INDIAN CLAIMS-Continued
or lost, then would the execution of the Timber Sale Agreement of August 20, 1951 (as admitted in paragraph 10 of defendant's Answer), constitute a compensable taking of such rights, or would it give rise to a right to an accounting within the jurisdiction of this Court, or both? In view of the court's answers to the preceding questions it is concluded that question 6 does not call for an answer. Id. United States 113.
IX. Following the decision of the Court of April 6, 1954, it was ordered that defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's petition be granted and the petition was dismissed.
X. On appeal the decision of the Indian Claims Commis- sion is affirmed granting the Government's motion for summary judgment and dismissing the amended petition of the appellant alleging a claim under clause (1) of Section 2 of the Indian Claims Com- mission Act (60 Stat. 1049) for approximately $23,000,000 as just compensation for the taking of land given to the Indian Tribe by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 (11 Stat. 749), and holding that the issues involved in the instant case are res adjudicata under the decision of the Court of Claims involving a claim for the same land in Assiniboine Indian Tribe v. United States, 77 C. Cls. 347. Assiniboine Indian Tribe, 617.
XI. Under & Special Jurisdictional Act (44 Stat. 1263) the Assiniboine Indian Tribe presented to the Court of Claims for adjudication a claim with regard to the identical land for which just compensation is sought in the instant suit (77 C. Cls. 347). It is held that the appropriation of appellant's land by the United States, whether the taking was lawful or unlawful, gave rise to only one cause of action. Whether the Indian Tribe had a cause of action for just compen- sation or for breach of treaty was dependent upon the nature of the taking. Id.
XII. It is held that in the former case the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims was not limited to the award of damages. The Special Jurisdictional Act conferred on the Court of Claims jurisdiction to adjudicate all
claims arising from the violation of the Tribe's prop- erty rights by the United States. Id.
XIII. If Indian Tribes should be permitted to reopen and relitigate, in whole or in part, claims which have been heard, considered and determined on their merits by the Court of Claims, the Congress should so provide. It should not be done by judicial legis- lation. Id.
XIV. The legislative history of the Indian Claims Commis- sion Act, which has been reviewed exhaustively in previous decisions of the United States Court of Claims, confirms the conclusion that the defense of res adjudicata was preserved to the United States by the Act. Id. Courts 449 (4).
INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, APPEALS FROM.
I. On appeal the decision of the Indian Claims Commis- sion adverse to the Quapaw Tribe's claim contained in Count I of its petition (immemorial occupancy and possession) and the award made by the Com- mission in Count II and the allowance of certain offsets in connection with Count II is affirmed. Certain findings and the opinion of the Commission with reference to certain items of offsets are modified and remanded. Quapaw Tribe, 45.
II. Claim I was asserted under Section 2 (3) of the Indian Claims Commission Act on the ground that the con- sideration provided for in the treaty of 1818 and paid by the United States to the Quapaw Tribe for the land taken thereunder was grossly inadequate and unconscionable within the meaning of the Act. On the record it is found that the findings of the Commission are sustained by substantial evidence and the findings and decisions are affirmed. Id. United States 113.
III. It is held that Indian tribes, in the absence of a treaty reservation, have only an occupancy and use title, or right, the fee being in the United States, and when an Indian tribe ceases for any reason, by reduction of population or otherwise, to actually and exclusively occupy and use an area of land clearly established
INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, APPEALS FROM-Continued
by clear and adequate proof, such land becomes the exclusive property of the United States as public lands, and the Indians lose their right to claim and assert full beneficial interest and ownership to such land; and the United States cannot be required to pay therefor on the same basis as if it were a recog- nized treaty reservation. Id.
IV. In its second cause of action appellant tribe sought to recover on the ground that the amount paid to the tribe for its 1818 treaty lands sold to the Government by the treaty of 1824 was grossly inadequate within the meaning of Clause (3) of Section 2 of the Indian Claims Commission Act. It is held that the Com- mission correctly decided upon the record, that the sum paid was grossly inadequate and determined that the tribe was entitled to an award of $987,092 less such offsets, if any, as might be allowable. Id. United States 113.
V. In a cross-appeal by the Government from the Com- mission's determination on Count II, the Govern- ment assigned as errors (1) the Commission's failure to hold that the Quapaw Indians had waived their right to claim fraud in the execution of the 1824 treaty, by entering into the treaty of May 13, 1833, under which the tribe accepted substantial benefits conferred by that new or "supplementary" treaty and (2) in the alternative in not taking into con- sideration the sums paid under the 1833 treaty in determining whether or not the terms of the 1824 treaty were unconscionable. In view of all the cir- cumstances surrounding the negotiation of the 1833 and 1824 treaties, and the actual terms of the two treaties, it is held that the two treaties were separate and distinct, and the Commission's finding and conclusion are fully supported by substantial evidence. Id.
VI. The determination of the Commission in disallowing certain offsets is affirmed. As to the items allowed as offsets, certain items are affirmed, certain items are modified and others are reversed. Id.
VII. On an appeal from a decision of the Indian Claims Commission dismissing appellant's petition seeking
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judgment against the United States for the amount disbursed from the appellant's funds, from July 1, 1898, to June 30, 1929, for expenses incurred by the United States on behalf of the Choctaw Nation incident to carrying out the provisions of the Atoka Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement, the decision of the Commission is affirmed. Choctaw Nation, 195.
VIII. The Indian Claims Commission held that the claim asserted before the Commission in the instant case had previously been considered and adjudicated on its merits by the Court of Claims in Choctaw Nation v. United States, 91 C. Cls. 320 (certiorari denied 312 U. S. 695) and that the decision was res adjudicata. This decision of the Indian Claims Commission is affirmed where it is shown that all of the items con- stituting the instant claim were included in the suit by the Choctaw Nation under the jurisdictional act of June 7, 1924, 43 Stat. 537, as amended by 44 Stat. 568 and 45 Stat. 1229, and it was there held by the Court of Claims that the Choctaw Nation was not entitled to recover, Id.
IX. In accordance with the provisions of Section 2 of the Indian Claims Commission Act (25 U. S. C. 70), the Indian Claims Commisssion alo considered appel- lant's claim upon the merits and concluded in its findings and opinions that the claim was not sus- tained by the evidence presented. The decision of the Commission is affirmed, upon a study of the record on appeal and the briefs and argument of counsel. Id.
See Indian Claims Commission, Appeals From, I, II, III, IV, V, VI.
INFORMATION WITHHELD.
See Contracts X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII.
See Taxes XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII.
I. Under the provisions of Section 403 (e) of the Rene- gotiation Act of April 28, 1942 (56 Stat. 245, 246)
as amended, the exclusive remedy provided by statute for an aggrieved contractor to obtain a review of renegotiation determination of a war contract by a Government department is by the filing of a petition for redetermination with the Tax Court of the United States. In the instant case the allegations of the petition show that the plaintiff failed to petition the Tax Court pursuant to the applicable statute. The United States Court of Claims is without jurisdiction to hear and determine plaintiff's claim and the petition is dismissed, on defendant's motion. Dresser Operations, 294.
War and National Defense
II. The contention of plaintiff is not sustained that the issue involved in the instant case is not one of rede- termination but is whether or not the order by the War Contracts Price Adjustment Board was timely made. The plaintiff seeks to have the United States Court of Claims adjudicate issues which could have been, and should have been, presented to the Tax Court, on which exclusive jurisdiction is conferred by the statute. Id.
III. The failure of plaintiff to seek relief administratively renders the determination of excess profits final and establishes lack of jurisdiction in the United States Court of Claims.
IV. Where plaintiff brings suit in the United States Court of Claims for wharfage against vessels owned by the United States which had been bareboat chartered to the East Coast Shipping Company, and placed by that company at a wharf owned by plaintiff at Jacksonville, Florida, it is held that the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction, and the plaintiff's petition is dismissed on defendant's motion. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 747.
V. In October 1949, the Government, through the Navy Department, entered into a charter party with the East Coast Shipping Company under which the Shipping Company agreed to perform barge service between Jacksonville and the Banana River Naval Air Station on the east coast of Florida. As so used the vessels were in the Merchant Marine Service.
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