472. In that proceeding, involving a tariff rule which provided for the application to intermediate points of rates from or to the next more distant points, when rates were not specifically published, division 3, as then constituted, found that, since specific commodity rates to the destinations there considered were not shown, despite the provision of a basis therefore, the rates to the more distant points applied under the intermediate rule. Among the points there under consideration were Klamath Falls, Oreg., intermediate to Modoc Point, Oreg. However, with respect to a substantially similar intermediate rule and statement of facts, and involving these among other points, in Baldwin Hardware Co. v. Director General, 129 I. C. C. 708, division 4 said, at pages 709-710:

The intermediate rule was applicable only when rates were not specifically provided for stations located directly intermediate to stations to which rates were provided. Joint through class rates were published from the points of origin under consideration to Klamath Falls and, therefore, the intermediate rule has no application here. The rates charged were applicable.

A substantially similar rate situation was presented in Standard Oil Co. v. Director General, 66 I. C. C. 472. In that case we found that the Modoc Point rate was applicable to Klamath Falls under the intermediate rule. But the fact that joint through class rates were published to Klamath Falls was not before us when that decision was rendered. [Emphasis supplied.]

This principle has been consistently followed by the Commission in a long line of cases.

Since no commodity rates from Atlanta to Asheville were applicable on the articles included in the shipment, they were subject to class rates. Defendant was a party to a tariff naming class rates, which was governed by the national motor freight classification and by Agent Cooper's exceptions tariff MF-I. C. C. No. 81. The latter tariff named an exceptions rating of column 60, minimum 6,000 pounds, on furniture as described in item 3, page 129, of the governing classification, which included bed springs in packages. The classification also provided a less-than-truckload rating of first class on metal couches, knocked down, without any requirements as to packing. The exceptions tariff, however, provided a rating of 12 times second class on couches, securely wrapped, as there provided, or in boxes or crates, any quantity. The metal couches here considered, according to the bill of lading, were shipped in packages. The record is lacking in any description of these packages, but the joint board which heard the proceeding inferred, from such other evidence as was available, that the couches were in containers, which would come within the purview of the term "boxes or crates" as used in the exceptions tariff. The joint board accordingly found that the exceptions rating of 12 times second class was applicable, and no exception to this finding was filed by

complainant or defendant. In view of this circumstance, we feel constrained to sustain the joint board's finding on this point, but such action is not to be construed as affording a precedent in other proceedings where the facts would justify a contrary finding. The rates based on 12 times second class and column 60, from Atlanta to Asheville at the time the shipment moved, were $1.59 and 75 cents, respectively. These were the applicable rates, and the rate of $1.59 should have been applied on the metal couches, which weighed 324 pounds, and the rate of 75 cents on the bed springs, which weighed 8,932 pounds.

The remaining issue to be determined is whether the applicable rates were reasonable. At the time the shipment moved, the defendant was a party to commodity rates ranging from 46 to 62 cents, minimum 10,000 pounds, on metallic furniture, mattresses, and upholstered furniture, from Atlanta to a number of points in North Carolina and Virginia more distant than Asheville. For example, rates of 46, 50, 52, and 58 cents, respectively, were maintained to Charlotte, Salisbury, and High Point, N. C., and Danville, Va., for respective distances of 277, 305, 341, and 410 miles. Over a reasonably direct route, the distance from Atlanta to Asheville is about 210 miles. These rates did not apply on metal couches. Complainant's evidence raises a presumption that the applicable rate was unreasonable on the portion of the shipment consisting of bed springs. This was not rebutted by defendant, and we conclude that a reasonable rate on the part of the shipment consisting of the bed springs would have been 50 cents, minimum 10,000 pounds. As indicated, the metal couches, if shipped loose, would have been entitled to a rating of first class, and the first-class rate from Atlanta to Asheville at the time the shipment moved was $1.25. By reason of their meeting the packing requirements of the exceptions tariff, however, the couches were subject to the higher exceptions rating. This had the anomalous result of penalizing the shipper for careful packing of the shipment, whereas penalties are generally applied for failing to pack commodities properly. We conclude that the applicable rating and rate of $1.59 on the metal couches were unreasonable to the extent they exceeded the first-class rating and rate of $1.25 thereon.

We find that the assailed rate of 75 cents was applicable to the extent that it was applied on the bed springs, but inapplicable to the extent that it was applied on the metal couches, and that the applicable rate thereon was $1.59. We further find that the rate of 75 cents was unreasonable for application on the portion of the shipment consisting of the bed springs, and that a reasonable rate thereon

would have been 50 cents, minimum 10,000 pounds, and that the rate of $1.59 was unreasonable for application on the metal couches to the extent that it exceeded $1.25.

An order will be entered dismissing the complaint.

No. MC-C-220

ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS CORPORATION v. CONSOLIDATED COPPERSTATE LINES (LESSEE OF CONSOLIDATED SHIPPERS, INC.) (LESSEE OF NEVADA CONSOLIDATED SHIPPERS)

Submitted February 9, 1943. Decided April 12, 1943

Rate charged on shipment consisting of metal sign faces, metal signs, tools, neon tubes, and glass, in separate packages, from Los Angeles, Calif., to Las Vegas, Nev., found applicable, except as to the tools, which were overcharged. Applicable rates not shown to have been unreasonable. Complaint dismissed. Earl W. Cox for complainant.

Arthur H. Glanz for defendant.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

DIVISION 3, COMMISSIONERS MILLER, PATTERSON, AND JOHNSON BY DIVISION 3:

Exceptions were filed by complainant to the order recommended by the examiner.

By complaint filed November 6, 1940, complainant corporation alleges that the charges collected on one less-than-truckload shipment of metal sign faces, metal signs, tools, neon tubes, and glass, in crates, forwarded June 4, 1938, over the line of defendant, Consolidated Copperstate Lines, from Los Angeles, Calif., to Las Vegas, Nev., were unjust, unreasonable, and inapplicable in violation of part II of the Interstate Commerce Act. An informal complaint presenting the same allegations with respect to the same shipment was filed with us on June 6, 1940. Rates will be stated in amounts per 100 pounds.

The shipment weighed 1,481 pounds and consisted of two crates of metal sign faces and three crates of metal signs, weighing a total of 962 pounds, one crate of neon tubes weighing 178 pounds, one crate of glass weighing 88 pounds, and one crate of tools weighing 253 pounds. Except the crate of tools, the various articles in the shipment were components of a neon electric sign. Charges of $83.53

were collected at the four times first-class rate of $5.64 applicable on neon electric signs. Charges of $18.41 are alleged to have been applicable, based upon lower class rates applicable on the individual packages in the shipment. Complainant seeks a finding that it has been damaged in the sum of $65.05, with interest. Defendant concedes that an overcharge exists on the crate of tools and offers to adjust the charges thereon to the basis of the second-class rate of $1.21.

The charges collected resulted from the application of rule 16, of the national motor freight classification (Agent Jackson's tariff MFI. C. C. No. 5, effective March 30, 1938), which provided that "parts or pieces constituting a complete article, received on one bill of lading, will be charged for at the rating provided for the complete article." The primary question is whether these various items constituted the parts and pieces of a complete article, i. e., a neon electric sign, as contemplated by rule 16.

The bill of lading was not introduced in evidence, but the various components of the shipment are all listed on one paid freight bill. Defendant treated the shipment as a complete neon electric sign, and assessed the charges accordingly. At no stage of the proceeding has the complainant contended that the packages were forwarded on separate bills of lading. Nor is there any evidence warranting a conclusion to that effect. To the contrary, the evidence raises a presumption that the packages were forwarded on one bill of lading, and this has not been rebutted. Complainant's witness testified that the various items in the shipment, except the tools, were component parts of a "neon sign," and conceded that such a sign required electricity for its operation. Moreover, complainant is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling complete signs, and is not engaged in the merchandising of sign parts. The conclusion is warranted that the various packages, except the tools, together constituted a complete article.

In its exceptions, complainant insists that it is entitled to the lowest freight charges applicable on the constituent parts of the article included in the shipment. It also reiterates its original contention that the metal signs and sign faces were subject to the second-class rating provided on "signs, other than figures or images, prepaid, iron, steel or tin, not otherwise indexed, framed or not framed, in packages"; that neon tubes were subject to a rating of 110 percent of first class provided on "lamps, electric, incandescent, in barrels or boxes"; and that the glass was subject to the third-class rating provided on "glass, window, other than plate, not bent, in boxes or crates." The rate charged is also alleged to have been unreasonable to the extent that it exceeded the above-mentioned class rates. The claimed rating on

incandescent electric lamps was not in effect in the governing classification at the time the shipment moved. The correct rating thereon was 11⁄2 times first class. The rating of 110 percent of first class apparently was first established in a subsequent issue of the classification. A rating of second class on tools is provided under the commodity description of "mechanic's hand tools."

Rule 16 of the national motor freight classification is essentially identical with rule 20 of the consolidated (rail) classification. Issues relating to the applicability and reasonableness of rates on separately packaged parts constituting a complete article and offered as one shipment have been considered in a long line of cases. A shipper has the right to disassemble his product in any way which would make the shipment take a lower rate than if the article were in final form. Western Classification Case, 25 I. C. C. 442; and Lakewood Engineering Co. v. New York Central R. Co., 259 Fed. 61. The classification rule does not abridge that right, for it is inapplicable to shipments separately billed and shipped. Memphis Freight Bureau v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 174 I. C. C. 171. However, if all, or substantially all, of the pieces constituting a complete article are offered as one shipment under one bill of lading, the freight charges should be calculated upon the rating for the complete article. Western Classification Case, supra; Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Alton & S. R., 226 I. C. C. 367 and 234 I. C. C. 703; and Associated Teleph. Co. v. Chichago & N. W. Ry. Co., 251 I. C. C. 311. Moreover, the rate applicable on the complete article may be applied, even though a part or parts thereof may be missing, if the missing part or parts do not alter the fundamental character of the complete article from a transportation or tariff standpoint. Lakewood Engineering Co. v. Director General, 57 I. C. C. 311; Parkersburg Rig & Reel Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 115 I. C. C. 539; and Diamond T Motor Co. v. Michigan Central R. Co., 200 I. C. C. 599.

Complainant relies on Graver Corp. v. Southern Ry. Co., 156 I. C. C. 619, and Southern Traff. & Audit Assn. v. International-G. N. R. Co., 160 I. C. C. 212. The substance of the holdings in those reports is to the effect that when a shipment does not consist of the necessary parts of a complete, or substantially complete, article, the rate on the complete article should not be applied. Complainant also refers to Barker Bros., Inc., v. Southern Pac. Co., 192 I. C. C. 537, in which the finding is to the effect that, when the articles in a shipment are separate entities, used interchangeably and usually sold as separate articles, the rates on the separate articles should be applied. The conditions referred to in the reports cited are not present in the instant proceeding. Complainant stresses the fact that the various items in the shipment were