APPENDIX II Responses to Additional Questions RESPONSES OF ELJAY BOWRON TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR MURKOWSKI Question 1. If confirmed, do you plan to review the organization of the Office of Inspector General? Personnel? Answer. If confirmed, I can assure the committee members that I will review the operations and personnel of the Office of Inspector General (OIG). It is essential that an OIG organization, which provides oversight for the Department and its programs, be organized and staffed in a manner that most effectively meets the mission and statutory requirements of the Inspector General Act, as amended. Question 2. With increasing budget constraints placed on the Office of Inspector General, how do you plan to effectively and efficiently manage your responsibilities? Answer. I have been advised that the OIG has experienced budgetary constraints despite ever increasing demands on its resources to perform mandated audits. The Office has absorbed the budget constraints through a variety of streamlining and cost-cutting measures such as not filling personnel vacancies and reducing office space requirements. I will ensure that the economy and efficiency of our operations are evaluated on a continuous basis and that new and innovative approaches to optimize the use of our resources are initiated to provide value and assistance to the Administration, the Congress, Departmental managers and the taxpayers. This may include pursuing options such as seeking asset forfeiture language (budget neutral) in our appropriation legislation to receive, through the Department of Justice and Treasury, a pro-rata share of proceeds from asset forfeiture to use for prescribed law enforcement purposes. Question 3. How much involvement do you believe the Secretary of the Interior should have in the operations of the Office of Inspector General? Answer. To preserve the statutory independence of the Office of Inspector General, it is vital that neither the Secretary nor any other administration officials have any involvement in the day-to-day operations of the OIG. The Office must be (and must be perceived to be) completely independent to render objective assessments of Departmental operations and to take the necessary actions to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. By the same token, I strongly support the Inspector General community's Statement of Reinvention Principles, adopted in January 1994, that Inspectors General need to "[b]uild relationships with program managers based on a shared commitment to improving operations and effectiveness." Question 4. Beside confirmation hearings and the semi-annual report to Congress, this committee's involvement with the IG's Office has been limited. Unfortunately, it is difficult for this committee to figure out what is in the semi-annual reports to Congress. It would be helpful to us if the IG's Office would point out issues of importance or interest in Congress. What do you think this committee can do to improve the dialogue with the IG's Office? Answer. Information that I have received makes it clear that the Inspector General community recognizes that there are shortcomings in the effectiveness and the value of the semi-annual report. While the contents and form of the report are mandated by statute, I will work through the President's Committee on Integrity and Efficiency to participate in suggestions for improving the shortcomings identified in the current reporting method. I will discuss with staff members alternate ways to provide the committee with the information it needs. Through these discussions, the committee can provide me with feedback for an improved dialogue. Question 5. If confirmed, do you pledge to work with this committee to improve communications? Answer. In addition to the matters mentioned in response to question No. 4, I welcome further involvement with this committee and pledge to work closely with the committee to improve communication. I understand the OIG has in the past met (99) with committee staff at their request, on issues of importance to the committee. Efforts to foster further involvement and dialogue could include more frequent meetings between the OIG and committee members and their staff and briefings on particular matters of interest to the committee. I strongly support such meetings and briefings. Question 6. Some IGs, in other agencies, have designated a staff member to serve as a congressional liaison. What do you think of this possibility? Answer. I am committed to taking action to improve communications with the committee. I support the concept of a designated person to engage in frequent and proactive dialogue with the committee and its staff. If confirmed, I will review staffing and personnel issues to identify an appropriate staff member to fulfill this obligation. RESPONSES OF DAVID MICHAELS TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR CRAIG As you are aware, I am very concerned about the recent accident at the INEEL. I am equally concerned about the overall safety program of the DOE. Could you please answer the following questions? Question 1. What are the number of fatalities and workplace injuries, resulting in loss of work time, that have occurred at DOE facilities during the past 10 years? Anawer. For the years 1988 through September 1998, a total of 51 fatalities and 28,018 reportable lost workday cases were recorded. A "lost workday case" involves days away from work or days of restricted work activity or both. Question 2. Please provide the committee with complete written records of Class A accident investigations that have taken place as a result of injuries and fatalities that have occurred at DOE facilities during the past 10 years. Answer. I have attached written records of all "Type A" Accident Investigations conducted during the past 10 years along with a list summarizing these records. Type A Accident Investigation Reports Savannah River Site, Security Rappel Tower Fatality, April 3, 1995 INEEL Fall Fatality at the Radioactive Waste Management Complex, 1996 The Los Alamos Lab Electrical Shock Area 21, 1996 Los Alamos Electrical Shock Area 53, July 11, 1996 INEEL Electrical Shock at the TRA-609, August 13, 1996 BNL Construction Fatality, 1997 K-25 Site Oak Ridge Welding/Cutting Fatality, 1997 INEEL CO, Fatality, 1998 June 25, 1997 Contract Inspector Fatality at BPA Satsop-Aberdene #2 and #3 Transmission Lines Fatality of Two REECO in a Vehicle Roll-over Area 19 NTS, November 19, 1990 Construction Accident, March 20, 1992 at Olinda-Tracey Transmission Line, Rio Vista, CA Pedestrian Fatality Involving Fork Lift Truck at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, May 9, 1991 Airplane Crash Richland Field Office, June 3, 1992 U-3, Steam Pit Valve Failure Resulting in a Fatality at DOE Hanford Site, June 7, 1993 36-Inch Brine Line Failure at the Bryan Mound, Freeport Texas Strategic Petroleum Reserve Site, June 22, 1989 Fatality of REECO Employee Involved in Removing Line-of-Site in P-Tunnel Area 12 NTS, October 31, 1989 Fatal Electrical Contact Airport-Cottonwood Transmission Line, Tree Trimming Operation Redding, California, August 22, 1994 DOE Workover Rig Pedestrian Accident with Injuries, Vidor, Texas, August 11, 1990 Fatality at the Superconducting Super Collider, January 29, 1993 Electrical Supply Failure at LLNL, June 30, 1988 Plating Laboratory Fire at Rocky Flats, May 21, 1990 Fatal Shooting Accident During Performance Testing at the Los Alamos Laboratory, December 20, 1994 Security Helicopter and Resultant Fatalities at the NTS, July 24, 1991 M-K Ferguson Employee Fatal Accident on West Chestnut Ridge Road, February 17, 1993 Electrical Arc Blast Building 9725 Oak Ridge Reservation, June 17, 1994 Accident Involving the RAPTOR Demonstrator Aircraft. Edwards Air Force Base, Accident Resulting in a Fatality at the Naval Petroleum Reserve #1 Elk Hill, CA, July 20, 1988 Fatality of REECO Employee Involved in Portable Screening Plant Accident at Tonopah Test Range, June 23, 1990 NTS, N-Tunnel, Flammable Gas Flashover Accident, August 1992 Aircraft Accident Western Area Power Administrations Cessna Jet Aircraft Crash, Billings, Montana, December 18, 1992 X-333 Process Building Cascade Disturbance at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, January 3, 1991 Fatal Accident Sentennial Mountain Rocky Boy Repeater, Havre, Montana, March 9, 1989 Fatal Accident Clipping Operations, 230 kV Transmission Line, Aguila, AZ, April 19, 1988 Tritium Release Incident at the Mound Plant, November 8, 1989 Fatal Traffic Accident Involving DOE Vehicle, LLNL, August 14, 1990 Fatality of Security Police Officer Involved in Physical Fitness Qualification Test, Pantex Plant, December 16, 1995 Fall Related Fatality of Construction Worker at Hanford Site 105-F Building, April 7, 1992 K-Reactor Heat Exchanger Leak and Resulting Tritium Release, Savannah River, December 22-25, 1991 Fatality of a Wackenhut Services Inc. Employee During a Physical Fitness Test, December 14, 1989 Fatal Accident Tree Cutting Operation at WAPA, Sacramento, CA, August 20, 1991 The Dropped Shielding Block Incident at the LANL Messon Physics Facility, October 15, 1992 Question 3. Please provide the committee with complete written evaluations of environment, safety and performance and procedures conducted at all DOE facilities during the last 5 years. Answer. I have attached copies of all Safety Management Evaluations conducted by the Office of Oversight since 1994 along with a list summarizing these evaluations. These reports assess line management efforts in the implementation of DOE's environment, safety, and health management system policies and effectiveness of key safety and health programs at the facilities. I am aware that the Office of Oversight, which conducts these evaluations, was created during the 1993 reorganization of the Office of Environment, Safety and Health. Safety Management Evaluations Evaluation of ES&H Programs at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, August 1995 Evaluation of ES&H Programs at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, October 1995 Evaluation of ES&H Programs at the Savannah River Site, January 1996 Evaluation of ES&H Programs at the Fernald Environmental Management Project, Evaluation of ES&H Programs at the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, June 1996 Evaluation of ES&H Programs at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, October 1996 Evaluation of ES&H Programs at the Pantex Plant, October 1996 ISME of the Brookhaven National Laboratory, April 1997 ISME of the Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico, August 1997 ISME of the Facility Disposition Program at the East Tenn Tech Park, September 1997 ISME of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, November 1997 Special Studies and Reviews S&S Technology Assessment, 1995 Increasing Fissile Inventory Assurance within the DOE Special Review of DOE Nuclear Related Equipment Special Review of the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment Special Analysis of Suspect Counterfeit Parts Occurrence Reporting Programs within the DOE Special Review of Radiological Protection Programs within the DOE Special Review of Emergency Management at DOE Headquarters Evaluation of ES&H Programs of the Yucca Mountain Characterization Project Industrial Hygiene Program, December 1996 Review of Potential Safety Concerns in S&S, March 1996 Review of DOE Quality Assurance Program for Suspect and Counterfeit Parts, May 1996 Special Study of Hoisting and Rigging Incidents within the DOE, October 1996 Interim Report on the Office of ES&H Oversight of Ground Water Tritium Plume Special Study of Security Issues Related to Employee Assistance Program Referral Option Policies and Procedures, March 1997 Independent Technical Review of the West Valley Demonstration Project Event, April 1997 Special Evaluation of DOE CAIRS Program, 1997 Review of Aviation Safety Programs in the DOE, August 1997 Limited Review of DOE Unclassified Computer Systems, March 1998 Interim Status Report on the Status of S&S in the DOE, November 1997 Review of the Radiation Protection Program at the Albuquerque TSD, November 1997 Review of the Status of DOE Year 2000 Compliance, July 1998 Evaluation of Emergency Management Programs Across the DOE Complex, Vol I & Vol II, July 1998 Follow-up Reviews Follow-up Review of Vital Safety Systems at the RFETS, August 1997 Follow-up Review of ES&H BNL Tritium Plume Recovery Activities, 1997 Follow-up Review of Accident Investigations at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, January 1998 Limited Review of DOE Unclassified Computer Systems, March 1998 Follow-up Review of the 1995 SME at the INEEL, June 1998 Follow-up Review of Fissile Material Assurance in the DOE Complex, July 1998 Safeguards & Security Profiles LLNL, May 1997 Savannah River, May 1997 Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, June 1997 Los Álamos National Lab, June 1997 Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico, June 1997 Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, July 1997 TSD, July 1997 Y-12 Plant, July 1997 ANL-West, July 1997 Pantex Plant, August 1997 Hanford Site, August 1997 INEEL, September 1997 DOE Nevada Facilities, October 1997 Kansas City Plant, December 1997 Question 4. Please provide the Committee with a detailed record of Price-Anderson Act violations, penalties and enforcement actions conducted at all DOE facilities (by facility) for the past 5 years. Answer. I have attached a site-by-site record of the 31 Price-Anderson Act enforcement actions taken since the enforcement program began in January 1996. Severity Levels refer to a range from Level I to Level III, with Level I violations posing the most serious safety hazards. I have also attached copies of all Notices of Violations issued.* ATTACHMENT FOR QUESTION 4 Price-Anderson enforcement actions. Severity Levels refer to a range from Level I to III, with Level I violations posing the most serious safety hazards. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (New Mexico) April 3, 1996; Notice of Violation-Severity Level III; Civil Penalty: None (waived by statute) *The Notices of Violations have been retained in committee files. Hanford (Washington) Westinghouse Hanford Company July 16, 1996; Notice of Violation-Severity Level II; Civil Penalty: $37,500 September 19, 1997; Notice of Violation-Severity Level III; Civil Penalty: None March 26, 1998; Notice of Violation-Severity Level II; Civil Penalty: $140,625 August 14, 1996; Notice of Violation-Severity Level II; Civil Penalty: $5,000 Kaiser Hill Company, Ltd. October 7, 1996; Notice of Violation-Severity Level II; Civil Penalty: $37,500 October 7, 1996; Notice of Violation-Severity Level II; Civil Penalty: $37,500 June 6, 1997; Notice of Violation-Severity Level III; Civil Penalty: None June 6, 1997; Notice of Violation-Severity Level III; Civil Penalty: None April 14, 1998; Resolution through Consent Decree; Payment: $100,000 Brookhaven National Laboratory (New York) PETSCO December 18, 1996; Notice of Violation-Severity Level II; Civil Penalty: $37,500 Brookhaven National Laboratory December 18, 1997; Notice of Violation-Severity Level II; Civil Penalty: $142,500 waived by statute Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (California) March 9, 1998; Notice of Violation-Severity Level I; Civil Penalty: $159,375 waived by statute July 28, 1998; Notice of Violation-Severity Level II; Civil Penalty: $153,750 waived by statute Los Alamos National Laboratory (New Mexico) December 18, 1996; Notice of Violation-Severity Level III; Civil Penalty: waived by statute September 21, 1998; Notice of Violation-Severity Level II; Civil Penalty: $112,500 waived by statute Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (Idaho) Lockheed Martin Idaho February 27, 1997; Notice of Violation-Severity Level II; Civil Penalty: $25,000 Lockheed Martin Idaho September 19, 1997; Notice of Violation—Severity Level III; Civil Penalty: None June 4, 1998; Notice of Violation-Severity Level II; Civil Penalty: $125,000 June 4, 1998; Notice of Violation-Severity Level II; Civil Penalty: $25,000 September 21, 1998; Notice of Violation—Severity Level II; Civil Penalty: $55,000 EG&G October 21, 1997; Notice of Violation-Severity Level I; Civil Penalty: $112,500 Mason & Hanger June 5, 1997; Notice of Violation-Severity Level III; Civil Penalty: None Fernald (Ohio) Fluor Daniel Fernald July 29, 1997; Notice of Violation-Severity Level III; Civil Penalty: $10,000 Savannah River (South Carolina) Westinghouse Savannah River Company November 24, 1997; Notice of Violation-Severity Level III; Civil Penalty: None |