the infamous defpótifm of a Cromwell.

To prevent thefe dire effects of ambition, which, in all ages, if unconrouled, has never failed to destroy the peace and happiness of fociety, the conftitution of Eugland has wifely deprived the legislature of all executive power, and placed it in the hands of the king, who holds his office for life by hereditary right and independent both of the nobility and people. The king conftitutes a third branch of legiflation; and as the -commons have a negative on the doings of the lords, the lords on those of the commons, and the king on both, in cafe of a conteft between either two of the branches for an addition of power, there is ever a third, who is able to hold, and whofe intereft it is to preferve the ballance. For whenever the equipoife is deftroyed, all the powers of govern. ment feem neceffarily to flow into the preponderating fcale. Wherefore it is plain, that that very rage for power, which renders it an inftrument of wretchednefs and ruin, unlefs guarded by fome effe&tual means of controul, becomes, when thefe means are provided, the frongest barrier of our freedom. Civil government bears a ftrong analogy to the inoral. The former is kept in harmony and peace by the agency of differing interefts, when properly directed and arranged; the bleflings arifing from the latter are commonly, and perhaps always, affected, by fummoning up the paffions, thofe fprings of human action,and preventing the undue controul of one by checking and ballancing it by the influence of the others.

In cafe of a contest between the King and cominons it must be the intereft of the houfe of lords to prevent the fuccefs of either. The protectorate of Cromwell, on the one hand, and the infupportable oppreffions of the first Henrys, on the other, put the truth of the pofition beyond the reach of difpute.

Should the king and nobility engage in a struggle for the prerogative of each other, the commons must fland in oppofition to the views of both. If the nobility fhould prevail, the government will undoubtedly

become an abfolute aristocracy; f the king,an abfolute monarchy. The leffon of Thrafy bulus, the tyrant of Miletos to Periander the tyrant of Corinth, ought ever to be borne in remembrance by the people of Eug. land, especially when the rights and the prerogatives of the nobility are encroached upon by the influence and power of the throne. Periander alked of Thrafybulus, what me. fures he should take with his new acquired fabje&s. The latter without any other anfwer led the meffenger into a field of wheat, where, in walking along, he beat down every ear of corn that was higher than the rest.

Both branches of the legislative power, being deprived of all mare in the executive, it is impoffible that either the lords or commons should enCroach immediately on the jurifdi&ion of each other, but by confent or inadvertence. The former is by no means prefumeable. But in cafe that either the former or the latter fhould take place, the intereft of the king on ma. ny accounts must be opposed to every fuch innovation and unconftitutional encroachment. Power always giving ardour to the fpirits of men, a politi cal body, in the undue acquifition of it, never moves, but with increafing ftrength and an accelerated motion. It must be oppofed in the firft ftages of its efforts, or otherwife, though, it poffibly may not be able to bear down all oppofition, yet it cannot fail to throw the government into convulfi ons, which, probably, will terminate in the accumulated horrors of a civil war. It was from this principle, that Cicere, who well knew the tempers of men and their influence on govern. ment, undertakes to affure us," that novelties in republics are dangerous things."

But I do not,at prefent,recollect any inftances,in which, while the king was poffeffed of his conftitutional authori ty, that either the nobility or commons have ever attempted an immediate encroachment on each other, tho' inftances are frequent where they have endeavoured to obtain the prerogative of the monarch, in order to give efficacy to their views of deftroying the ballance, and thus, to effect a defpotic aggrandifenient of themfelves.

felves. Thefe attempts however. have been generally checked without the interference of the crown.

The prefent claims of the House of Commons headed by Fox, and encouraged by the young Prince of Wales, appears to me to be a fubject, that ought to roufe the exertions of every friend to the conftitution of England. They ftrike at the very exiftence of monarchy. The King can aft, and is accountable, but by his minifters, and if the right of controuling or even approbating bis appointments is vested. in the commons, the principal part of his authority vanishes in an inftant, The right of approving neceffarily fuppofes the reverfe; of courfe if the, doctrine of the commons fhould prevail, monarchy will only become a mere inftrument in their hands, for the purpose of making fuch appoint ments as they shall dictate. In the time of Charles the firft, the King was deprived of the right of appointing any officer of ftate,unlefs by the advice and approbation of parliament. This, fays the hiftorian, gave a most fatal blow to the regal prerogative, and in a manner dethroned the prince. Should the fame event, again take. place, and the authority of the monarch, as in the reign of Charles, be vefted in the commons, I will venture to predict, that in a little time, fome daring fpirit, aided, perhaps, by foreign force, will rife a fecond Crom well from the ruins of monarchy. The ftruggle between his majefty and the commons has exceedingly convulfed the nation, and nothing but the firmness of the king, fupported by the nobility, will fave the conflitution from ruin. Should he perfevere in his oppofition with manlinefs and fpirit,fuccefs will probably await him, unlefs corruption has pervaded the whole mass of the people.

It has generally been fuppofed that the government of England is not free,by reafon of the prodigious extent of the regal authority. It is true the prerogative of the King is very extenfive. He appoints every officer of the kingdom, diffolves the parliament, fumnions them again to exiflence, commands the fleets and armies, makes war and peace, negotiates treaties and holds the purfe rings of the

kingdom. But, though he is poffeffed of thefe powers, and many more, yet he of himself cannot prefcribe a fingle rule to the actions of his fubjects; he can only execute fuch as are prefcrib ed by others. And, though it is with him to draw monies from the public treasury, yet he cannot give it fupplies; and without them,his Majefty, with all powers and regal pomp about him, becomes a cypher. It is not Kings or Lords that conftitute tyranny, nor Senate and People that confitute liberty; but it is that diftribu-' tion of political power, which gives fecurity to the rights of perfons and thofe of property, which renders a government free,and the reverfe of this, defpotic.

It is a queftion, that has long been the fubject of difcuffion, whether the government of England inclines most to a monarchy or a democracy. It has generally been fuppofed to incline moft to the former, because of the many means, with which the King is furnifhed, if extending his influencethroughout the kingdom. But if I might be permitted to hazard my fentiments, I fhould readily give it as my opinion, that it inclines moft to the latter The King certainly can never become an abfolute monarch, or in other words, deprive the people of all fare in the adminiftration of government, but by the exercife of great addrefs and probably the efforts of a civil war. The Commons, on the other hand, by a refufal to give fupplies to the public treafury, may in effect,dethrone the monarch in a day. And if this temper and disposition hould generally prevail among the ma's of the people, even if the King fhould refort to the affiftance of his armies, he yet muft fall a facrifice to popular refentment. people of England are numerous, fpirited, enterprizing and powerful. The truth of this obfervation is verified in almost every page of the English hiftory. And agreably hereto, we find, that from the firft exiflence of the Houfe of Commons, commencing under the Earl of Leicester, in the reign of Henry the third, they have been in a constant encreafe of their authority and power. The fpirit of revolution, as it gratifies the pride of

The

fuch

fuch as are engaged in it, by giving importance to the moft obfcure, is more readily diffufed than a fpirit of fubmiffion. Convulfions in the political world, like thofe in the natural, frequently reverse the order of things and bring thofe into view, who would otherwife have remained forever bu ried in obfcurity. When I confider thefe things and reflect on the extenfive power that remains in the hands of the people of England, it is to me a matter of fome furprize that the government has not long face become a democracy.

Having made thefe general obfervations refpecting the English conftituti on, the nature of a ballance of power, and the mode in which it is provided, and preferved in that government, we pafs now to fome obfervations refperting the conftitation of this Commonwealth, whofe form bears, in mrny inftances, a very confiderable ana logy to that of England, though the tenures, by which most of the offi ces are held, are altogether diffe

rent.

Our House of Representatives cho fen by towns, in proportion to their numbers, reprefent the perfonal rights of the Community. The Senate, chofen by Counties, in proportion to their property, represents its rights of property. These two branches, hav

ing a negative each on the other, make

are

the laws, by which the citizens governed; but no part of the executive authority lies with them. This

is vefted in the Governor, chosen annually by the People, and poffeffing a qualified negative on both branches of the legislature. The judicial officers in this Commonwealth, as in England, are appointed by the fupreme Executive, and as in that government, Hold their offices, in moft inftances, for ¶fe, determinable on misbehaviour. In England, this mifbehaviour is to be determined by the Lords on an im peachment of the commons, in this overnment, by the feuate, or an impeachment of the Reprefentatives. As the whole executive power is verted in the governor, had he an unqualified negative, political power in this Commonwealth during its delegation, would be deflributed nearly

the fame manntr-as by the confi

tution of England; and fo fong as the government fhould be adminiftred agreeably to its principles, every encroachment, by one branch on the other would be effectually prevented, and the rights, both of perfons and of property, rendered perfealy fecure. But what fecurity have we, by our conftitution, furnished as it is with thefe checks, that they will be properly dire&ted and attended to? The ftability of the government and its fafety depend on the energy of the principles and motives which fhall dietate: the exercife, and urge the obfervance of them. To determine, whether any fuch motives exift, and to afcertain their origin and fpirit, is an enquiry of the higheft importance; efpecially as the bleffings of civil government-depend,in the firft inftance,on their exiftence and the continuance of thofe bleflings in a very great degree, or the encouragement we give them. But to discover thefe principles and motives, their origin, their frength and fupport, requires a more minute view of the feveral parts of our conftitution, their relations, their interefis and dependencies, than we have sat this time been able to take. Thefe fubje&s therefore mult be defered to another day.

For the BOSTON MAGAZINE.

Volpone. A modern Charaðler.

all evils that diffurb and interrupt the peace of civil fociety, there is fcarce any one comparable to a publick cheat and impoftor. Men who make it their chief ftudy to deceive the world by fair appearances and a fhew of honefly, are of all the most deteftable. Their Battering words and falle infinuations are fo many beautious flowers, which they ftrew in the way to cover their hidden foares, in order to deceive the more effectually. Juftice and honefty are the very foul of civil fociety, without which no intercourse between man and man can fubfift. It must therefore be a very blameable condu&t in any person to plunge him. felf in debt, to appear grand and magnificent in the eyes of a deluded world. We cannot help cenfuring fuch dishoneft wretches, who look

big

Big at the expence of their unfortunate creditors; nor can we entertain any real compaffion for them, when they fall under the misfortunes they fo jufly deferve.

Volpone (for this is the name by which I fhall chufe to call him) was one of this principle. He was a gentleman of a Cornish extraction, of very mean birth and parentage. Im his younger years he was very remarkable for his vivacity and a peculiar turn of genius, which inclined' his friends to train him up to the Audy of the law, in which he foon became a very great proficien, and gave the world very great expecta

The na

tions of an eminent man. tural gravity of his countenance, and fmooth volubility of tongue confirm ed people still more in the opinion they had conceived of him.

Recommended with thefe and feve ral other qualifications, he married into a very reputable family and becamesintided to a confiderable fortune, which had he been fufficient by careful, he might have improved to great advantage; but, alas! he grew to manifeftly negligent and carelefs. As to the law, he general. ly employed it to very bad ends; he was a perfect mafter of all the quibbles and ambiguities of his profeffion. Never man acted more incon. fiftent with the true intent of his profeffion. If any perfon came with a bad caufe to be fupported, Volpone was the man that could beft defend it. If there was any point in petty borough affairs, that others looked upon as too dirty to undertake, Vol. pone was the man that was always applied to on fuch an occafion. He was a perfon of that complexion, he cared not how difhoneft his practice was in This refpect, if he could obtain his defired end. His skill in matters of this nature was fo extraordinary, that it is generally thought, he never had his equal, and indeed it is great pity he ever should.

But unhappily for him, the natuzal bent of his genius likewife inclined him to the ftudy of the mathematicks and natural philofophy; the latter, of which he grew fo paffionately enamoured, as to neglect the inBricate prazes of the law for a more

delightful theory. Had Volpone obliged the publick with his observati ons on this topick, they might have been of fingular fervice to mankind.

This was his courfe of life for feveral years. At length the good lady his wife died without iffue, whofe death put a happy period to the growing miferies the had elfe been a partaker of. Soon after the deceitful Volpone paid his addreffes to a young lady in her full bloom of years, whom I fhall call Cleora. She was a women of merit, but without any fortune to recommend her. Her, the barbarous Volpone allured into the indiffoluble ftate of matrimony, and inhumanly involved in the baseft nature. The young lady, encouraged with foch a fuppofed advantageous offer of marriage, confented to his propofals confented, and was undone. Frequently he made to her the moft folemn proteftations of his worth and fortune, in order to decoy her into the fatal fnare. S range inhumanity! thus to decoy a poor thoughtless innocent creature with all the enchanting hopes of grandeur and greatness. How often would the wicked Volpone recline his head in the fair Cleora's bofom, and tell her a thoufand fine things he would one day be miftrefs of? How often would the fond dotard fqueeze her foft hand in the raptures of a dying lover, and Aufh her vain imagination with the tempting thoughts of equipage and vanity.

Scarce was the fatal knot tied that gave the deceitful Volpone to his Cleora's arms, when he was called to London upon neceffary bufinefs, or obliged, as fome fuppofe, to abfcond on occafion of the preffing infults of his creditors, which ftill grew more numerous, increased at home by the profufion of Cleora, who imagining he was married to fo great a gentleman, thought he was privileged to live in a manner fuitable to the dignity of her exalted ftation. But, alas! how foon was the unfortunate Cleora convinced of her mistake? The house and all her husband's valuable effects became a prey to the hands of unmerciful bailiffs. What a new and unexpected scene of horror was here! Her husband was abfent,

where,

where, file could not tell---She con cindedht might he for this very purpofe he had felt her All the complicated agonies of grief and defpain came upon her at once, the wept fhe fighed the curfed the ingrativ rude of faithlefs man. Ah! wretched Cleora, how in a moment were all thy hopes and expeЯations vanithed! how unhappily haft thou been deceive ed by the vile and inhuman Volpone! helpless, alone, exposed to the abufive Janguage of cenforious tongues, and the malicious fneer of an injured, world:

But fee the fad reverfe of fate while things were thus carried on, the artful Volpone, who had been long in expectation of the threathing form to break upon him, makes ap. plication to a great gentleman in power,in order to obtain a protection. A protection is granted, The deceitful Volpone is hereby enabled to preferve his eftates, and cheat his poor unfortunate creditors. Where, O abandoned Volpone! was thy integrity! where was any principle of honour and honefty Strange pre sogative of power and intereft! Wherein is the equity of fuch a proceeding? Can it be equitable for one man to prote& another in fo impious a defign, to cheat to defraud? The villain and the abettor is this cafe are equally criminal, the one commits the crime, and the other vindicates him in it. Such enormities, in perfous of a lower rank of life, would be deemed highly culpable if not capital; agreeable to the juft obfervations of an English poet,

Great villains,they enjoy the world in flate,

While little villains muft fubmit to fate.

IGNOTUS.

For the BOSTON MAGAZINE.

An Efay on Entertainment. M

ARCUS Varro, in a treatise of the difpofition and orde. of an elegant banquent, the choice, concition and qualities of the guests, begins, firft with their number, which he lays, fhould not be listhan the gra

ces, nor more than the muses. They ought not to be rony, that every perfou may have his turn to fpeak, as well as to hear. A large company is fubies to noife and confufion; and a number of equals cannot be reAramed within the bounds of decen cy and refpect towards each other.

Four things, he fays, are requifite towards an elegant entertainment,---The guests inuft be of fome quality, well bred and well dreffed; the place, retired from public view, and all difturbances of pallengers or business, where the company may hear nothing but what proceeds from them. felves: the time convenient, neither too late nor too early; for an early fupper follows too foon upon dinner, and a late one breaks in upon our hours of reft, as well as the business of the next day: the apartment, atten, dants, and whole apparatus for the feaft, rather neat than fine; elegant than rich; and the entertainment fuch as the invited may afford, each in their turn.

The company fhould not be great talkers, nor too filent; but ingenius perfons, knowing when to speak, and when to liften; rather facetious and witty, than argumentative or rheto rical. Eloquence is proper for a fe nate, and difputation may be neceffa ry at the bar; but a more concife expreflion, and quicker repartee, are fitter talents for familiar converfe.

The guests fhould neither be all old, nor all young men ; for the one talk of nothing but former times, laudatur temporis, acti; and the other only Speak of prefent debauches or amours. Upon fuch meetings, the old thould affume an air of youth, and the young ought to comport themselves with a pro tempore gravity, which will bring the extremes to meet, in au happy and focial medium. A perfe& company thould be like a concert of mufick, where the thirds, fifths and eighths form the harmony together.

Stories fhould be rarely introduced, because they prevent the freedom of converfation too long, and may oc cafion difgufis, three feveral ways -by being tedious, common, or ill told. The difcourfe ought never to turn jects in which any of the company upon politics, private concern, or fub

are