Mr. RIVERS. That is why I say I don't want to be too hard on the general.

Mr. PRICE. The general said this, "Since this policy was distributed just a little over 1 month ago, I am sure you will understand that my presentation will not provide final answers as to how the Air Force as the principal implementing agency will carry out the program which has been prescribed by the Department of Defense."

Of course, personally I would like that the Air Force would have these answers before the Department of Defense would be so sure of its program.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Hardy, continue.

Mr. HARDY. Before I conclude

Mr. RIVERS. I want to recognize Mr. Bray.

Mr. HARDY. Let me conclude very briefly. I didn't have any purpose at all in casting any aspersions or reflections on the general's presentation.

Mr. RIVERS. I know that.

Mr. HARDY. He was sent here to do a job, and obviously they do the best they can. And they use rather mealy-mouth expressions sometimes to try to cover up the things they don't say.

Mr. RIVERS. Well, we are going to help the general.

Mr. HARDY. We are going to help him.

Now this policy thing and I do want to make this observation about it, because as I went through this thing actually it scares me half to death, and I am not at all sure I know what it means, and I don't know how in the world the people who have to determine those things would know what it means.

I think, Mr. Chairman, that is something we need to study, and study very, very carefully, this outline of policy, because it could be our complete downfall if somebody gets to operating that thing on the basis of some decisions I know have been made. We would just get rid of them-turn it over to private industry, no matter what it costs.

It has been done, General. name several of them for you. General WHELESS. Yes, sir.

-assure you.

You know it and I know it. And I can

That is not our intention, I can

Mr. HARDY. I know that is not your intention. I don't mean to ascribe any improper intent. But I am sure concerned about the manner in which this thing might work out.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Smart, have you any questions?

Mr. SMART. No, sir.

Mr. RIVERS Anybody else have any questions?

(No response.)

Mr. RIVERS. I would like to put this in the record at this point: Come next fiscal year, this committee has already been directed to assume the responsibility of authorizing whatever weapons systems the military will have.

Before this report of the President's is completely implemented, it might be well if we would write into law that MATS is a weapons system, that military airlift is a weapons system, and get that behind us. So under the guise of getting the Government out of business, we may also get the Air Force out of the weapons system of airlift.

So before it is given away or delegated out of business I think it might be well, Mr. Smart, if we would consider writing a little definition of what airlift is, so that we will have it under the military control. And that would help you very much, as you know. And I am sure you would appreciate that.

General WHELESS. Yes, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. That would solve a lot of problems that you haven't got solved.

And if we can do that, we may do just exactly that. Because as the law exists now, the Military Air Transport Service, which is the only airlift you have other than the tactical airlift in the Tactical Air Command your 130's-it could go out of the window immediately. It has no standing. It is an executive setup. It is either a Secretary of Defense setup or-how is the MATS created? By Executive order or secretarial direction? How is the MATS set up? Who set up the MATS?

General WHELESS. I am just trying to find out. I am not sure of the answer to that one specifically.

Mr. RIVERS. That is what I say. A lot of people aren't even sure it exists, as Mr. Gavin pointed out.

General WHELESS. It was established by Department of Defense order.

Mr. RIVERS. I think so.

Mr. SMART. By the Secretary of Defense, I would presume.

Mr. RIVERS. We may have to look into that. That would help you a lot.

I am not going to sit on this committee and not have any airlift. I think we have given General Lemnitzer enough ulcers-whatever you call ulcers in a polite term.

And also the two divisions that you are interested in, General Binney.

(General Binney nods.)

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, let me ask a general question before you leave this.

Mr. RIVERS. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. General, I would like to just clear up one question that occurred to me here in connection with this policy-this statement we were discussing a moment ago. Was this developed by some highpowered outside committee?

General WHELESS. It was developed by the Department of Defense, with inputs from the services to some extent.

Mr. HARDY. Are you sure that there weren't some big names, or industrial committees that came in with this suggestion?

General WHELESS. I don't think so; no, sir. It was developedMr. HARDY. We had so many debacles-the one that you had not too long ago in the Department of Defense, on this matter of movinghousehold goods, because somebody got a brainstorm.

I was just wondering if this one also might have been generated from the outside.

General WHELESS. No, sir. It was generated in the Department of Defense.

The Presidentially approved airlift policy represents more than a DOD position. The nine courses of action were approved by the President following an extended discussion of the entire national air

lift problem by the National Security Council. They were approved by every member of the NSC as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Air Force believes the DOD policy is compatible with and complementary to an airlift policy developed independently by the Air Force which was approved by the Chief of Staff prior to the final DOD report. This policy is stated following this discussion.

As early as April 1959 the Air Force had established the policy that the regular intertheater logistics mission should be performed largely by the airline industry, subject to modernization and expansion. In a reorientation to a primary military hard core role, MATS would be freed to a great extent from the regularly scheduled interthreater logistics operation, which presently consumes the bulk of its sustained capability, peace or war.

Under existing concepts, large-scale diversion of the MATS fleet from its peacetime logistics mission has an adverse effect on continuity of the oversea logistics pipeline, which is so vital in maintaining our general war posture.

Even with full activation of the CRAF cargo fleets (disregarding the inevitable disruption to the communications and transportation systems of the U.S. economy) the airline industry today does not possess sufficient capability to take over on short notice the very large, and vitally important global resupply mission now performed by MATS. In short, MATS cannot maintain the normal intertheater logistic mission and simultaneously carry out hard core military deployments and other urgent missions of any real magnitude.

In order to take recurring cold war crises in our stride, (1) MATS must be instantly available to carry out fast-reaction, short term hard core operations; (not requiring a high peacetime activity rate); (2) the vital intertheater logistics resupply must be maintained, perhaps expanded, and (3) the entire civil economy cannot be disrupted due to sudden withdrawal of a very large portion of civil cargo airlift capacity, at the very time the entire Nation must support the emergency effort. The Air Force has concluded that the only reasonable way to resolve this national problem is through the implementation of the referenced courses of action. It is only in this manner that the Nation can afford an effective, modernized MATS fleet, simultaneously with a rapid growth and modernization of the civil cargo fleets to meet the airlift shortages we might face, all of which are "civil-eligible,” as opposed to hard core requirements.

(Attachment 1)

THE AIR FORCE POLICY ON NATIONAL AIRLIFT

1. The Air Force recognizes the desirability of developing a greatly expanded and modernized national airlift capability, particularly a larger civil cargo capability. The Air Force appreciates that the effort to achieve this objective could be given favorable impetus through increased application of such civil carriers to both the wartime and the peacetime military airlift requirement.

2. At the present time the Air Force has a wartime airlift requirement of major magnitude to meet. (The word "wartime" as used herein and throughout this document is intended to include general war, limited war, and periods of heightened tension.) As long as the Air Force must rely primarily on its own airlift resources to meet the cargo portion of this requirement, it must maintain an adequate airlift force and it must operate and exercise this force at a flight activity rate to insure that it will be prepared and competent when required. This necessary flight activity rate is at this time of such magnitude that the Air Force is capable of meeting a major portion of the military peacetime airlift requirement as a by

product of essential preparedness flight operations. Until and unless the wartime airlift requirement which the Air Force must be prepared to meet with military airlift is reduced, this situation will continue. Consequently, it is in the national interest that civil carrier capability be increased to meet the wartime military requirement. Such growth can be encouraged by increased use of civil carriers in lifting military cargo and passengers in peacetime, consistent with reasonably economic use of MATS.

3. Use of civil carriers in wartime for military purposes must be contingent upon the consummation of suitable agreements and contracts backed by necessary legislation which would assure the proper performance and availability of civil airlift in an emergency under the operational control of the military.

(a) The required legislation would amend existing law to expand the statutory authority of the President to take possession and assume control of transportation systems in times of heightened tension or "national emergency," as well as in "wartime."

(b) The contracts should include the following general areas of agreement on the part of the civil air carriers:

(1) That each carrier will equip itself with modern cargo and passenger aircraft which the Air Force considers suitable for the airlift to be performed.

(2) That each carrier will operate into agreed geographic areas and will continue to operate under wartime (as defined in paragraph 2 above) conditions if determined to be feasible by military authority; further, that each carrier will provide in wartime this airlift and such reasonable degree of expanded airlift into this and other areas as may be determined to be necessary by military authority. For purposes of these contracts, the Secretary of Defense may decide what circumstances constitute "wartime."

(3) That each carrier will obtain from the operating unions and/or individual personnel with whom it contracts agreements that all union members or individuals will provide required airlift at all times.

4. Pursuant to the foregoing the Air Force, acting in concert with the civil carriers, should restudy carefully, as a first step toward the national airlift objective, the extent of application of civil carriers to the military wartime task. This should be done as follows:

(a) Reevaluate, on a continuing basis, the magnitude of the total wartime airlift requirement. This requirement should be met with all available airlift resources, military and civilian. This consideration fixes the size of the combined effort of military and civil carriers.

(b) Ascertain the willingness and capability of the civil operators to guarantee the availability of airlift of the type, and on the time schedule, required, particularly that which is suitable for regular scheduling. Provided suitable guarantees are forthcoming, allocate to the civil carriers as much of the total as they can supply consistent with paragraph 4(c) below. This consideration fixes the upper level of civil participation.

(c) Since civil air carrier availability is not as certain as a military force in its response to an emergency, the Air Force will identify those wartime operations which are of a character demanding the use of military airlift. This consideration fixes the minimum level of military participation. The operations in question are: (1) Those requiring such quick reaction as to necessitate a force in continuous state of readiness, such as emergency positioning of support personnel and equipment in anticipation of maximum effort operations, and deployment of initial elements of strategic and tactical units.

(2) Those requiring extensive military training.

(3) Those of such a sensitive nature as to require military discipline and security.

5. At such time as civil air carriers are committed to the military wartime requirement on a scale permitting reduction in the Military Air Transport Service commitment, the Air Force should redefine the wartime mission of MATS and reduce the MATS peacetime flight activity rate. Civil carriers should then assume a greater portion of the military peacetime air traffic load. Under this arrangement a greater proportion of MATS flying activity would be devoted to the objective of quick reaction. MATS, however, must continue to participate in channel traffic, to the degree required:

(a) To keep the worldwide operating capability alive.

(b) To utilize gainfully those flying hours, over and above that required for exercises and local training, which must be flown to keep its activity rate up to the level necessary to meet that part of the wartime requirement beyond civil capability and/or commitment.

6. The Air Force will participate in and support any joint military/civil program which is consistent with the policy set forth herein and which has as its purpose the enhancement of the Nation's military and commercial posture through improvement of the overall airlift capability. In this connection the Air Force is prepared at this time to support transport and engine development oriented toward joint military/civil application. Any cargo aircraft developed as a joint military/civil project must possess certain minimum operational characteristics in order to be capable of accomplishing its military mission. The minimum characteristics required by the Air Force include payload/range capability of 40,000 pounds/4,000 nautical miles when operating from 5,000-foot. runways. The airplane should possess truck bed height straight-in loading, a side loading cargo door, integral loading equipment, level floor, and an optional air delivery capability.

7. Movement of military personnel and cargo by civil airlines should be increased as early as the foregoing policy will permit.

8. MATS should be modernized as rapidly as possible consistent with resources available for all weapon systems.

(Attachment 2)

IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

1. Secure from the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense approval of these statements of policy. 2. Following such approval, release these statements for public information. 3. Implement action to obtain necessary legislative safeguards, appropriate coordination with Government agencies and contracts with civil carriers.

4. Obtain from the Joint Chiefs of Staff a realistic appraisal of airlift requirements during general war, limited war, and periods of heightened tension, based upon a revised strategy and joint war plan, taking into account bomb damage considerations and the revised mobilization base concept (JCS 2101/366). This appraisal should give due cognizance to the steady and rapid growth trend in the use of airlift by both military and civil agencies. Further, the appraisal should give due recognition to not only the ton-mile requirements, but also the airframe requirements and the war readiness utilization rate of the military transport force. (JCS 2016/95 is current statement of requirements.)

5. Establish with FAA and the civil carriers a program oriented toward joint military/civil development of a new cargo aircraft.

6. In alinement with the objectives of this policy, the Air Force will review the assignment of an air transport mission to designated reserve forces, along with appropriate equipment, to augment DOD wartime airlift requirements.

Mr. HARDY. Thank you.

Mr. RIVERS. You must remember

General WHELESS. And no committee.

Mr. RIVERS. The Military Air Transport Service has been under fire from a jillion sources.

General WHELESS. It has.

Mr. RIVERS. I think the Hoover Commission even recommended against it. If they didn't, they are the only people who haven't. I know the U.S. Chamber of Commerce either has or started to. Mr. HARDY. I thought maybe this might have been generated from industrial sources.

Mr. RIVERS. Because I had some correspondence on it from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. They did take out after them. the oldest chamber of commerce in America, which is mine in Charleston, took issue with them. And other chambers of commerce. know that is one organization that didn't help you.

And

We want to help you. Let's get to the next witness. Mr. SMART. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest, to accommodate a personal situation, we proceed out of order on item 9 of the agenda,