Mr. SMART. Well Mr. RIVERS. We have that authority. Mr. SMART. I would say, Mr. Chairman, that upon conclusion of the military phase of this hearing, that it is going to be most important that these civil operators be brought in here, in accordance with your statement of yesterday. At that time they can walk their own plank if they have made false claims. Mr. HARDY. I want to ask one further question, and then I am through. Now, I would like, Mr. Chairman, to see if I could get an answer to the question. My comment was a statement, along with the question. And one reason I raised the question about the factor that was employed, of reliability of the civilian aircraft and of the losses which would take place on the first flights that they would make, is because the experience that I have, in having to wait for them to get a darn airplane out of a hangar in running shape so it can take me off from here on to Norfolk, on a little short jump like that-if we have that kind of thing to put up with, I am afraid you may be overestimating the lift capacity which the commercial airlines would provide. Mr. PRICE. I don't think Genral Lemnitzer is, but maybe some others are. Mr. HARDY. I am talking about General Wheless now. In General Wheless' statement, he presented this picture yesterday and I would like to know what factor is allowed for breakdowns and for losses of aircraft on that initial flight. There might be a little enemy action. (Mr. BECKER aside to the chairman.) Mr. HARDY. Let's see if he can give me an answer. General WHELESS. To answer your specific question on the factors that were used, I am not sure I could get that answer for you, and I will bring it back here, on all the factors used in this particular category. Now, we are going to have a complete briefing on CRAF later on in the presentation. But our present plans call for 232 aircraft to be available within. 48 hours from CRAF now, to take up part of this general war mission, their part of it. Mr. HARDY. That is from CRAF, 242? General WHELESS. 232. Mr. HARDY. 232, out of a total of 242. Am I looking at the wrong figures? General WHELESS. Well Mr. HARDY. All you have is 242, according to the sheet you had up there yesterday at least the way I read it. Maybe I read it wrong. General WHELESS. Right, sir. The fleet as of today. The figures I presented are as of last October. The present fleet of 232 aircraft are considered to be available within 48 hours, in our planning with CRAF. Mr. HARDY. That would take everything out of civilian traffic. That would take everything out of civilian traffic? General WHELESS. No, sir. Mr. RIVERS. Just out of CRAF. Mr. RIVERS. Just CRAF. General WHELESS. I believe Mr. HARDY. What percentage of the civilian-total civilianservice would that take out? Anything above a DC-3. You still have a few of them flying. General WHELESS. My information indicates that there are over 900 more civilian aircraft that have this capability. So we are taking 232 in our present fleet. Mr. HARDY. Out of how many? General WHELESS. Out of probably 1,100. Because the indication is there are 900 additional available that could be used in some categories, sir. Mr. SMART. I think you should distinguish there, that the 232 you are taking are all four-engine aircraft. General WHELESS. They are all four-engine aircraft. Mr. SMART. And there are many CRAF planes on the civilian side of this situation that are not four-engine aircraft, aren't there? They are still flying some "Gooney Birds"? General WHELESS. Yes, sir, there are a lot that are not. Mr. RIVERS. This hasn't been thought through. And I have to at this point put that in the record, before I forget. This thing hasn't been thought through by the Joint Chiefs enough to suit me, sitting back here in Washington and exposed as I am. [Laughter.] Mr. SMART. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman? Mr. RIVERS. Yes. Mr. SMART. Before we adjourn Mr RIVERS. Mr. Hardy, are you through? Mr. HARDY. I am not through. am not through. Mr. RIVERS. We will get that. I give up, Mr. Chairman. But I Mr. SMART. General Lemnitzer, could you envisage a general war which could occur [deleted]? General LEMNITZER. No. Mr. SMART. Mr. Chairman, I think this is Mr. RIVERS. What was that question, Mr. Smart? Mr. SMART. I asked General Lemnitzer if he could envisage our getting into a general war that did not involve actual military conflict and [deleted] and his answer was "No." So that when we talk-I think it is important to consider that answer in connection with the hard core general war problems here. On the other hand, in a limited war situation, do you anticipate, or do you feel, that we could be in a limited war situation [deleted]? Can you envisage that, without it expanding into a general war? General LEMNITZER. Well, I can't forecast what would expand into a general war, but I think it is a generally accepted premise that there can [deleted] without it developing into a general war. But I want to make the distinction that if one of our aircraft is patrolling, as it did in my area many times in Japan, and a Russian aircraft attacks it, that doesn't necessarily mean it will go into general war. It depends on what our reaction is and then, in turn, what the Russian reaction is to our reaction. That is what is involved. Mr. SMART. That would be an international incident? General LEMNITZER. That is right. Mr. SMART. Then I would presume that you envisage [deleted] the commitment of American troops to fighting nationals other than Russians? General LEMNITZER. Actual fighting? Mr. SMART. Yes, sir. General LEMNITZER. Nationals other than Russians, yes. The best recent example that we have in history is the introduction of the so-called Chinese Communist volunteers into Korea. Mr. SMART. Yes, sir. Mr. RIVERS. Tell me Mr. Smart, are you finished? Mr. SMART. I just had one more question. Mr. RIVERS. Go ahead, sir. Mr. SMART. You know, General Lemnitzer, that there is projected for the fiscal year 1961 budget the sum of $50 million, presumably for the development of what we call an SOR aircraft. General LEMNITZER. Yes, sir; I understand the $50 million is so tagged. Mr. SMART. Now, you have testified that you feel so acutely about the current shortage of modern aircraft in the inventory that we must move forward immediately to try to close that gap. In that connection you have mentioned further procurement [deleted]. Would it be your preference that the currently programed $50 million for SOR aircraft be made available for the procurement of [deleted] aircraft or other aircraft of this nature? General LEMNITZER. I think it would be a serious mistake not to go ahead with research and development of an improved type of aircraft. So I can't accept the premise that it is an either-or business. If we stopped the development of weapons throughout the armed services merely to meet our immediate requirements, we would be making the greatest mistake of our lives. Mr. HARDY. Well General LEMNITZER. You have to do both. That is right. Mr. HARDY. I had questions on that, but I was passing them up. Mr. SMART. In other words, the essence of what you are saying is that there simply isn't enough money in the budget to do the job that must be done? General LEMNITZER. I am saying that I do not advocate the switchover of the $50 million for the development of better aircraft to the procurement of current aircraft. That is what I meant. Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Gavin has made the observation that out of $1,800 million-I think those were his figures. Mr. HARDY. $18,000 million. Mr. RIVERS. $18,000 million, only fifty goes to the procurement of aircraft in this budget. And that is to produce a photo-I mean a prototype. Now, General Lemnitzer, you said [deleted]-of course when I am like Mr. Hardy. I just keep busting over into MATS. Why couldn't we reconfigure one of the 707's or the 880's or the DC-8's to meet our immediate, emergent conditions? That wouldn't take 4 years. General WHELESS. We have under consideration all of these courses of action, as a matter of fact. I would like to correct one thing. Of course, at the same time we have this $50 million for modernization that Mr. Smart mentioned, we are still continuing to buy C-130's and C-133's in the 1961 budget-oh, I take that back. C-130's only in the 1961 budget. Mr. RIVERS. No 133's. General WHELESS. They are all bought out. Mr. RIVERS. What? General WHELESS. The C-133's would be bought out. But the C-130's we have $70.4 million for continued production of those. Mr. RIVERS. I see. You already paid for that. General WHELESS. Sir? Mr. RIVERS. That has already been obligated. General WHELESS. The C-133's have been obligated. Mr. RIVERS. The only new money you have is $50 million? Mr. RIVERS. That has to do with strategic aircraft, though. Mr. RIVERS. That is not a strategic aircraft? General WHELESS. No, sir. Mr. RIVERS. Let me ask you this. You have only one missilecarrying airplane, haven't you, or is the 133 a missile-carrying airplane? General WHELESS. It has a capability of carrying the large missiles. I think we have smaller ones that can be carried, I am sure, in other aircraft. Mr. SMART. The ICBM's. Mr. RIVERS. What is your missile-carrying airplane? Isn't that the 124? General WHELESS. The 124 and 133. They are the large cargotype aircraft. Mr. RIVERS. Can the 133 carry as large a missile as the 124, and vice versa? General WHELESS. The 133 can carry-my understanding is—a larger missile. It was demonstrated here very recently, I think, in carrying Atlas and Titan. Mr. RIVERS. I just wanted to be sure. Mr. BECKER. It carried Atlas General WHELESS. Yes, sir. Mr. BECKER. It has carried Atlas already. It delivered it to the site. Mr. RIVERS. How about the 124? General WHELESS. The 124 can't carry the Atlas, no, sir, nor the Titan, but it can accommodate every other missile currently in production. Mr. RIVERS. So at the end of this year you will have 50 planes. And, incidentally, that is all for the free world. Nobody else has any. There isn't any such thing as airlift, is there, in the free world? Nobody has an airlift, do they? General LEMNITZER. We in the Army are the only ones that do not have any airlift. Mr. RIVERS. Don't say Great Britain, because they don't have it. General LEMNITZER (continuing). That you can say have an airlift capability of the kind we are talking about in the free world. Mr, RIVERS. I say the free world. General LEMNITZER. Yes. Mr. RIVERS. We are the only people in the free world. And the only planes that the free world will have at the end of the fiscal year 1961 will be [deleted] airplanes capable of carrying the big missiles. Is that a true statement? General WHELESS. Of the big missile? Mr. RIVERS. Yes. General WHELESS. I think that is probably true; yes. Mr. RIVERS. No "probably" do it. It is true. General WHELESS. Well, I don't know the capacity of the CL-44, for example. Mr. RIVERS. You haven't it. General WHELESS. But it can't, I understand. Mr. RIVERS. Yes. So the 133 is what you call-what do you call the 133? General WHELESS. I beg your pardon? Mr. RIVERS. What is the name you give the 133? The Hercules is the 130? General LEMNITZER. What is the C-133 named [repeating the question to General Wheless]? Mr. RIVERS. What? Mr. SMART. Has it a name? Mr. RIVERS. I thought the Hercules-the Hercules is the 130, isn't it? General WHELESS. That is right; yes, sir. Mr. RIVERS. But the 133 is the only plane that can carry big missiles in the free world. General WHELESS. That is correct. FREE WORLD MILITARY AIRLIFT The free world military airlift forces operate or have on order a total of 141 turbine-powered transports alone, as shown below, plus miscellaneous piston engine types. The Short Bros. Britannic has a load-carrying capacity in excess of the Douglas C-133 at longer ranges, but somewhat less at shorter ranges. Although the loading envelope is quite large, it is not known whether the Atlas missile could be accommodated. General BINNEY. The answer to the question was the Cargomaster. Mr. PRICE. General, the "CL" you mentioned-it was 44? General WHELESS. Yes, sir. |