ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY.
See Jurisdiction I, II, III; Taxes XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX.
ALASKA INDIANS.
See Indian Claims I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX.
ALASKA ROAD COMMISSION.
See Overtime Pay I, II, III, IV.
ANNUAL LEAVE.
See Civil Service Annuity I, II, III.
ARMY PROPERTY, TRANSPORTATION OF.
See Contracts XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV,
XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX.
CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES.
See Taxes I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII.
CAREER COMPENSATION ACT.
See Pay and Allowances V, VI, VII, VIII.
CHOCTAW NATION.
See Appeals from Indian Claims Commission VII, VIII, IX.
CIVIL SERVICE ANNUITY.
I. In a suit for the annuity to which plaintiff claims he
is entitled under Section 6 of the Civil Service
Retirement Act, where the question involved is
whether or not the plaintiff had the five years of
service required by the Act, it is held that plaintiff is
entitled to recover. Curzon, 5.
II. Under the provisions of Section 6 of the Civil Service
Retirement Act in effect on September 2, 1947,
plaintiff, a classified employee of the Government,
who had served 4 years, 11 months and 9 days, was
entitled to include accrued annual leave of 57 days,
to which he was entitled and for which he was paid,
in the calculation of his length of service for retire-
ment pay as a civilian employee, before his induction
into the armed forces.
United States
CIVIL SERVICE ANNUITY—Continued
III. Plaintiff, a classified employee in the civil service, was
inducted into the military service on June 3, 1942,
at which time he had served in the civil service 4
years, 11 months and 9 days, and he had 57 days of
accrued annual leave, for which he was subsequently
paid. After the expiration of his annual leave he was
carried on the Government rolls on a furlough basis
through September 30, 1947. On November 1,
1947, he was discharged from the military service
for physical disability incurred in line of duty, and
began to receive retired pay from the Army. Ex-
cluding his military service, it is held that under the
applicable statutes he is entitled to annuity under
the Civil Service Act, as amended, on the basis of 5
years service in the civilian establishment. (See
Prentiss v. United States, 123 C. Cls. 225.) Id.
United States 39 (15).
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION.
See Suit for Salary IV, V, VI, VII, XL, XLI.
CIVIL SERVICE PROCEDURE.
See Suit for Salary XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX, XXX, XXXI,
XXXII, XXXIII, XXXIV, XXXV, XXXVI, XXXVII,
XXXVIII, XXXIX.
COAST GUARD OFFICER.
See Pay and Allowances V, VI, VII, VIII.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, SETTLEMENT BY.
See Overtime Pay I, II, III, IV.
CONGRESS, RECOGNITION BY.
See Indian Claims I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX.
CONTRACT SETTLEMENT ACT.
I. In a suit brought under the provisions of Section 17
of the Contract Settlement Act by a subcontractor,
where the Appeal Board of the Office of Contract
Settlement made a preliminary decision holding that
plaintiff was entitled to be compensated for extra
costs incurred after December 19, 1944, and that the
plaintiff was not entitled to be compensated for
other claims which plaintiff had asserted; and where
upon subsequent negotiation it was stipulated by the
parties that the amount due under the Board's
decision was $110,000; it is held that the plaintiff
did not, by entering into the negotiated agreement
as to the amount due under the Board's preliminary
decision, compromise and settle any part of its claim
CONTRACT SETTLEMENT ACT-Continued
which had been denied by the Board in its preliminary
decision. Defendant's motion for summary judgment
is denied. Condenser Service, 1.
United States 74 (16).
II. As to all parts of its claim that were denied by the
Board's preliminary decision, the plaintiff was a
party aggrieved, because the decision had been
against it. Under Section 13 of the Contract
Settlement Act, a war contractor aggrieved by the
decision of the Appeal Board may sue on his claim
in the United States Court of Claims, which the
plaintiff has done and has a right to do. Id.
United States 74 (16).
See also Contracts LX, LXI, LXII, LXIII, LXIV, LXV.
CONTRACTING OFFICER.
See Contracts X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XVIII, XLIII,
XLIV, XLV, XLVI, XLVII, XLVIII, XLIX, L.
I. In a suit by a contractor to recover the amount of
increased labor costs, in the performance of a con-
tract with the Government, where such increased
costs resulted from the payment of a higher wage
rate to unskilled labor than the scale contained in the
contract specifications, as determined by the Secre-
tary of Labor under the Davis-Bacon Act; it is
held that in the instant case there was a mutual
mistake of fact, justifying a reformation of the con-
tract, and plaintiff is entitled to recover. Defend-
ant's motion is denied and plaintiff's motion is
granted. Judgment for plaintiff for $19,901.08.
Poirier & McLane, 117.
II. In July 1943 plaintiff entered into a contract with the
Government to construct a hangar at Municipal
Airport, Buffalo. Plaintiff's bid, which was the low
bid, was based upon the scale of wages as deter-
mined for the region by the Secretary of Labor
under the Davis-Bacon Act. The minimum wage
rate and also the maximum rate for unskilled labor
was 85 cents an hour. Prior to submitting its bid
plaintiff made an investigation to determine the
availability of labor and the wages it would have to
to pay to obtain the required labor. Id.
United States 70 (23).
III. After performance of the contract had begun it was
found, in August 1943, that the prevailing wage
rate for unskilled labor in the Buffalo area was $1.00
per hour. Plaintiff was compelled to pay this in-
creased rate, in order to perform the contract, and
in the instant case sues to recover the difference.
Id.
IV. In September 1943 the Department of Labor, after
investigation, modified the Secretary's prior deter-
mination by increasing the wage rate for unskilled
labor in the Buffalo area to $1.00 per hour retroac-
tively. The Secretary's letter, announcing the
modification, stated that the prior determination of
85 cents was "due to an inadvertence." Id.
United States 70 (2)3.
V. It is held that the plaintiff is not precluded from recov-
ery in the instant suit by its failure to make request
to the Wage Adjustment Board for a wage adjust-
ment.
VI. The instant case is distinguished from the case of
United States v. Binghamton Construction Co., Inc.,
347 U. S. 171, in that the contractor in the instant
case prior to performance did make an adequate
and thorough investigation of wage conditions, and
the provisions of the contract in suit fixed not only
the minimum wages but also the maximum wages
which the contractor could pay, on the basis of the
decision of the Secretary of Labor, at the time the
contract was made. The change in the Secretary's
decision and therefore in the contract, brought
about the increased costs for which the instant
suit is brought. The contracting officer required
plaintiff to pay the increased wages. Id.
United States 70 (23).
VII. Upon the stipulated facts, which are before the court,
there is nothing to indicate that the contractor's
investigation was inadequate nor that it was made
without reasonable care and diligence. The Secre-
tary of Labor's subsequent letter, admitting depart-
mental error, retroactively increased the wage rate
and the contracting officer required the plaintiff to
pay the increased rate. Id.
VIII. In the circumstances of the contract in suit, it is held
that there was a mutual mistake of fact, and the
contract as executed did not reflect the true intent
of the parties.
IX. The United States Court of Claims, in the exercise
of its equitable jurisdiction, and for the purpose of
awarding, or refusing to award, a money judgment
against the United States, may reform a contract
so as to reflect the true understanding and intent of
the parties. In the instant case the contract in suit
is reformed so as to correct the erroneous wage rate
contained in the specifications. Judgment is based
on the contract as reformed.
X. Plaintiff, a partnership, in 1942 entered into a
contract with the Federal Works Agency, for the
construction of a defense publie works sewer project
in Baltimore. In the instant case plaintiff sues for
excess costs incurred by reason of encountering
quantities of underground water in an amount which
it says it had no reason to expect and concerning
which information was withheld by the defendant.
On the evidence and under the terms and provisions
of the contract, it is held that plaintiff is entitled to
recover. Ragonese and Scaravelli, 156.
XI. Plaintiff claims that it is entitled to an equitable
adjustment under Article 4 of the contract, because
of an unknown condition; or in the alternative that
it is entitled to excess costs on the ground that the
defendant concealed the existence of this water and
in this way prevented plaintiff from including in its
bid an amount to take care of this condition. Id.
United States 70 (22).
XII. On the evidence in the instant case it is difficult
to determine whether or not unusual conditions were
encountered materially differing from the conditions
ordinarily encountered, within the meaning of Article
4 of the contract, although the consulting engineer
and defendant's construction engineer found that
such conditions had been encountered and so re-
ported to the contracting officer but their finding
was never approved by the contracting officer. Id.
United States 74 (11).
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