ones they will take bad ones. The only choice open is whether they shall be provided with leaders, trained and tested as to character and ability, or whether by resolute resistance to their demands they shall be driven into the arms of reckless and irresponsible demagogues, abusing their enthusiasm for selfish purposes. It is precisely the evolution of leaders which is the main object of admitting executive officials to the floor of legislatures; and not merely in its effect upon themselves but upon the members as a whole. Instead of being nominated and elected as lay figures, labelled Republican or Democrat, they would become individuals, visible to their constituents and the State by supporting or criticising men, measures, and policies.

This improvement in the quality of members of the legislature and in the considerations on which they are elected would operate in one direction, where it is perhaps more needed than anywhere else in the country, and that is, in the Senate of the United States. It is not an exaggeration to say that there is no one of our institutions which has caused more dismay and mortification to every self-respecting citizen, anxious not only for the welfare of his country, but for its appearance in the eyes of the world, than the conduct of that body in the last five years. It seems as if even the conservative and dignified members amounts of money thereby placed at its disposal. In the control of the public press, the employment of workers, and the direct bribery of voters, it is evident how much can be accomplished by such means. Yet the figures of the election show that it might not avail, especially with a majority requirement, against a fully aroused moral sense of the people. Whether this could be brought about by such a personality as has been described may be open to question, but it is certain that under present conditions of our public life the experiment never has been and never can be tried.

Notwithstanding the adverse appearance of the Pennsylvania election, we maintain that it involves no condemnation of the character or intentions of the voters of the State. It only proves that they have not been appealed to in the right and effective way.

had lost all power of resistance, and as no chain is stronger than its weakest link, so the attitude of the whole Senate is governed by the most violent and reckless forces. Yet the explanation of these things, as has been already indicated, is very simple. The senators are elected by the State legislatures, and the Senate will be in a higher degree what the State legislatures are. It is notorious how these legislatures to make the remark fit for home consumption we will say outside of Massachusetts - are jobbed and lobbied and log-rolled. When some arch-intriguer, or, according to the popular phrase, 'boss,' by a combination of schemes equally ingenious in contrivance and masterly in manipulation, has obtained control of the majority of a legislature, the reward and distinction which he covets are a seat in the United States Senate, where he remains impregnably intrenched till his superior in his own arts comes to dislodge him. If the Senate was not what it already is, it would be easy to predict what at no distant day it is certain to become.

State legislatures in which business was done with order and system and in public view; in which a responsible executive and a watchful body of members kept public opinion interested and informed both as to men and measures; in which members won their places by their attitude and action in public affairs, and in which senators themselves were exposed to constant discussion and criticism; such legislatures would soon begin to modify the character of the United States Senate.

There is another point of view which shows the wonderful adaptation of the original Constitution to the necessities of the case. The structure of the Senate was devised to satisfy the demand for independence of the separate States, large and small. We have elsewhere dwelt upon the growing tendency of the centralization of power in Washington since the Civil War, a tendency which has

been powerfully promoted by the weakness of the State governments, by the steady absorption of State in national politics, and by the course of the Spanish war. If this is not to go on until the States as separate political units are completely wiped out and the whole country is administered from Washington as thoroughly as France from Paris, the representation of the States as such in the Senate was never more needed than now. If the Senate was elected by popular vote it would not be extravagant to say that in twenty-five years the States would become in relation to the federal government little more than the counties now are to the States.

Again, great complaint is made that States with a scanty population like Nevada and Utah have just as much power in the Senate as great States like Pennsylvania and New York. But the reputation of the one class has certainly not been more discreditable of late years than that of the other, while if the thickly settled States would combine for the manifest common interests of their people they would have no difficulty in holding the balance of power. The shortcomings of the Senate are not, at least to any preponderant degree, chargeable to the new States.

The danger from concentration of power in the executive under the proposed system would be much less than it is now. The examples of New York, Pennsylvania, and other States in Massachusetts the danger has been escaped through the high character of the men- show that collusion and intrigue between the governors and members of the legislature or outside parties may lead to any amount of corruption and betrayal of the public interest. On the other hand, a governor, who by himself or his agents was exposed to public and daily cross-examination by members eager for distinction, would find it impossible to carry on any negotiations which could not bear the full

light of day and which, moreover, would risk almost certain exposure from their very inception.

Even the absolute power of appointment and removal of all officials would be entirely free from danger with the safeguard of such unrelaxing test machinery as that. It is very much safer to try men by a constant criticism of their work after they are appointed than to make that appointment dependent upon some third person or body, and then leave them to carry on their work without effective supervision. The absence of personality in the commissions tells in the same direction. Thus far, by what seems almost a miracle, they have for the most part been made up of men of high character and who have done good work. But if corruption does creep in among them -and the temptation and the opportunity are tremendous-it will bring into stronger light the anarchy, the impotence, and the greed of power of the legislature, while the exasperation and disgust of the people will drive them towards acquiescence in the rule of one man, whether he be good or bad.

Passing to the next item, we shall find that the effect upon the voters would be quite as great and important as upon public men. It is only necessary to read the regular party platform to see how perfectly colorless politics are now; how they rest upon a set of abstract and general platitudes, framed to attract the largest and repel the smallest possible number of voters; how completely the element of personality is eliminated, or if mentioned at all, upon considerations as abstract and irrelevant as the platform itself. And then set over against this that thirst for personality which we have so constantly insisted upon as one of the strongest elements of human nature. As already observed, it is a matter of the commonest observation in the case of actors, singers, clergymen, orators, authors, that it is always the individual who draws the

crowd. In a popular government the first thing is to get at the wish of the people and precisely of the class which, having no direct interest, is least disposed to take an active share in politics. It is of no use to scold at them because they will not take the trouble to decide between two or more sets of men whom they have never seen and of whom they know nothing; as to which of them they will constitute the uncontrolled managers of public affairs, of which they know if possible even less than of the men. The people must be drawn and not driven. If the masses are expected to take an interest in politics, politics must first be made picturesque.

Suppose the public business to be taken out of the secrecy of the committee rooms and brought into the open arena of debate, with leaders on both sides and an order of procedure which would give scope for individual ability. There would be a small, perhaps a very small, number of voters who would follow both the details and the principles involved, dividing, according to their constitutional dispositions, into conservatives and progressives. Yet even these would have a feeling of sympathy or repulsion towards the men with whom the views were identified. Next would come a somewhat larger class, with whom the business occupied a rather less and the men a rather larger share of attention; and so on till finally the largest class was reached, for whom the measures would have very little of interest and the men a very great deal. Yet between both extremes the men would form a common bond of sympathy. Instead of indignation on the part of the first class that the others would not share their views, and frantic and more and more hopeless efforts to arouse them to action, the former would resort to the more available method, satisfied if they could forward desired measures by an agreement as to men; while all would feel increased confidence and courage, by finding that they could work