Mr. FISHER. Our district is very proud of him, a great war record. Mr. RIVERS. That is the highest recommendation I know you can get, to come from his district.

You may proceed, General Wheless.

General WHELESS. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, you have heard the other services outline their limited war requirements for strategic airlift. Now I will briefly cover the strategic airlift requirements of the Air Force to support the deployment of our forces from the United States in event of a limited war. Also, I will show you the strategic airlift capability available to support the movement of forces as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

CHART 2. COMPOSITE AIR STRIKE FORCE

First, the Air Force requirement for strategic airlift. In the Tactical Air Command, we maintain the composite air strike force, a ready mobile force for rapid deployment to any worldwide objective area. The CASF is made up of various units designed for specific areas of the world.

The "Bravo" and "Charlie" forces, designed for operations in the Middle East, are shown on this chart.

Bravo: They include: [Deleted].

The Charlie force includes: [Deleted].

MATS moves [deleted] personnel and [deleted] tons of equipment for CASF Bravo. For the Charlie force, they move personnel and [deleted] tons of equipment.

These forces are so designed that any part of the total forces, as listed, can be deployed as may be required.

Bravo is the initial force and, if required, Charlie is a follow-on augmentation force.

Comparable size forces, called X-ray and Yankee, are organized for the Far East.

CHART 3. MATS TRIPS

Now, the strategic airlift required to support the deployment of the CASF forces.

Here, you see the number of trips by days that MATS would have to provide to support the movement of each force.

For deployment to the Middle East, CASF Bravo, which would move out first, requires [deleted]. CASF Charlie is an augmentation follow-on force, and, if deployed, would move sometime after Bravo, requiring [deleted].

Mr. RIVERS. Did you say in your statement that these began in the very first day of the emergency?

General WHELESS. That is right; if ordered.

For deployment to the Far East, we have CASF X-ray and Yankee forces which are comparable to the Bravo and Charlie forces. X-ray, the initial force, requires a total of [deleted] trips as indicated. Yankee force, if deployed, would follow X-ray at a later date and require a total of [deleted] trips by MATS.

In addition to these MATS trips, the [deleted] squadrons of C-130's in the CASF, which augments the theater airlift force, move part of the total force in their deployment.

Sir, this is the estimated Air Force requirement for strategic airlift in limited war. Now, I will cover the strategic airlift capabilities available to support contingencies.

CHART 4. ESTIMATED AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

In my previous briefing on the airlift study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I covered in detail the hypothetical requirements for the condition of limited war in Korea coinciding with worldwide mobilization deployments for general war. For this condition, the requirements for deployment from the United States to support the limited war in Korea, as submitted by each service, included [deleted]. Perhaps you recall that the capability shown in the study indicated that over [deleted] and equipment, the total requirement, could be deployed to the Korea-Japan area in the [deleted].

Although the JCS will determine the specific forces for deployment from the United States to support contingency actions, I will now show the estimated airlift capability available to deploy the various forces as outlined by the Army.

CHART 5. ARMY FORCES

First, a brief review of the composition of the Army forces. [Deleted.]

Mr. BECKER. Mr. Chairman, would it be permissible just to ask a question to get an understanding of what this tonnage is?

Does this cover just the equipment of the troops or is this other type equipment military weapons or what not? I mean, I would like to get that clear, Mr. Chairman, if you don't mind.

Mr. RIVERS. Go ahead.

Mr. BECKER. It bothers me.

General WHELESS. This includes all the equipment they would normally carry for such a move.

Now, the detailed equipment I would like to ask the Army to answer. Mr. RIVERS. General Lemnitzer.

General LEMNITZER. [Deleted] days of supplies; that is, ammunition and the other types of supplies that are required to support this force.

Mr. RIVERS. That goes along with the initial group?

General LEMNITZER. That is right.

Mr. BECKER. That includes the weapons?

General LEMNITZER. Yes.

Mr. BECKER. Whatever they need for those [deleted] days.
Thank you.

General LEMNITZER. I think the committee will note a slight difference between our tonnages and the Air Force's because, as I pointed out, we use the factor of nine men equaling 1 ton. The Air Force have broken theirs down by troops and tonnages of equipment and supplies.

Mr. BECKER. That is what caused me to ask the question, General. General LEMNITZER. There is a small difference for that reason. Mr. BECKER. Thank you.

Mr. RIVERS. I am glad you asked that because it cleared it up in my mind, too.

Go ahead.

General WHELESS. We know, from previous work with the Army, that they have made sizable reductions in the weight of these packaged forces for airlift by eliminating certain less critical personnel and supplies. For example, the one-division force shown on this chart has been reduced by approximately [deleted] from a previous division force which was planned for airlift. Also, the initial forces, either one or two battle groups, have been similarly reduced so as to provide an adequate, austere combat force capable of responding immediately to a contingency.

CHART 6. TRIPS REQUIRED FOR DEPLOYMENTS

This chart shows the estimated number of trips required to airlift the various forces to either Turkey or South Vietnam.

One battle group force to Turkey; [deleted] trips to South Vietnam. Two battle group force to Turkey; [deleted] trips to South Vietnam. One division force to Turkey; [deleted] trips to South Vietnam. Two division force to Turkey; [deleted] trips to South Vietnam. The numbers of trips are based on the various types of aircraft in MATS, TAC, and CRAF. For the one and two battle group forces, only the types of aircraft in MATS were considered. The Marine Corps requirement for movement of two battalion landing teams would require slightly fewer trips than the two battle group force.

The critical or longest leg of the deployment routes determine the payload for each aircraft. For Turkey, the critical leg is from Bermuda to the Azores which is approximately 1,900 nautical miles, whereas on the South Vietnam route, the critical leg is 2,150 miles from Travis AFB, Calif., to Hickam in Hawaii. This longer critical leg on the South Vietnam route reduces the payload for the cargo aircraft, thus more trips are required as indicated. For example, the C-124 payload is reduced approximately 4,000 pounds on the Pacific route.

CHART 7. ESTIMATED AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT DEPLOYMENTS

Next, an estimate of the number of aircraft available to support deployments.

This chart shows the programed fiscal year 1961 force for MATS, TAC, and CRAF; the number of aircraft withheld for other purposes; and the number of aircraft we consider available to support the deployments.

In fiscal year 1961, MATS is programed to have 465 aircraft of various types, TAC 96 C-130's, CRAF 211 of various types with a total force of 772 aircraft.

From MATS we withheld [deleted] aircraft, which includes [deleted] for the initial general war support of SAC and [deleted] to continue vital military airlift to oversea areas, leaving [deleted] available. In TAC, [deleted] C-130's which are assigned to the composite air strike force are withheld, leaving [deleted] available. All of the 211 CRAF fleet are considered available, giving a total of [deleted] aircraft to support limited war deployments.

Mr. RIVERS. Now I would like to ask you: You said there at the top: 465 planes from MATS. You are talking about 121's, 118's and the 133's?

General WHELESS. And 124's.
Mr. RIVERS. And the 124's.
General WHELESS. Yes, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. You are not talking about other categories of nondescript planes, like air rescue and stuff like that?

General WHELESS. No, sir. These are the strategic part of MATS' fleet.

Mr. RIVERS. Strictly strategic.

General WHELESS. Řight.

Mr. PRICE. This is your total inventory that you have right now? General WHELESS. This is the total inventory for fiscal year 1961. Mr. PRICE. It is possible, then, you don't have 465 right now; is that right?

Mr. SMART. They have more.

Mr. PRICE. There are more?

Mr. SMART. They are falling out. The C-97's are going to the Air National Guard.

General WHELESS. I could get that total for you now, if you would like it. I don't have it right here with me.

Mr. RIVERS. Go ahead. We will get to that when you can get it up for him.

General WHELESS. All right.

Also, not included in this total of [deleted] aircraft are 40 C-97's transferred to the Air National Guard, 36 C-124's in the logistical support squadrons in AMC, 48 C-124's in the strategic support squadrons in SAC, and the four-engine aircraft in organized transport support units of the Navy and Marine Corps that are based in the United States.

To determine the distance and flying hours for deployments to Adana, Turkey, the Army forces were moved from North Carolina and Kentucky areas. However, for the deployments to Saigon, South Vietnam, we used a midpoint in the United States, Scott Air Force Base, Ill., for the average distance. The distance to Turkey is 6,200 nautical miles, and for example, requires 35 flying hours for the C-124. For South Vietnam, the distance is 9,600 nautical miles, requiring 51 flying hours for the C-124. The round trip time to Turkey and return, including flying hours and ground time, is approximately 86 hours. For South Vietnam, the round trip time is approximately 130 hours.

CHART 8. ESTIMATED DAYS REQUIRED TO DEPLOY ARMY FORCES

This chart reflects the estimated number of days required to deploy the various forces to Turkey or to South Vietnam, and the desired time for deployment as stated by the Army.

In the upper part of the chart is the estimated capability of the programed [deleted] aircraft in MATS to move the indicated forces. And, in the lower part, is the combined capability of the [deleted] aircraft in MATS, TAC, and CRAF.

I would like to point out that this is an order of magnitude only. In development of detailed movement plans and using more refined data, it is possible that some changes would be made.

Using MATS aircraft only, we can deploy: One battle group force to Turkey in [deleted] days or to South Vietnam in [deleted] days; two battle group forces to Turkey in [deleted] days or to South Viet

nam in [deleted] days; one division force to Turkey in [deleted] days or to South Vietnam in [deleted] days. For the one or two battle group forces, the Army requires either force to depart within a matter of hours in other words, just as soon as possible. The one division force is to be in the objective area within [deleted]. The MATS capability alone satisfies the deployment times for these forces as indicated, except for deploying the one division to Turkey, where [deleted].

Mr. BECKER. You have [deleted] days here.

General WHELESS. Well, that is a mistake, sir. It is [deleted] days. Mr. RIVERS. Now, say that again.

General WHELESS. As indicated, except for the deployment of one division to Turkey, we are [deleted] days over the desired [deleted] days, as indicated on the chart.

Mr. RIVERS. I see.

General WHELESS. And to South Vietnam we are [deleted] days over the desired time.

Mr. BECKER. You are how many days over in Turkey?

General WHELESS. Oh, wait a minute. I am sorry. Excuse me. That was my mistake. I made some changes in my script here.

For the deployment of one division to Turkey, we are [deleted] days over the desired [deleted] days. To South Vietnam we are [deleted] days over the desired time.

However, when using the combined capability of MATS, TAC, and CRAF as shown on the lower part of the chart, the one division can be deployed to Turkey within the [deleted] days period but to South Vietnam we're [deleted] days over the desired time period. Deployment of the two-division force to Turkey is well within the specified time of [deleted]; however, we're [deleted] days over for moving this force to South Vietnam. The limiting factors here, as well as moving the other forces, are indicated on the next chart.

Before going to the next chart, however, I would like to make this point. We believe that the objective in event of a contingency should be to respond as rapidly as possible with an adequate austere combat force. Therefore, as the airlift force is modernized and Army prestockage is effected, the above reaction times should be reduced. Now to the principal limiting factors in deploying the various forces.

CHART 9. PRINCIPAL LIMITING FACTORS

Deploying one and two battle groups: Aircraft handling and servicing capacity of onload, en route, offload airfields.

Deploying one and two divisions:

1. Flying-hour capability that can be supported over an extended period.

2. Capacity of en route bases in Pacific.

For deploying the one or two battle groups, it is simply a matter of how many aircraft you can land, park, service, load, and take off at the bases within a matter of hours. After the 24-hour warning, we would have approximately 300 aircraft operationally ready to move out, so numbers of aircraft are not the limiting factor.

However, in deploying the one-division and especially the twodivision forces, the primary limiting factor is the flying hours that the airlift forces can support over an extended period. In deploying the