Some of the main problems have already been identified: Is it possible to divide space into zones for purposes of political, scientific, and technological control? What applications to outer space can be obtained from traditional concepts of national sovereignty, discovery and conquest, and freedom of the seas? Are international conventions for the regulation of civil aviation applicable to space vehicles? What is the relationship between national aviation laws and legal requirements for controls in outer space? What rules and regulations could insure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only? Should a new regulatory international commission for space research and technology be established or can this function be given to one of the existing organizations of the United Nations? What is the international legal situation during, and subsequent to, the International Geophysical Year? How can international agreement be reached on definitions concerning space so that there will be universal acceptance of rules and regulations based upon common understanding? Can the common interest of all nations in space development be achieved by agreements which provide for advance notice on the launching of satellites? What arrangements can be made for the exchange of information on satellite data? Shall we begin now to handle the problem of assigning wavelengths for broadcasting in order to prevent interference with communi cations? Can nations agree on an inspection system concerning the contents of satellites? What methods can be employed to distinguish long-range ballistic missiles from satellites? How shall we solve the problem of responsibility for damages caused by space vehicles? Can problems of space navigation and world meteorological information be handled under the auspices of the United Nations? What provision should be made for problems of ownership, commercial use of space resources, and legal situations incident to space travel? Can any of our existing national and international legal systems be applied to other planets or will it be necessary to develop new codes based upon facts as revealed by science and technology? Is it possible to begin the codification of a portion, if not all, of the rules and regulations which could prevent the extension of national rivalries into space? Should an international convention be held to deal with the problems of space development? The implications of such problems have been analyzed by the authors of the articles which appear in this symposium. The overwhelming number of publications in the field made it necessary to establish criteria for the selection of this material. An effort has been made to include the writings of outstanding experts and to avoid duplication as much as possible. Some general articles summarize the history of thought and analyze the issues which have given rise to divergent opinions in studies of space activities as they relate to national sovereignty and the possibility of codifying space law. The chronological arrangement of the material should prove of assistance to those who are concerned with the interrelationship between law and the complex of scientific and technological space development. The result is not unlike expert testimony taken in a congressional hearing, and should prove useful to the many special groups which have begun to study the problems involved in space law-the United Nations, bar associations, private research organizations, and universities. The foresighted thinking which has already occurred on different aspects of space law should also prove helpful to Congress in dealing with specific problems as they arise. It is possible that parts of the whole field of space law may require action before a system of international cooperation is achieved. In this category, particular attention is called to the article on Law of Outer Space: Radio Controls Urgently Needed, by Andrew G. Haley, president of the International Astronautical Federation; and to the article on The Responsibility of the States for the Damage Caused by the Launched Space Bodies, by I. H. Ph. de Rode-Verschoor. If it becomes necessary to act on single cases in advance of a United Nations program or an international convention which adequately provides for space problems, it should be possible to relate the examples to the knowledge we already have available on the total requirements of mankind for the peaceful uses of outer space. SPACE LAW-A SYMPOSIUM 1. Selected Articles, Arranged Chronologically By John Cobb Cooper1 High altitude rocket flights have reopened an old question: How far upward in space does the territory of the state extend? This is a simple question to state, but a very difficult question to analyze, and perhaps even now an impossible question to answer. Nevertheless it must be considered. If international relations are to be conducted in the future in anything approaching a normal manner, both the statesman and the jurist ought to know the extent to which a state has the acknowledged right to control all activity in the areas of space above its surface territory. The territory of a state, geographically considered, is a three-dimensional region. It includes an area on the surface of the earth, a sector of the earth below, and a sector of space above. Legally considered, the territory of a state may be defined as those regions in which the state is recognized by international law as having the right to exercise national sovereignty to the exclusion of all other states. As the distinguished jurist, Max Huber, said in his opinion in the island of Palmas arbitration between the United States of America and the Netherlands: "Sovereignty in the relations between states signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein to the exclusion of any other state the functions of a state *** territorial sovereignty *** involves the exclusive right to display the activities of a state." Among these territorial functions are included the right of a state to determine the extent to which it will control and police human activity within its territory. The legal concept that a state has territorial rights above the surface of the earth is far older than the discovery of the art of human flight. Rome did not hesitate to control the use of space whenever deemed necessary to protect public or private rights on the surface of the earth. The airspace over public highways and over sacred ground was kept open by law. The Roman emperors limited the height to which buildings could be erected. Private rights in space above the landowner's property on the surface were carefully protected. The Roman state made its laws as effective above the surface of the earth as it did on the 1 An address delivered before the Escuela Libre de Derecho, Mexico City, January 5. 1951, by John C. Cooper, Member Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton), Fellow American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Member Institute of the Aeronautical Sciences. Reprinted from International Law Quarterly (London), July 1951: 411-418. surface. The great jurists of a much later era fully recognized the existence of state sovereignty in space. Pufendorf, for example, in the latter part of the 17th century remarked that "since man has been denied the ability to be in the air to the extent that he rest in it alone, and be separated from the earth, he has been unable to exercise sovereignty over the air except insofar as men standing upon the earth can reach it." To Pufendorf sovereignty in space was thus limited by the ability for effective control, and not otherwise. With the discovery of the balloon in 1783 and the gradual development of the art of man-controlled flight culminating with the Wright brothers in 1903, man found a way "to be in the air to the extent that he rest in it alone," and the problem of the extent of state sovereignty upward became acute. In analyzing this period it must always be remembered that neither statesmen nor lawyers conceived of the possibility of man-made flight through space beyond a region where there would be sufficient gaseous air to support a flight instrumentality of the general nature of a balloon or an airplane. So in 1906 when Professor Westlake, at a meeting of the Institute of International Law, first put into concrete legal statement the doctrine of state airspace sovereignty, he added that there was no limit upward of such sovereignty. Discussing the necessity for state control in the air over its territory, he said: "In the air the higher one ascends, the more damage the fall of objects will cause on the earth. If there exists a limit as to the sovereignty of the state over the oceanic space, none exists for the sovereignty of the state over the airspace. The right of the subjacent state remains the same whatever may be the distance." It is perfectly obvious that Westlake assumed that the state had territorial rights in space as high as flight could exist, but at the same time he assumed that such flight must take place in what he termed "airspace." In 1911 the British Government prepared a draft statute to be entitled "Aerial Navigation Bill" which, in its preamble, recited that "the sovereignty and rightful jurisdiction of His Majesty extends, and has always extended, over the air superincumbent on all parts of His Majesty's dominions and the territorial waters adjacent thereto." Again, it was assumed that if the state had sovereignty "over the air," it had the right to regulate all flight over its lands and waters. Whether the term "air" or the term "airspace" was used, the basic idea was the same. In the first great international legislative enactment of the fundamental principles of air law, the Paris Convention of 1919, article 1 stated that "The High Contracting Parties recognize that every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory." The convention then proceeded to the regulation of the use of "aircraft." In the annex to the convention, adopted shortly after it came into effect, aircraft were defined as comprising "all machines which can derive support in the atmosphere from reactions of the air." The Paris Convention was a statement of long existing and fully recognized state sovereignty over a region called "airspace," but otherwise undefined, in which "aircraft" might operate. But the Paris Convention is not to be construed as meaning that in international law states have territorial rights only in this airspace. The airspace was accepted as part of state territory but no international determination was made as to the regions of space above. The same argument can probably be made with reference to the statutes of various states not parties to the Paris Convention which asserted sovereignty over the "airspace." It might be argued that the Paris Convention, and certain other conventions, asserted state sovereignty in the earth's "atmosphere" beyond the regions where sufficient air exists to support the flight of aircraft as defined in the Paris Convention. Both the French and Italian versions of the Paris Convention use language in article 1 which literally translated into English means "atmospheric space" (French: espace atmospherique, Italian: spazio atmosferico). My own view has always been that these terms were intended to mean exactly what the English version meant, namely, the region of space where the "air" was present in, it must be assumed, sufficient quantities to support flight in the balloon or airplanes which were regulated by the convention. This argument is supported by the fact that the Madrid Convention of 1926, signed by Spain and various Latin American countries, referred in article 1 to sovereignty over "atmospheric space" (espacio atmosferico); while in the Habana Convention of 1928, signed by many of the same states, state sovereignty is recognized over the "airspace" (official Spanish text: "espacio aereo"). Although, as will be indicated hereafter, the earth's atmosphere from the purely scientific point of view extends much further above the surface of the earth than does the region in which "air" is present in sufficient quantities to maintain aircraft flight, it would seem that in the Paris, Madrid, and Habana Conventions the terms "airspace" and "atmospheric space" must be considered as synonymous, constituting legally a recognition that every state has territorial rights at least through these regions where sufficient gaseous air is found to support such flight. This view is further borne out by the fact that the Chicago Convention of 1944, now in force, states in article 1 that "The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory." While the convention recites that French and Spanish texts were to be drawn up and opened for signature, this was apparently never done and the English text is still the only text which was officially signed. In the French translation of the convention which is ordinarily used, so I am advised, the English word "airspace" has been translated as "espace atmospherique," while in the Spanish translation distributed by the International Civil Aviation Organization, it has been translated as "espacio aereo." It may, therefore, be said that international law now answers the question "How far upward in space does the territory of the State extend?" as follows: The territory of the state extends upward at least as far above the surface as to include a region which can be roughly defined as "airspace." An international law contains no presently accepted rule covering the question as to whether usable space above and beyond the "airspace" is or is not part of the territory of the state below. It is at this point that high altitude rocket flights open unsolved legal and political problems. Just how high such flights have been made I do not know. But as long ago as the spring of 1949 it was disclosed in the public press that a 2-stage rocket had reached a height |