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Mr. PHILLIPS. Was there input from the private sector in this study-space contractors, the aerospace industry, computer firms, or others?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. PHILLIPS. This was entirely government agency?

Mr. JOHNSON. No.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Why were some of the most obvious agencies not included or asked for input into the study, for example, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, which has developed the DID system. There is a whole section here on disaster warning systems, which goes into great detail and created quite a stir when it was released last fall about the possibility of home surveillance through monitors and receivers in homes for disaster warning purposes. Then there is GSA, which has vast experience in the telecommunications field and automated data processing field; the Social Security Administration, which is one of the heaviest and earliest users of such technology among all government agencies, as we heard this morning; also there is the Office of Telecommunications Policy which we understood had an overall responsibility for coordinating executive branch activities in this entire field.

None of these four which I mentioned-and there are many othersapparently was invited to participate or had no input, if they were invited, in this important study.

Can you explain why they were not included?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, first of all there was the rapid time frame. Second, and equally important, the emphasis on NASA's part was to identify agencies that were providing services to the public, and of those particular agencies, to identify areas of social need that seem susceptible to improvement with satellite communications primarily, or telecommunications in general.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Well, how about the Social Security Administration? Nobody deals more with the public in a social area than the Social Security Administration. They were developing at the particular time the whole concept of the SSADAR system. It would seem that they would be a logical choice.

Mr. JOHNSON. NASA did go to HEW.

Mr. PHILLIPS. But not SSĂ.

Mr. JOHNSON. But to the whole Department rather than pick and choose among agencies within the Department.

However, I do not want to indicate that NASA was trying to pick and choose among agencies. There was certainly no thought of doing so on NASA's part. First of all, this was not intended as a compre hensive picture in which every possibility was exhausted. The time was not available to do that. Certainly in hindsight and with more time, those other agencies could and would have been added.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Mr. Johnson, let me ask what may seem to be an unfriendly question, but I have to ask it.

Was there any agency invited to provide input into this study that was not a potential consumer of NASA's satellites or other NASA technology?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; an element in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, for example, identifying health experiments and improved techniques for bringing doctors closer together,

did not depend on satellite communication. The addition of the wired cities concept of HUD did not have anything to do with satellite communications.

It is true that many-and indeed most-were susceptible to the kind of technology that NASA specialized in, but it certainly was not an exclusive thing.

Mr. PHILLIPS. At one point in the study there is a section that talks about terrestrial systems, and in fact a figure of $2.9 billion in development costs is assigned to the terrestrial systems field-microwave, CATV, and other such systems. I believe this is larger than the satellite investment if you count the fact that much of the cost would be on a reimbursable basis to NASA for launch, and would be billed eventually to private industry. Thus there seems to be a heavy emphasis on terrestrial systems in the report but very little input from agencies that are involved in the development or use of those systems. This is what I am trying to understand.

Mr. JAFFE. The study was meant to determine whether or not someone should pay additional attention to these areas of technological employment.

Now, we were asked specifically not to involve industry at this particular time. We were asked to do this internally and determine whether or not the prospects seemed large enough to warrant additional attention. I would like to point out that we did work with the communications agencies of the administration, OTP and FCC, and we got from them additional advice regarding additional user agencies that we ought to contact, and that advice was taken into account. Mr. PHILLIPS. But they had no role in the overall management of the study.

Mr. JAFFE. They did not manage the study, but they reviewed the study and made input to us, as a matter of fact, made considerable input to us regarding what they thought the potential was regarding the wired cities approach.

Mr. PHILLIPS. Who was the person that you dealt with at OTP?
Mr. JAFFE. Walter Hinchman.

Mr. MOORHEAD. We have got another vote coming up.

The committee will stand in recess for approximately 5 minutes. [A brief recess was taken.]

Mr. MOORHEAD. The Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information will please come to order.

Mr. Cornish?

Mr. CORNISH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Johnson, I noticed that this is entitled "Communications for Social Needs: Technological Opportunities."

Do I understand that the communications portion of this thing is simply one in a series of stuies on technological opportunities?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. There were other studies that were performed for the Domestic Council in other areas.

Mr. CORNISH. But are they all part of this general series on technological opportunities?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. However, this is the only one with this particular title.

Mr. CORNISH. This one relates solely to communications.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Mr. CORNISH. But you did mention others; I think you gave an example of the Department of Transportation on aircraft.

Did they submit a smiliar study to the Domestic Council on what should be done in the field of aviation or transportation?

Mr. JOHNSON. I have not seen it, sir, but I think they did.

Mr. CORNISH. So there are actually a number of these reports, only on different subjects.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. CORNISH. Can you tell me why this bears the label administratively confidential?

Mr. JOHNSON. That was because the initial request from the Domestic Council which asked for input also bore the label on it, "Administratively Confidential."

I think it is fair to remember that this was part of a group of ideas that were being submitted for consideration. Certainly this study as it stands was not an approved program of the Government at all. It was. in effect, raw material for consideration. The alternatives were laid out.

Mr. CORNISH. I understand that perfectly. I just might suggest that if this had received some widespread dissemination, both in the public sector and through industry, I am sure that there would have been many, many very valuable observations and comments and suggestions on some of the proposals contained therein.

Would this document have been available to the public, in your opinion, under the Freedom of Information Act with this label on it? Mr. JOHNSON. It certainly is now. I think at the time, before action was taken by the agency for which it was done, it might very well have not been releasable until action was taken on it as a draft program. But I would not want to make a definitive legal judgment on that. without more study.

Mr. CORNISH. But this does bear the legend, "Final Report."

Mr. JOHNSON. Final report, yes, but a final report to a group that would make a judgment on it, and it is fair to allow the person who has requested the report an opportunity to consider it before it is released. But certainly there is no reason under the Freedom of Information Act for not releasing it now. It is fully releasable under the act. Mr. CORNISH. I understand that it is not available.

Mr. PHILLIPS. We have had any number of people contact the subcommittee for copies. We only have the one, which is too bulky to reproduce but many people have come into the office to read it. We have been told on many occasions that they have made an effort to obtain copies, both from NASA and the White House, and have not been able to obtain a copy. In fact, one person I know of said he talked personally to Dr. Fletcher of NASA and asked for a copy and it was not available.

Is this just a recent development?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, we had very few copies ourselves. All the copies were turned in to the Domestic Council when it received it. The report is actually under the control of the Domestic Council. It is not NASA which owns the report, if you will.

Mr. CORNISH. I think if you printed this at the Government Printing Office, it might turn out to be one of the best sellers over there. There would be a lot of demand for this.

Mr. PHILLIPS. I know several hundred people who would like to buy it.

Mr. CORNISH. Industry and the public would be very interested in looking at this document.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, from NASA's standpoint, there is no objection to the release of it. Frankly, we take a considerable amount of pride in this as a technical job. It can be misunderstood readily enough, but if it is understood as a technical work, laying out alternatives and putting price tags on those alternatives, and really focusing in on the long range consequences price wise at least, it is useful. But in no way is it intended as a comprehensive document, nor does it bring into play the many other factors that would have to be brought into play before deciding to go forward with it.

This is a product from the engineering side of the house, so to speak. It is not a product from the public policymaking side of the house.

Mr. CORNISH. Well, respect fully, I think you could put a preface in there saying that this is a technical proposal, and it has not been studied from the viewpoint of the social or political implications involved in it, or from the legal aspects or whatever reservations you would like to make, and just say it in plain old Anglo-Saxon English right in the front there, and everybody would be on notice what it is. I, for example, find little or no mention and perhaps I missed it-of some of the social concerns such as privacy, in this document, or some of the other aspects that might enter into whether any of these systems would be adopted, politically or socially in this country. Mr. JOHNSON. Well, yes. I would respect fully disagree.

There are a number of places where it is clearly identified that there are additional inputs into the problem of the invasion of privacy question, the question of acceptability. It is clearly identified that before this would proceed to any operational use, before any decision. would be made that it would become an actual operational system. there would have to be considerable amount of study of customer acceptability, consumer acceptability, and perhaps most important of all, governmental action by the Congress as the representative of the people in deciding whether this is the way we want to go.

There was certainly no intent to present anybody with a fait accompli. This is a system series of things that could not be put into effect right away.

Mr. CORNISH. I think that is a great statement, and I think if you could maybe just take that verbatim almost and put it in the preface there I am serious. I think that is a good statement, because you know, I read through this and I just did not get that impression.

Mr. PHILLIPS. There are a lot of people around the country that think this is fait accompli, and already in operation.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Johnson, maybe you could supply us when you correct your transcript, with page references to items where the social and political consequences were referred to.

Mr. JOHNSON. I will be glad to do that, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]

Section IIIA of the study, page 23, identifies, as one of several secondary objectives of the experiments recommended by the study, testing the social and political acceptance of the services being demonstrated. On page 24, it is recognized that steps would have to be taken to resolve policy questions of

jurisdiction, responsibility, and ownership before operational systems utilizing the services demonstrated by the experiments could begin.

Section IIIB, page 25, identifies, as one of several policy considerations arising from the experiments, questions of the legal and ethical aspects of a proposed operational use. Such questions would include the propriety of the use of facilities to convey governmental information (from the executive agencies or legislative or judicial bodies), the use of facilities for political campaigning, or the delivery of educational material by national institutions to local interests. The study recommends forming a Committee for Policy on Information to deal with these problems.

Further, under the heading of policy considerations the study, pages 25-26, identifies certain specific problems. Under public broadcasting, the study recommends that the extent of ability to control program content should be evaluated in view of existing law and regulatory authority at Federal, State, and local levels. Under postal services, the study points out that the authority to police and maintain privacy of the mails when electronic means of transmissions are employed must be determined. Concern for preserving the sanctity of the mail through technical means is further expressed on page 46 of the study. Under disaster warning, the study identifies both jurisdictional questions of authority and responsibility among the various agencies and, on page 50, the need to evaluate system interaction with and acceptance by the user public and also, on page 54, the need to obtain legislative consideration of the appropriate means to provide home reception of disaster warning signals.

None of these references purport to be a definitive treatment of these problems, or indeed, even a listing of all such problems. The focus of the study was technical, and the purpose of these references was merely to acknowledge that there are major questions of a nontechnical, policy nature which would have to be addressed and resolved before any operational system could be established. Mr. PHILLIPS. I think what Mr. Cornish is saying is that there is not a separate section that deals with this issue. There are several references through the text, but it is a very voluminous report, and they do not stand out.

I think had there been a separate section that dealt with them all in one place, that this would have been a very healthy indication that there was at least an awareness and a concern for these kinds of issues, but it is not dealt with in a separate section anywhere.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Well, in my quick reading of it, I got the same impression that Mr. Cornish did.

Mr. PHILLIPS. We have some questions for the record that we would like to submit in writing in case we do not get to them. Mr. MOORHEAD. Is that satisfactory with you?

Mr. DANIELS. That is fine.

[The questions and answers follow:]

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION,

Washington, D.C., July 18, 1973.

Hon. WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD,
Chairman, Foreign Operation and Government Information Subcommittee, Com-
mittee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Washington,
D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed are the answers to the six additional questions, pertaining to the subcommittee's hearing held on Federal Information systems and plans on June 26, which were asked of NASA in Mr. Cornish's letter of June 29 to the general counsel of NASA.

If we can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to call on us. Sincerely,

GERALD D. GRIFFIN, Assistant Administrator for Legislative Affairs.

Enclosure.

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