And the defendant prays that this his bill of exceptions may be allowed, settled, and signed.

We have seen that the opposite counsel may appear before the judge in settling the bill of exceptions either upon or without notice and may file his objections or amendments offered to each exception in the bill, which may be rejected or allowed by the judge by order as heretofore stated. (See form of order, ante, p. 108.)

CHAPTER XV.

CHARGE TO JURY.

In charging the jury, the Federal courts are not bound by State laws or practice, for charging the jury is a function of the personal administration of the judge, and does not fall within the provisions of the conformity act, sec. 914, U. S. Rev. Stat. U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 684, for it is neither practice, proceeding, nor pleading. Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U. S. 426, 23 L. ed. 286; Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. N. & M. Friedman Co. 66 C. C. A. 543, 133 Fed. 713, 714; Knight v. Illinois C. R. Co. 103 C. C. A. 514, 180 Fed. 372.

The charge may be oral or written.

Charge Must be Applicable to the Issues.

The general charge or special charges requested by either party must be applicable to the issues. J. W. Bishop Co. v. Dodson, 81 C. C. A. 346, 152 Fed. 128; Beaver Hill Coal Co. v. Lassilla, 100 C. C. A. 283, 176 Fed. 725. And where there is no evidence to support the allegations of a pleading, the other party is entitled to a charge that no recovery can be had on the court. Wilmington Star Min. Co. v. Fulton, 205 U. S. 60, 51 L. ed. 708, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 412.

May Comment on the Evidence in Charging the Jury.

State laws forbidding commenting on the evidence in charging the jury, either orally or in writing, do not control the Federal trial judges. Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U. S. 441, 23 L. ed. 290; Lincoln v. Power, 151 U. S. 442, 38 L. ed. 227, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387. The judge may comment on the evidence fairly and impartially, to more clearly define the issues and assist the jury in reaching a conclusion (Mead v. Darling, 86 C. C. A. 552, 159 Fed. 684; California Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co.

133 U. S. 417, 33 L. ed. 738, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365; Sommers v. Carbon Hill Coal Co. 91 Fed. 337; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S. 608, 36 L. ed. 834, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905; Knight v. Illinois C. R. Co. 103 C. C. A. 514, 180 Fed. 372, and cases cited); and may express an opinion on the facts (Id. 369).

While the judge may comment on the evidence, and express an opinion as to the facts, the jury at last must determine the fact, and may by their verdict dissent from the view of the court as to the facts; in a word, whatever may be the opinion of the court as to the credibility of a witness or the facts testified to, the jury must ultimately determine as to the truth of the testimony, and the judge should so charge them. If the jury are told substantially that it is their province alone to determine the facts without reference to the opinions expressed by the court, then the expression of opinion by the court, though erroneous, is not reviewable, if the court has stated the law of the case to them correctly. Union P. R. Co. v. Thomas, 81 C. C. A. 491, 152 Fed. 371, and cases cited; Lesser Cotton Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 52 C. C. A. 95, 114 Fed. 142; Lovejoy v. United States, 128 U. S. 171, 32 L. ed. 389, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57; Nyback v. Champagne Lumber Co. 48 C. C. A. 632, 109 Fed. 737. But he must take care to separate the law from the facts, and leave the latter in unequivocal terms to the judgment of the jury, for the jury must be free to exercise their own judgment. Ibid.

When Special Charges May be Refused.

When the general charge substantially covers the case, and was all that was necessary to give the jury an intelligent understanding of the law applicable to the facts, the court may refuse special charges offered. Iron Silver Min. Co. v. Cheesman, 116 U. S. 529, 29 L. ed. 712, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 481; Norfolk & P. Traction Co. v. Rephan, 110 C. C. A. 254, 188 Fed. 284, 285; International Banking Corp. v. Payne, 110 C. C. A. 418, 188 Fed. 40; Southern R. Co. v. Terrell, 108 C. C. A. 377, 186 Fed. 299; Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 295, 23 L. ed. 899; Ruch v. Rock Island, 97 U. S. 695, 24 L.

ed. 1102; Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Muskegon Nat. Bank, 122 U. S. 510, 30 L. ed. 1103, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1221; Meyer v. Richards, 49 C. C. A. 344, 111 Fed. 297; Simmons Co. v. Eskridge, 186 Fed. 676; Coulter v. B. F. Thompson Lumber Co. 74 C. C. A. 38, 142 Fed. 706; Mountain Copper Co. v. Van Buren, 66 C. C. A. 151, 133 Fed. 7, and cases cited. Again, under sec. 918, U. S. Rev. Stat. U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 685, authorizing courts to make their own rules, when the court entered a rule that special charges should be presented before the argument began, it was not error to refuse such charges presented after the argument began. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hamble, 101 C. C. A. 270, 177 Fed. 652.

When Charges are Asked in the Aggregate.

When charges are asked in the aggregate, by counsel, if there be any objectionable the whole may be refused. Morgan v. United States, 94 C. C. A. 518, 169 Fed. 242-250, and cases cited; Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 295, 23 L. ed. 899; Moulor v. American L. Ins. Co. 111 U. S. 338, 28 L. ed. 448, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466; Mann Boudoir Car Co. v. Dupre, 21 L.R.A. 289, 4 C. C. A. 540, 13 U. S. App. 183, 54 Fed. 650; Armour & Co. v. Kollmeyer, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1110, 88 C. C. A. 242, 161 Fed. 84, and cases cited. Or when charges asked contain two or more propositions of law, and one is erroneous, the charge should be refused. Ibid.; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Hale, 99 C. C. A. 379, 176 Fed. 72.

When General Charge Incomplete.

If the general charge is believed to be incomplete in the statement of the law to the facts, special charges should be asked to complete it. No general exception to the charge under these circumstances can avail. Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Leach, 95 C. C. A. 47, 169 Fed. 549, 550, and cases cited; United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 92 C. C. A. 159, 166 Fed. 416; McDermott v. Severe, 202 U. S. 600, 50 L. ed. 1162, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 709; Southern P. Co. v. Maloney, 69 C. C. A. 83, 136 Fed. 171; Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. McDonough, 88 C. C.

A. 517, 161 Fed. 657; Central Union Depot & R. Co. v. Mansfield, 95 C. C. A. 142, 169 Fed. 615, 617; Coney Island Co. v. Dennan, 79 C. C. A. 375, 149 Fed. 692. And the requested charge must be sufficiently definite to direct the attention of the court to the error. Coney Island Co. v. Dennan, 79 C. C. A. 375, 149 Fed. 687; Washington & G. R. Co. v. Varnell, 98 U. S. 485, 25 L. ed. 235; Stewart v. Morris, 37 C. C. A. 562, 96 Fed. 703.

When Exceptions to the Charge Must be Taken

Exceptions to a charge, given or refused, must be taken before the jury retire. Park Bros. & Co. v. Bushnell, 9 C. C. A. 140, 20 U. S. App. 425, 60 Fed. 583; Hickory v. United States, 151 U. S. 316, 38 L. ed. 176, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334; Hindman v. First Nat. Bank, 57 L.R.A. 108, 50 C. C. A. 623, 112 Fed. 934; Commercial Travelers' Mut. Acci. Asso. v. Fulton, 24 C. C. A. 654, 45 U. S. App. 578, 79 Fed. 423; Sternenberg v. Mailhos, 39 C. C. A. 408, 99 Fed. 46; Berwind-White Coal Co. v. Firment, 95 C. C. A. 1, 170 Fed. 151. Exceptions taken after the jury retire are too late. Klaw v. Life Pub. Co. 76 C. C. A. 154, 145 Fed. 185; Bracken v. Union P. R. Co. 5 C. C. A. 548, 12 U. S. App. 421, 56 Fed. 448, 450; Price v. Pankhurst, 3 C. C. A. 551, 10 U. S. App. 497, 53 Fed. 312; Mann v. Dempster, 103 C. C. A. 325, 179 Fed. 837; Phelps v. Mayer, 15 How. 160, 14 L. ed. 643. So objections to remarks of the trial court made during the trial must be taken when made. Drumm-Flato Commission Co. v. Edmisson, 208 U. S. 535, 540, 52 L. ed. 608, 610, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 367. And unless so taken, you cannot assign error for review. Levi v. Mathews, 76 C. C. A. 122, 145 Fed. 152; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Womack, 97 C. C. A. 559, 173 Fed. 753-759; Tromp v. William Cramp & Sons 1 Ship & Engine Bld. Co. 75 C. C. A. 75, 143 Fed. 867, and cases cited; Wabash Screen Door Co. v. Lewis, 106 C. C. A. 402, 184 Fed. 260; Hinds v. Hinchman Renton Fireproofing Co. 91 C. C. A. 325, 165 Fed. 339, 340; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Dandridge, 96 C. C. A. 178, 171 Fed. 74; Western Invest. Co. v. McFarland, 91 C. C. A. 504, 166 Fed. 77. See Dalton v. Moore, 72 C. C. A. 459, 141

S. S. at L.-8.