Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice PerspectiveCharles Rowley Constitutional political economy is a research program that directs inquiry to the working properties of rules and institutions within which individuals interact and to the processes through which these rules and institutions are chosen or come into being. This book makes the case for an approach to constitutional political economy that is grounded in consistent, hard-nosed public choice analysis. Effective institutional design is simply not feasible unless the designers build their structures to withstand rational choice pressures from the political market place. If mean, sensual man is here to stay, then let us, in our better moments, incorporate that knowledge into the institutions that must govern his behavior. A distinguished list of public choice scholars pursue this approach against a varying backcloth of constitutional issues relevant to the United States, Canada, Western Europe, the transition economies and the third world. |
Contents
A survey | 11 |
Reflections of turmoil or agents of stability? | 55 |
Toward a new constitution for a future country | 73 |
Clarifying the arguments | 117 |
A natural experiment in interest group influence | 139 |
Evidence from Californias state legislative races | 165 |
Choosing free trade without amending the US Constitution | 185 |
Marginal cost sharing and the Articles of Confederation | 201 |
On the relative unimportance of a balanced budget | 215 |
Public choice in a federal system | 235 |
A constitutional perspective | 255 |
A European constitutional perspective | 281 |
Lessons for Third World countries | 311 |
Other editions - View all
Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective Charles Rowley No preview available - 2012 |
Constitutional Political Economy in a Public Choice Perspective Charles Rowley No preview available - 2011 |
Common terms and phrases
18th Amendment analysis argument Article Articles of Confederation authority balanced budget benefits bicameral budget balance Calculus of Consent campaign expenditures capital citizens collective action competition confederation Congress constitutional amendment constitutional change constitutional economics Constitutional Political Economy constitutional rules constraints convention costs decisions deficit delegates democracy dummy economic growth effects Election Commission electoral enforcement environmental European federal federal subjects federalist finance fiscal function growth rate income income effects increase incumbent individual institutions issues Journal legislative level of government Maastricht Treaty marginal normative official legislature optimal outcome paper parliament parties percent Pigouvian tax politicians positive preferences prescribed principle of subsidiarity problem procedures produce Prohibition property rights proposal public choice ratified referendum rent-seeking Repeal represented requisition revenues rule space Section separation of powers spending structure Subsection term limits theory tion Tollison trade U.S. Constitution variables vote voters
References to this book
Le istituzioni nella mente: āncore di legittimitā del potere politico Daniela Piana Limited preview - 2005 |