128 C. Cls.

JURISDICTION—Continued

The plaintiff's wharf at Jacksonville was used for
docking the barges in transferring cargo from the
railroad cars of plaintiff to the vessels. In October
1950, because of financial losses, the Shipping Com-
pany ceased operations. Eventually the charter was
terminated by the Navy, under the terms of the
charter, because of default by the Shipping Company,
and the Navy ordered the vessels delivered to the
Navy at Charleston and at Green Cove Springs.
However, the vessels were never delivered by the
Shipping Company, as directed, but were left at
plaintiff's Jacksonville docks, until removed by the
Navy. In the instant suit the Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Company claims wharfage from the Gov-
ernment for the period October 4, 1950, to February
21, 1951. Id.

VI. It is held that plaintiff's cause of action, if any, arose
as an incident to the employment of the barges,
under charter, as merchant vessels. The vessels
remained merchant vessels until delivered as directed
by the Navy. Any claim which plaintiff might have
relative to them would be cognizable in the United
States District Court under the Suits in Admiralty
Act. See Field v. United States, 125 C. Cls. 559,
certiorari denied, 346 U. S. 922, and cases cited
therein. Id.
518.

Courts

VII. Claims for wharfage, whether in the nature of a contract
or lien, have long been recognized as causes of action
within the admiralty jurisdiction. Id.

Wharves 19.

See also Contract Settlement Act I, II; Contracts XXIII, XXX,
XXXI, XXXII; Pay and Allowances XVI, XVII, XVIII;
Statute of Limitations II, III, IV, V; Suit For Salary IX, X,
XXXII.

JUST COMPENSATION.

See Contracts XXXVI, XXXVII, XXXVIII, XXXIX, XL, XLI.
LUCAS ACT.

I. Where plaintiff's claim for extra-legal relief for losses
incurred under a war contract is presented under the
provisions of the War Contract Hardship Claims
Act (Lucas Act) 60 Stat. 902, as amended; and
where it is shown by the evidence that the losses
incurred by the plaintiff were not incurred without

128 C. Cls.

LUCAS ACT-Continued

fault or negligence on the part of plaintiff in the
performance of the contract, as required by the Act;
it is held that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.
Reltool Service, 14.

II. Plaintiff was a subcontractor with another contractor
which in 1943 entered into a contract with the War
Department to supply high explosive shells for the
war effort. Plaintiff was encouraged by the War
Department and by the prime contractor to partici-
pate in the war effort and was given assistance, tech-
nical and financial, by the prime contractor, from
time to time, but was unable to produce satisfactorily
and on time, in accordance with its subcontract. Id.
United States 74 (17).

III. On all the evidence, and the report of a commissioner
of the court, it is found that plaintiff's failure to
produce, in accordance with the provisions of the
subcontract, was due to inadequate technical man-
agement, improper plant facilities and equipment,
financial instability, interference by unskilled man-
agers with technical plant operations, and failure to
adhere to proper forging methods.

United States 74 (17).

Id.

IV. It is held that plaintiff's losses were not incurred without
fault or negligence on its part and hence plaintiff is
precluded from recovery under the Lucas Act. Id.
United States 74 (17).

V. Where the instant case is before the United States
Court of Claims on the issue whether, under the facts
as proved, the plaintiff has legal standing to recover
under the War Contract Hardship Claims Act,
commonly known as the Lucas Act, it is held that
the plaintiff has a right to recover if in further pro-
ceedings it makes the necessary proof of loss. Ross
Engineering, 27.

United States 74 (17).

VI. In May 1943 plaintiff entered into a contract with the
United States for the construction of an Armed
Guard School at Camp Bradford, Virginia. The
plaintiff lost money on certain phases of the per-
formance of its contract, and requested relief for those
losses under the First War Powers Act, which was

LUCAS ACT—Continued

128 C. Cls.

denied. After the enactment of the
plaintiff took the prescribed steps to
United States Court of Claims. Id.
United States

74 (17).

Lucas Act,
sue in the

VII. In a suit under the Lucas Act, where the Government
asserts fault or negligence, within the meaning of the
Act, by reason of mistakes in the contractor's bid,
resulting in losses for which suit is brought; it is
held that such mistakes were not such fault or negli-
gence as to preclude recovery under the Act. The
decision in Spicer v. United States, 127 C. Cls. 428,
is affirmed. Id.

VIII. In the computation of plaintiff's bid relating to some
road work, a marking of square yards on a drawing
was mistaken for square feet, resulting in an estimate
for only one-ninth as much road to be built as actu-
ally had to be built. The mistake was called to
plaintiff's attention but plaintiff thought it could
make up for the loss by its profit on other parts of
the contract, and did not change its bid. A heavy
loss was incurred. Id.

IX. Where the contract stated that the contractor should
furnish and install the collateral equipment; that he
should include a cash allowance of $130,000 for
furnishing the equipment; and that if it cost more
than that to furnish the equipment, the contractor
would be compensated for the additional cost, the
plaintiff, in making its bid, misread the contract to
mean that the $130,000 cash allowance was for both
furnishing and installing the equipment, and did not
include in its bid anything for installing the equip-
ment, which work cost it a considerable sum; it is
held that the mistake in bidding was not fault or
negligence which barred recovery under the Lucas
Act. Id.

X. Where it is shown that the contractor's work was
delayed by an excessive number of rainy days, and
to make up for the lost time, employees were worked
overtime and were paid a large amount of premium
pay therefor, entailing loss on the contractor; it is
held that the loss is recoverable under the Lucas Act

128 C. Cls.

LUCAS ACT-Continued

unless found to be due to some fault or negligence of
the plaintiff. No such finding has been made. Id.
United States 74 (17).

XI. Losses recoverable under the Lucas Act are not limited
to losses peculiar to wartime. Id.

United States 74 (17).

XII. In a prior case (No. 46804) reported 118 C. Cls. 527,
where plaintiff sued the Government for breach of
contract, it was held that the plaintiff's asserted con-
struction of the contract provision relating to collat-
eral equipment was wrong and that plaintiff had
not taken an appeal from the contracting officer's
refusal to grant an extension of time on account of
excessive rains. Recovery was denied as a con-
tractual right.

United States

Id.

74 (17).

XIII. Where a contractor, who requested First War Powers
relief, had, or possibly had, a legal claim which he
did not pursue, it is held that he is not thereby pre-
Icluded from suing for relief under the Lucas Act
in the United States Court of Claims.
United States

74 (17).

Id.

XIV. Where, in a suit in the United States District Court
brought by its subcontractor against the plaintiff in
the instant case, the plaintiff filed a counterclaim
asserting that due to the negligence of the subcon-
tractor in failing to complete promptly the drainage
and road work which the subcontractor had con-
tracted to perform and plaintiff had been thereby
delayed and obliged to use an excessive amount of
overtime work; and where in the instant suit the
Government alleges that the testimony of the
plaintiff's president in the District Court suit was so
inconsistent with his testimony in the instant suit
it would be immoral to allow the plaintiff to have the
benefit of his testimony in the instant suit; it is held
that in the facts alleged there is no reason for, in
effect, forfeiting the plaintiff's right. Id.

128 C. Cls.

MUTUAL MISTAKE.

See Contracts I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

See Suit for Salary XVII, XVIII, XIX.

OVERSEAS DIFFERENTIAL.

See Suit for Salary IV, V, VI, VII.

OVERTIME PAY.

I. Following the decisions in Marr v. United States,
123 C. Cls. 474, and Andrews, et al. v. United States,
126 C. Cls. 571, the defendant consents to granting
of plaintiffs' motions as to seven of the nine plaintiffs
in the instant case. It is held that the other two
plaintiffs are entitled to recover. Defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment is denied. Albin, 204.
United States 113.

II. Where it has been held that notices of settlement
issued by the Comptroller General and the acqui-
escence in these settlements by the claimants consti-
tuted accords, which were contracts that could be
sued upon by the claimants, the Government could
not unilaterally cancel such contracts.
United States

113.

Id.

III. In the instant case the Government shows that, as to
the plaintiff Ben H. Pratt, his certificate of settlement
was issued July 7, 1950, and was cancelled May 31,
1951. The Government contention is not sustained
that under the provisions of Section 74 of Title 34,
U. S. Code, providing that the Comptroller General
may revise his decision in any case within one year,
his "cancellation" of the decision in the instant case
was final. Congress could not have intended to
make all such agreements tentative for one year. Id.
United States 113.

IV. In the case of the plaintiff John Elmer Peterson,
where it is shown that his certificate of settlement
was issued May 17, 1950, and was cancelled May 31,
1951, but that the instructions of the Comptroller
General to cancel the settlement were given on
April 25, 1951, it is held an internal notation of the
intentions of the Comptroller General, without
notice to the claimant, was of no effect. Id.

United States 113.

PARTNERSHIP.

See Taxes VIII, IX, X, XI, XII.