which had been fo long generally pursued by her predeceffors as well as herfelf, in their conduct with respect to England and France. The friendship fhewn, and the effectual fervice done by England, in that war against the Ottomans which covered her reign with glory, and from which Ruflia has derived fuch vaft acquifitions of territory, and fo great an extenfion of at least apparent power, was but ill returned by the latter in her fubfequent conduct, at the time that Great Britain was oppreffed and nearly overborne by the greatest combination of hoftile power which has been formed against any fingle ftate in modern times. The fcheme of the armed neutrality was formed upon principles as unfriendly to England, and, intentionally, if not actually, as inimical to her interefts, as any thing short of abfolute hoftility could well be; nor did it afford much lefs encouragement to her numerous enemies, nor depreffion to herself (for friends fhe had none) than an actual declaration of war from Ruffia would have done.

Indeed the wisdom of the policy adopted by Great Britain in that Rufian and Ottoman war was much queftioned, and her conduct no lefs cenfured, at the time, by not a few, who were well acquainted with the general politics of Europe, as well as with the interefts of its refpective states. They contended, that fhe departed from the ancient principles, as well as the ftrait line of her policy, in encouraging or admitting Ruffia to take any hoftile fhare in maritime affairs, without the limits affigned to her by nature in the Baltic; but that to lead her by the hand, as it were, from the bottom of the gulph of Finland to

the extremities of the Mediterranean, and there to aid or encourage her in acquiring poffeffions which might enable her to establish a formidable naval force in those central feas, which would afford her an opportunity of continual interference in the concerns of all the ftates of Europe, was reprefented as fuch a violation of all the obvious principles of policy, that it seemed to partake more of the rafh predilection of an individual, than of thofe cold but comprehenfive maxims which should regulate the conduct of ftates, and which fhould look as fully to future contingencies as to prefent effect.

The coincidence of views and defigns between Ruffia and the house of Auftria has drawn the bands of their union fo clofe, that whatevever excites jealoufy or diffatisfaction in the one is fure to operate no lefs powerfully upon the other; a circumstance by no means tending to render the fudden and extraordinary friendship which has fprung up between them the more pleafing to other ftates. This was fully exemplified in the hafty and uncalled-for fentence, without being authorized as a judge or mediator to interfere, which Ruffia pronounced against Holland on the affair of the Schelde. The part taken by the king of Great Britain, as elector of Hanover, in his acceffion to the Germanic league, was, without queftion, the caufe of diftafte with both thefe formidable powers towards England: it was reported, and probably not without foundation, that the court of Petersburgh was no lefs zealous or urgent than that of Vienna, first in its endeavours to prevent the acceffion to that league, and then in using every

poffible

poffible means which could induce the king to a renunciation of it. The failure in both produced fuch effects as were to be expected from the character and refpective fituation of the parties.

It is not, however, to be forgot ten, that the commerce with England is to the full as effential to Ruffia as to the former; that a very confiderable annual balance, in money, is gained by her from England on that trade; that no merchants, with fmaller capitals or lefs commercial spirit than the Englifh, could or would adventure the large fums of money which they constantly and neceffarily advance long before the period of a return, in order to invigorate the manufactures, to fet the people to work in a wide and poor country, and to enable the fmall traders to bring the goods, whether ftaple or manufacture, from their refpective and remote districts to market; and that without this effential pecuniary affiftance, a confequent decrease of induitry and product muft inevitably take place, trade and manufacture would languith, and what ever there was would become a monopoly in the hands of a few opulent natives, whofe avarice would encumber it with fuch obftructions as would bring it to nothing. The advantages being thus reciprocal, the evil of any interruption to the long-established commerce between the two countries (if fuch it really would be to England, which is a queftion of much doubt) is likely to cure itfelf; and things, if not carried too far, will probably, in defiance of caprice or ill-humour, as in other cafes of improper restrictions on trade, return to their natural channel. Com

merce once loft is with great difficulty recovered; and it happens well to mankind in general, that there are but few products confined entirely to any one country. Our countrymen and old fellow-fubjects the Americans would joyfully fupply the place of Ruffia in many refpects; and thofe articles in which they are yet deficient might be procured in the intermediate time.

An irregular, expenfive, and deftructive, though not brilliant war, has been carried on with increafing action and effect between the Ruffians and the Tartar nations inhabiting the regions of Caucafus and the Cafpian, ever fince the violent feizure by the former of the Crimea, and the neighbouring countries. The circumftances of these remote tranfactions can at prefent be but very imperfectly known, and would not be very interefting if they were, any farther than as they tend to difplay the generous and defperate efforts which a people naturally brave and warlike will make, under the greateft poffible difadvantages, in the contention for their rights and liberties. The condition of the contending parties was, indeed, very unequal: the one poffeffed numbers and courage, with fuch advantages as the ineffectivenefs of their means could enable them to derive from difficult countries, covered with vaft mountains, and abounding with inacceffible pofts and dangerous defiles; but they wanted generals, military fkill experienced officers, and, befides artillery, all other effective weapons and machines for offence or defence; the fword and the arrow, once fo decifive in the field, being now of fmall avail in war. They being likewife compofed of a num

ber

ber of fmall independent nations, no one leader was furnished with fuch coercive powers as could give due efficacy to the union. Neither is the manner of life, or habits of the Tartars, fuited to the fupport of a continual war; nor would their poverty and deficiency of refources admit the poffibility of their keeping the field for any confiderable length of time, had their difpofitions been otherwise.

On the other hand, their potent enemy, befides unlimited power and refource, and numbers at all times fuited to the exigency, were themfelves mafters in the art of war, and adepts in all its great modern improvements. They poffeffed able generals, experienced officers of all nations, and a line composed of veteran troops, inured to war, and trained up in the fevereft difcipline; they were covered with a tremendous artillery, abundantly furnished with every weapon and engine invented either for defence or destruction, fupported by ftores, magazines, and money, and could with little difficulty fortify in a fhort time whatever posts they thought proper, in fuch a manner as to render them impregnable to the enemy. The Ruffians were likewife joined by feveral bodies of dependant Tartars, and of Coffacks poffeffing fimilar qualities, who encountered the enemy in their own manner, being equally expert in the fuddennefs and quickness of their attacks and evolutions; equal in the endurance of hunger, cold, and fatigue; and equally adapted to the nature and difficulties of country and climate; but with the prodigious advantage of being led or under the direction of experienced officers, and of being infinitely better provided

with arms and neceffaries than their enemy.

But what greater and more deci five fuperiority need be mentioned, than that which the Ruffians derived from their acting in concert under a fole command; from their being enabled at all times to keep collected in ftrong bodies ready for action; and from their poffefling an advantage which the Roman legions wanted, that their artillery rendered every camp an impregnable fortress to the enemy? Under thefe circumftances they could lie quiet and fecure while the enemy was exhaufting his vigour in fruitlessly traverfing the defarts, and wait coolly for that occafion of advantage which could not but foon offer: while the Tartars, destitute of ftores and magazines, and having no other provifion than the small bag of millet which each man carried, or one of the horses which he rode when that failed, however eminent their fucceffes might be, or however inviting the occafions for keeping the field, were obliged of neceffity, at a given time, to feparate and retire to their respective hordes for fubfiftence. Then came on the inevitable feafon of danger and ruin; for, living in tents, or in villages not lefs open and defencelefs, they were either furprized and cut to pieces by their active and merciless enemy, or if they had the fortune, by notice or accident, to efcape the fword, the lofs of their flocks and herds was scarcely lefs deftructive in its confequences.

In fuch a flate of inequality the object of furprize is, how a war could at all exift; or at moft, how its existence could be much more than ephemeral. Yet under thefe disadvantages, which feemed capa

ble

ble of annihilating all the principles of courage, excepting merely the confcioufnefs of its own dignity, the Tartars appear to have long fupported it with unexampled conftancy and refolution; and notwithftanding the dearth of intelligence that has prevailed upon the fubject, enough has tranfpired to fhew that the Ruffians have found it full of difficulty and trouble; that their victories have by no means been decifive; and that however deltructive they proved to the enemy, they have not been bloodlefs to themselves.

Some circumftances of notoriety were neceffary to the communication of fuch intelligence as the public have received relative to thefe tranfactions. The fall of a brave German prince, of the houfe of Heffe Rhinfels, in the autumn of 1784, gave occafion to the mention of an action, which probably would not otherwife have been heard of. Its nature was, however, very differently reprefented. While a victory nearly bloodlefs, excepting in the misfortune that befel the prince, was claimed on one fide, the accounts from Conftantinople and Paris described that event as the confequence of hard and defperate fighting. The fame variation prevailed in general in the accounts which were received through the medium of either of those places, and those which were either publifhed at or received from Peterf burgh from which it may be no very unfair conclufion, that exact information was not the principal object in any of their state

ments.

A victory claimed by 1785. Ruffia in the following year was pretty well authenticated VOL. XXVIII.

by the capture of a Tartar chan, two of his fons, and a nephew, who were all brought prifoners to Petersburgh. This action was, however, acknowledged, even from thence, to have been very severe ; and it was owned, that in the beginning the fhock fell fo heavily upon the regiment of Aftracan, that it was defeated, ruined, and its colonel killed.

In the latter part of the fame year, great havock was made and execution done among the Cuban Tartars, by the Ruffians. It would feem that the whole nation had been either fubdued, cut off, or totally ruined, by the deftruction of their villages, and the lofs of their flocks and herds at the approach of winter. Brigadier General Apraxin, and a Colonel Nagel, distinguished themfelves greatly about this time, either against the Cuban, or fome other nations of Tartars; for we cannot pretend to afcertain dates,' places, or circumftances. It appears, however, that colonel Nagel had the honour of being the firft who defeated the new prophet, Sheich Manfour, and his adherents; who being difappointed in the fuccour which he had taught them to expect from Heaven, were doomed to a fore conviction, that their fanaticifm was no proof whatever against the Ruffian bayonets. The prophet fought boldly on foot, at the head of feven or eight thoufand of his followers, who were in the fame fituation (which evidently fhews that they were not Tartars); and his own reliance on the divine aid appears to have been fo weak, that as a fubftitute he employed his invention in the conftruction of fome fort of rolling machines, which in their approach to the enemy they pushed [K]

on

The emprefs had pub1786. licly announced, in the beginning of the year of which we are to treat, her intention of making a magnificent progrefs to Cherfon and the Crimea, in order to her being crowned fovereign of the new conquefts. This defign feems at first to have been conceived in the moft fplendid ideas of eastern magnificence and grandeur. It was given out that Catharine was to be crowned emprefs of Taurida, and to be declared protectrefs or autocratrix of all the nations of Tartars. That, in order to render the folemnization of this great act the more auguft, aweful, and more extenfively striking, fhe was to be attended by the patriarch, by fix archbishops, and by a great body of other clergy; which, with the court and its attendants, muft have formed a prodigious number. Triumphal arches were to be erected, and enriched with fculpture, devices and infcriptions, on the approaches to Cherfon, and in the town; the emprefs was to be drawn on the latter part of the way in a triumphal car, crowned with laurel; and the concourfe of people was expected to be fo great, that the multitudes which attend the pilgrimages to Mecca would no longer be regarded as a wonder. She was befides to be escorted by a formidable army, to be compofed of no less than fix regiments of cavalry, and 22 of in

fantry. The magnificence of the proceffion, whether by land or by water, was to be fuited to that of the grand concluding ceremonial, A fleet of gallies were built on the Nieper, and befides their ornaments and embellishments, were to be furnifhed with all the accommodations neceffary for a court, or ufually found in a great city. It feemed as if coft was a matter not to be thought of in thefe preparations; and it feems fcarcely credible, though pofitively afferted, that the prodigious fum of feven millions of roubles, (amounting to about a million and a half fterling) had been originally dedicated to the purpofe only of thofe prefents which were to be diftributed at the coronation. It may poffibly be thought, that the return of Alexander from India, and the voyage on the Cydnus, were not entirely out of mind in the conception of this defign.

1

We are probably to make the fame allowance for vanity and exaggeration in fome of thefe accounts, which is ufually neceflary in fimilar cafes; but it is, however, certain, that every thing that could be conceived fplendid or grand, was included in the original defign, and the ufual magnificence of the emprefs feems to give a fanction to the whole. It is likewife to be remembered, that there was a great political object in view in this fplendour and expence. That it was undoubtedly expected that all the adjoining nations would have been either terrified by the power, or fafcinated by the pomp, fplendour, and wealth, which were now to be displayed, and that the Tartar chiefs, under thefe impreffions, would not only have rendered the fcene truly glorious, by coming from

all