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parliament, ad tractandum et confilium impendendum, though not ad confentiendum; but, whenever of late years they have been members of the houfe of commons, their attendance here hath fallen into difufe.

ANOTHER privilege is, that every peer, by licence obtained from the king, may make another lord of parliament his proxy, to vote for him in his abfence. A privilege, which a member of the other houfe can by no means have, as he is himself but a proxy for a multitude of other people *.

EACH peer has alfo a right, by leave of the houfe, when a vote pales contrary to his fentiments, to enter his diffent on the journals of the houfe, with the reafons for fuch diffent; which is ufually filed his proteft.

ALL bills likewife, that may in their confequences any way affect the rights of the peerage, are by the custom of parliament to have their firft rife and beginning in the house. of peers, and to fuffer no changes or amendments in the house of commons.

THERE is also one statute peculiarly relative to the house of lords; 6 Ann. c. 23. which regulates the election of the fixteen reprefentative peers of North Britain, in consequence of the twenty-fecond and twenty-third articles of the union: and for that purpose preferibes the oaths, &c. to be taken by the electors; directs the mode of balloting; prohibits the peers clecting from being attended in an unusual manner; and exprefsly provides, that no other matter fhall be treated of in that affembly, fave only the election, on pain of incurring a praemunire.

V. THE peculiar laws and cuftems of the houfe of commens relate principally to the railing of taxes, and the elec tions of members to ferve in parliament.

FIRST, with regard to taxes: it is the antient indifputable privilege and right of the houfe of commons, that all grants of fubfidies or parliamentary aids do begin in their house, and are firf bestowed by them; although their grants are not 8 Feb. 1620. 10 Feb. 1625. 4 Inst. 48,

8 Stat. 31 Hen. VIII. c. 10. Smith's commonw. b. 2. c.3. Moor. 551.4 Lift. Hale of Pail. 140.

4.

h See Con. Journ. 11 Apr. 1614.

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effectual to all intents and purpofes, until they have the affent of the other two branches of the legiflature. The general reason, given for this exclufive privilege of the house of commons, is, that the fupplies are raised upon the body of the people, and therefore it is proper that they alone should have the right of taxing themselves. This reafon would be unanswerable, if the commons taxed none but themselves: but it is notorious, that a very large fhare of property is in the poffeffion of the houfe of lords; that this property is equally taxable, and taxed, as the property of the commons; and therefore the commons not being the fele perfons taxed, this cannot be the reafon of their having the fole right of raifing and modelling the fupply. The true reafon, arifing from the fpirit of our conftitution, feems to be this. The lords being a permanent hereditary body, created at pleasure by the king, are fuppofed more liable to be influenced by the crown, and when once influenced to continue fo, than the commons, who are a temporary elective body, freely nominated by the people. It would therefore be extremely dangerous, to give the lords any power of framing new taxes for the fubject; it is fufficient that they have a power of rejecting, if they think the commons too lavifh or improvident in their grants. But fo reasonably jealous are the commons of this valuable privilege, that herein they will not fuffer the other houfe to excrt any power but that of reje&ing; they will not permit the leaft alteration or amendment to be made by the lords to the mode of taxing the people by a money bill; under which appellation are included all bills, by which money is directed to be raifed upon the fubject, for any purpose or in any shape whatsoever; either for the exigencies of government, and collected from the kingdom in general, as the land tax; or for private benefit, and collected in any particular diftrict, as by turnpikes, parish rates, and the like. Yet fir Matthew Hale m mentions one cafe, founded on the practice of parliament in the reign of Henry VI", wherein he thinks the lords may alter a money bill: and that is, if the commons grant a tax, as that of

on parliaments. 65, 66.

the answer to this cafe by fir Heneage Year book, 33 Hen. VI. 17. But fee Finch. Com. Journ. 22 Apr. 1671.

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tonnage and poundage, for four years; and the lords alter it to a lefs time, as for two years; here, he fays, the bill need not be fent back to the commons for their concurrence, but may receive the royal affent without farther ceremony; for the alteration of the lords is confiftent with the grant of the commons. But fuch an experiment will hardly be repeated by the lords, under the prefent improved idea of the privilege of the houfe of commons, and, in any cafe where a money bill is remanded to the commons, all amendments in the mode of taxation are fure to be rejected.

NEXT, with regard to the elections of knights, citizens, and burgeffes; we may obferve, that herein confifts the exercife of the democratical part of our conftitution: for in a democracy there can be no exercife of fovereignty but by fuffrage, which is the declaration of the people's will. In all democracies therefore it is of the utmost importance to regulate by whom, and in what manner, the fuffrages are to be given. And the Athenians were fo juftly jealous of this prerogative, that a stranger, who interfered in the affemblies of the people, was punished by their laws with death: becaufe fuch a man was esteemed guilty of high treafon, by ufurping those rights of fovereignty, to which he had no title. In England, where the people do not debate in a collective body but by representation, the exercise of this fovereignty confifts in the choice of reprefentatives. The laws have therefore very ftrictly guarded against usurpation or abufe of this power, by many falutary provifions; which may be reduced to thefe three points, 1. The qualifications of the electors. 2. The qualifications of the elected. 3. The proceedings at elections.

1. As to the qualifications of the electors. The true reafon of requiring any qualification, with regard to property, in voters, is to exclude such persons as are in fo mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their own. If these persons had votes, they would be tempted to difpofe of them under fome undue influence or other. This would give a great, an artful, or a wealthy man, a larger share in elections than is confiftent with general liberty. If it were probable that every man would give his vote freely and with

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out influence of any kind, then, upon the true theory and genuine principles of liberty, every member of the community, however poor, fhould have a vote in electing those delegates, to whofe charge is committed the difpofal of his property, his liberty, and his life. But, fince that can hardly be expected in perfons of indigent fortunes, or fuch as are under the immediate dominion of others, all popular states have been obliged to establish certain qualifications; whereby fome, who are fufpected to have no will of their own, are excluded from voting, in order to fet other individuals, whose wills may be fuppofed independent, more thoroughly upon a level with each other.

AND this conftitution of fuffrages is framed upon a wifer principle, with us, than either of the methods of voting, by centuries or by tribes, among the Romans. In the method by centuries, inftituted by Servius Tullius, it was principally property, and not numbers, that turned the fcale: in the method by tribes, gradually introduced by the tribunes of the people, numbers only were regarded, and property entirely overlooked. Hence the laws paffed by the former method had usually too great a tendency to aggrandize the patricians or rich nobles; and those by the latter had too much of a levelling principle. Our conftitution fteers between the two extremes. Only fuch are entirely excluded, as can have no will of their own: there is hardly a free agent to be found, who is not entitled to a vote in fome place or other in the kingdom. Nor is comparative wealth, or property, entirely disregarded in elections; for though the richest man has only one vote at one place, yet, if his property be at all diffused, he has probably a right to vote at more places than one, and therefore has many reprefentatives. This is the fpirit of our conftitution: not that I affert it is in fact quite fo perfect" as I have here endeavoured to defcribe it; for, if any alteration

n The candid and intelligent reader will apply this obfervation to many other parts of the work before him, wherein the conftitution of our laws and government are represented as nearly approaching to perfection; without descending to the invidious task of pointing out fuch deviations and corruptions, as length of

time and a loose state of national morals have too great a tendency to produce. The incurvations of practice are then the most notorious when compared with the rectitude of the rule; and to elucidate the clearness of the spring, conveys the strongest fatire on those who have polluted or difturbed it.

might

might be wifhed or fuggefted in the prefent frame of parlia◄ ments, it fhould be in favour of a more complete reprefentation of the people.

BUT to return to our qualifications; and firft thofe of electors for knights of the fhire. 1. By ftatute 8 Hen. VI. c. 7. and 10 Hen. VI. c. 2. (amended by 14 Geo. III. c. 58.) the knights of the fhire fhall be chofen of people, whereof every man fhall have freehold to the value of forty fhillings by the year within the county; which (by fubfequent ftatutes) is to be clear of all charges and deductions, except parliamentary and parochial taxes. The knights of fhires are the representatives of the landholders, or landed intereft of the kingdom; their clectors must therefore have estates in lands or tenements, within the county reprefented; these eftates must be freehold, that is, for term of life at least; because beneficial leafes for long terms of years were not in ufe at the making of thefe ftatutes, and copyholders were then little better than villeins, abfolutely dependent upon their lords: this freehold must be of forty fhillings annual value; because that fum would then, with proper industry furnish all the neceffaries of life, and render the freeholder, if he pleased, an independent man. For bifhop Fleetwood, in his chronicon preciofum, written at the beginning of the prefent century, has fully proved forty fhillings in the reign of Henry VI to have been equal to twelve pounds per annum in the reign of queen Anne; and, as the value of money is very confiderably lowered fince the bishop wrote, I think we may fairly conclude, from this and other circumstances, that what was equivalent to twelve pounds in his days is equivalent to twenty at prefent. The other lefs important qualifications of the electors for counties in England and Wales may be collected from the statutes cited in the margin; which direct, 2. That no perfon under twentyone years of age fhall be capable of voting for any member, This extends to all forts of members, as well for boroughs as counties; as does alfo the next, viz. 3, That no perfon convicted of perjury, or fubornation of perjury, fhall be capable

07 & 8 W. III. c. 25. 10 Ann. c. 23. 31 Geo. II. c. 14. 3 Geo. III. c. 24. - Geo. I. c. 21. 18 Geo. II. c. 18.

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