The Political Economy of Dictatorship''Although much of the world still lives today, as always, under dictatorship, the behaviour of these regimes and of their leaders often appears irrational and mysterious. In The Political Economy of Dictatorship, Ronald Wintrobe uses rational choice theory to model dictatorships: their strategies for accumulating power, the constraints on their behavior, and why they are often more popular than is commonly accepted. The book explores both the politics and the economics of dictatorships, and the interaction between them. The questions addressed include: What determines the repressiveness of a regime? Can political authoritarianism be 'good' for the economy? After the fall, who should be held responsible for crimes against human rights? The book contains many applications, including chapters on Nazi Germany, Soviet Communism, South Africa under apartheid, the ancient Roman Empire and Pinochet's Chile. It also provides a guide to the policies which should be followed by the democracies towards dictatorships.''-- |
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Contents
Introduction | 3 |
2 Images of dictatorship | 7 |
3 Plan of the book | 15 |
The Dictators Dilemma | 20 |
economics and the enforcement problem | 25 |
3 The instruments of political power | 33 |
4 Conclusion | 39 |
Equilibrium political repression | 43 |
The bureaucratic economy I the model | 197 |
2 Rents shortages and bribes | 204 |
3 The Soviet system as a bureaucracy | 208 |
4 Conclusion | 216 |
The bureaucratic economy II rise and fall | 218 |
2 The decline of the system | 228 |
3 Soviet versus Chinese reform strategies or the totalitarian twist | 232 |
4 Conclusion | 242 |
2 The model of a tinpot regime | 46 |
3 Totalitarian regimes | 58 |
4 Policy implications | 68 |
5 Conclusion | 76 |
Tyranny and timocracy | 77 |
2 Timocracy and tyranny | 79 |
3 War | 84 |
4 Gifts | 86 |
timocracy | 90 |
6 From timocracy to tyranny | 101 |
7 Conclusion | 104 |
A more general model | 106 |
2 The model | 108 |
3 The derivation of regimes | 118 |
4 Comparative statics | 120 |
5 Conclusion | 124 |
Economics of autocracy | 125 |
The economy of dictatorship | 127 |
2 Alternative approaches to the economy of dictatorship | 131 |
elements of the autocratic economy | 138 |
4 Conclusion | 143 |
Redistribution and rentseeking | 145 |
2 Dictatorship democracy and redistribution | 149 |
3 Redistribution in capitalistauthoritarian states | 160 |
Apartheid | 163 |
2 The polity under apartheid | 165 |
3 The apartheid economy | 174 |
4 Comparative statics and the fall of apartheid | 191 |
5 Conclusion | 195 |
The dynamics of dictatorship | 247 |
2 Political inaction | 248 |
3 Who gets harmed and why? | 257 |
and democratic breakdown | 259 |
5 The inefficiency of inaction | 262 |
6 Relaxing the assumptions | 265 |
the tradeoff between action and representation | 272 |
8 Mathematical appendix | 273 |
Ethnic conflict and nationalism from expressionism and futurism to kitsch | 280 |
2 The value of ethnic capital | 281 |
3 Intra and intergroup ethnic conflict | 289 |
on ethnic capital | 301 |
The simple economics of criminal bureaucratic responsibility | 307 |
2 Authority and power | 311 |
3 Competition in the Nazi state | 316 |
4 The efficiency of competition in the bureaucracy of murder | 321 |
5 Bureaucratic responsibility | 327 |
6 Conclusion | 328 |
Conclusion | 333 |
2 The Dictators Dilemma and the machinery of dictatorship | 335 |
3 Is dictatorship good for the economy? | 337 |
4 What policies should be followed toward dictatorship by democratic regimes interested in promoting freedom? | 343 |
5 Who is responsible? | 346 |
6 A brief speculation about the future | 348 |
351 | |
Name index | 369 |
373 | |
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Common terms and phrases
accumulating analysis apartheid Arendt assume authoritarian behavior budget bureaucracy central Chapter Commodus Communist competition consumption costs CPSU curve democracy democratic developed dictator dictator's dictatorship discussed economic growth economic performance effect efficiency Eichmann enforcement equilibrium ethnic capital ethnic group example exchange explain Figure firm former Soviet Union Freedom House gifts Hitler ideology inaction income increase individual influx control investments job reservation Kleptocracy leaders level of repression marginal maximize military nationalism Nazi Nazi Germany networks nomenklatura organization parents platforms point of view politicians population problem production redistribution reform rent-seeking rents result revenue Rotten Kid Theorem sanctions Section simply South Africa South Korea Soviet system Soviet Union Stalin status quo suggested supply of loyalty tend timocracy timocrat tinpot tion totalitarian totalitarian regimes trade trust tyranny University Press voters wage Weimar Republic white capital white labor white sector Wintrobe workers