. Director General, 66 I. C. C.

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