the termination date for the carload lot program to June 30, 1961, and to accept carload lot shipments of carload ore during that time or up until that time" (p. 313). "There is no question in my mind at all but that under the present rules of the game, which includes this 10,000-ton limitation, that we would be in a position to accept whatever is put to us through June 30, 1961” (p. 327). In the development of ore reserves and in the recovery of investments, manganese ore producers are concerned with the possible exhaustion of the 28 million units and the termination of the program in 1959. It is my understanding that you are now considering long-range programs for the mining industry. To insure continued developments in the manganese industry under the existing purchase program until a longer range program for manganese can be approved and put into effect and in line with the announcement of June 13, last, of the Honorable Gordon Gray, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, on revisions in policy for stockpiling strategic and critical materials to become effective June 30, I hereby ask that you, at this time, authorize and direct the allocation of additional units and extension of time for the continuation of the domestic high-grade manganese purchase program of the General Services Administration to June 30, 1961. With kindest regards, I am Sincerely yours, WILBUR D. MILLS. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, Washington, D. C., July 14, 1958. Hon. WILBUR D. MILLS, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. DEAR MR. MILLS: We in the Department of the Interior have given much thought to what the Government ought to do concerning manganese when the car-lot program ends. Your letter of June 16 asks that purchases be continued until a long-range program is approved and put into effect. The Bureau of Mines of this Department is now conducting an extensive research program designed to make it possible for industry to utilize the large lowgrade domestic manganese deposits. The car-lot program has provided additional data on costs, methods of beneficiation, and locations and extent of ore deposits. We do not believe, however, that continuation of the car-lot program beyond the limits set by the Office of Defense Mobilization for national security purposes would contribute materially to the long-range objective of reducing production costs of low-grade manganese to make its production economically feasible. Research, together with private operations which will continue after the termination of the car-lot program, will in our judgment provide for the wisest utilization of our domestic resources for peacetime purposes. The question of whether the purchase program should be continued to June 30, 1961, under the Defense Production Act authority, should be addressed to the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization. The termination date and the quantities to be acquired were originally established by the Director of ODM on the basis of defense needs. The statements which you quoted concerning the duration of the program and its justification were made by him in carrying out his responsibilities under the act. Executive Office of the President, Washington, D. C. DEAR MR. GRAY: In July 1956, by directive from the Office of Defense Mobilization, the regulations for the domestic "carload-lot" or high-grade manganese purchase program of the General Services Administration were amended to provide that the program be extended to January 1, 1961, or until 28 million long dry ton units of ore are delivered, whichever shall occur first. I am informed that, on the basis of the present rate of deliveries, this current maximum quantity will be attained in the latter part of 1959. On May 24, 1956, in hearings before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, Director of Office of Defense Mobilization, with reference to the extension of the manganese purchase program, testified as follows: "As soon as the information referred to above has been received from the General Services Administration it will be authorized to take action to extend the termination date for the carload lot program to June 30, 1961, and to accept carload lot shipments of carload ore during that time or up until that time" (p. 313). "There is no question in my mind at all but that under the present rules of the game, which includes this 10,000-ton limitation, that we would be in a position to accept whatever is put to us through June 30, 1961" (p. 327). In the development of ore reserves and in the recovery of investments, manganese ore producers are concerned with the possible exhaustion of the 28 million units and the termination of the program in 1959. It is understood that long-range programs for the mining industry are being considered by the Secretary of the Interior. To insure continued developments in the manganese industry under the existing purchase program until a longer range program for manganese can be approved and put into effect and in line with your announcement of June 13, 1958, on revisions in policy for stockpiling strategic and critical materials to become effective June 30, I hereby ask that you, at this time, authorize and direct the allocation of additional units and extension of time for the continuation of the domestic high-grade manganese purchase program of the General Services Administration to June 30, 1961. With kindest personal regards, I am WILBUR D. MILLS. Hon. WILBUR D. MILLS, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. DEAR MR. MILLS: This is in reply to your letter of June 16 addressed to Mr. Gray in which you urge that the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization enlarge and extend the termination date of the high-grade domestic manganese program. The domestic high-grade, or "carlot" manganese purchase program, was amended in 1956 to provide for an increase in the goal from 19 million to 28 million long tons and an extension of time to January 1, 1961, whichever should occur first. In 1956, mobilization planning was based on a 5-year emergency policy. Current policy provides only for a 3-year emergency. Acquisitions of manganese which have already been made under the 5-year program provide for all mobilization requirements for metallurgical manganese. Therefore I regret to inform you that there would be no defense justification for enlarging or extending the Defense Production Act carlot domestic purchase program as you have requested. Sincerely yours, RUSSELL H. HUGHES, Assistant Director. Mr. ROGERS. Let me ask you this question for the purposes of the record and future use. What percentage of the United States needs is produced in this country at the present time? Mr. ADKERSON. We are producing about 15 percent of the consumptive needs of the United States. Last year, during 1957 the consumption was about 2.25 million short tons of ore. Domestic production was 365,000 short tons. Mr. ROGERS. What would it take to increase that production in this country? Mr. ADKERSON. We can continue to increase that production at the rate of about 100,000 to 200,000 tons a year up to all the needs of the United States if necessary at a price carefully figured out which would not cost the steel industry more additional for manganese than $1 per ton of steel on account of the manganese used from domestic sources. Mr. ROGERS. That is because of the lower grade ore in this country? Mr. ADKERSON. It is because of the difference in wage scales largely. We do have lower grade deposits here on which we are working, lower grade than foreign, but primarily the difference is in the cost of labor between the United States and foreign countries. Mr. ROGERS. What would be the difference in cost per ton of manganese? Mr. ADKERSON. It would be approximately $1 a unit of manganese. In the program under which we are now working, we are getting $2.30 a unit. The price of foreign ores is a differential of about a dollar a unit, something close to that. The present schedule is $2.30 a unit, based on 48-percent manganese. Mr. ROGERS. For the record, would you rapidly sum up the uses that we need manganese for? Mr. ADKERSON. Manganese is used primarily in the manufacture of steel. There is no substitute for manganese in the manufacture of steel. Without manganese our steel mills would close. We use only 14 pounds of metallic manganese per ton of steel produced, but without that 14 pounds, we could have no steel. It has been generally recognized that manganese is the No. 1 strategic mineral and it has been since its recognition in World War I. Mr. ROGERS. State what it does to steel. Mr. ADKERSON. It does three things: It cleanses steel in the way of deoxidizing and acts as a desulfurizer. It also acts as an alloy and adds to the strength and hardness of steel. Mr. ROGERS. Your testimony is that we do have sufficient reserves in this country and could furnish all of our needs in manganese? Mr. ADKERSON. That is correct, largely from the low-grade ores, sir. We also have the processes developed in more recent years to recover the necessary tonnage and grade of manganese from the lowgrade ores. The only thing now required is the installation of machinery and equipment to do the development work, which takes time. Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Adkerson. Mr. ADKERSON. Thank you, sir. Mrs. PFOST. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement from Mr. Robert P. Porter, president of Porter Bros. Corp., Boise, Idaho, in which he gives some detailed testimony with regard to the columbium tantalum ores and calls attention to the fact that Porter Bros. has an investment in plant and facilities in excess of $4 million, and the line operations alone employ approximately 140 men with an excess of 405 dependents. I would like to ask unanimous consent to have the statement placed in the record. Mr. ROGERS. Without objection, it is so ordered. (The statement referred to follows:) STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. PORTER, PRESIDENT, PORTER BROS. CORP., BOISE, IDAHO Mr. Chairman, my name is Robert P. Porter and I am president of Porter Bros. Corp. of Boise, Idaho, a substantial producer of columbium-tantalum bearing ores, and by products, on the North American Continent, and also represent a number of small independent prospective producers. First, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee and present my views in regard to H. R. 13280, introduced by the chairman, and H. R. 13270 by Congressman Miller, to provide for payments as incentives for a number of metals and minerals including columbiumtantalum. I am sure others will testify as to the other metals and minerals, so I will devote my testimony to columbium-tantalum. I know, Mr. Chairman, of your fine work for the mining industry and this committee's diligent effort to keep a solvent, readily available supply of necessary raw materials. The introduction of H. R. 13280 is just further evidence of the chairman's keen interest in the mining industry. Later, I should like to point out what seems to me to be an easily correctable section of the bill. Briefly, however, I would like to point out why we need an adequate domestic supply of raw materials and then present my suggestions as to how this can be achieved. As most of you remember, in 1952 President Truman's materials policy commission made an intensive study into our basic raw materials. An excellent job was done, and I should like to quote just one section from that report dealing with columbium-tantalum. The supply of columbium is scarcer than that of any of the other of the additive metals. Some 95 percent of the world's production is from Nigeria, much of it a byproduct of tin mining. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that sufficient columbiumtantalum will be forthcoming to satisfy the potential demand for high temperature, columbium alloys to be used in jet engines, gas turbines, rockets, and similar devices. Since this report, other uses have been developed such as electronic devices, capacitors, rectifiers, high-voltage surge arrestors, vacuum tubes, chemical, petroleum, and synthetic rubber, processing equipment, surgical and dental uses, laboratory ware, aircraft engine exhaust systems, aircraft landing gears, computers, rockets, and guided missiles. The metals themselves and their high temperature alloys have many nuclear applications for shielding and other purposes. To indicate the present-day importance of these materials, a report submitted to the Honorable Gordon Gray, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, by a special stockpile advisory committee (known as the Pettibone Committee) dated January 28, 1958, recommend as follows, and I quote: "HIGH-TEMPERATURE AND OTHER SPECIAL PROPERTY MATERIALS "It is not possible to know with certainty at this time which of the hightemperature or other special-property materials will be in greatest demand for specific applications, as new techniques develop from research and practice. Known world supplies of many of these materials are limited. "The committee recommends that a mechanism be established to appraise the possible effects of research and development activities on requirements for hightemperature and other special-property materials. Instead of relying on past use patterns, possible needs 5 to 10 years hence must be surveyed and stockpiles built up as need is indicated. "The committee also agrees with the current concept of providing a higher degree of security in the case of metals and minerals by discounting completely all sources of supply outside the general North American area." As recently as 1952, the Bureau of Mines reported to this committee that the United States produced less than 1 percent of its requirements of columbiumtantalum. The following tabulation sets forth domestic production of columbium-tantalum oxides for the past few years, and illustrates the effectiveness of a sound Government program in developing domestic production. It will be noted that domestic production has greatly increased. Not only could the present production be maintained, but it could be further expanded as there are many known deposits which cannot be put into production because of the uncertainty of the domestic market. Our examination of various properties and examinations by many other mining operators indicate that there is a large potential domestic production if sufficient incentives are provided to assure operators or prospective operators of an adequate market for their products. Many of the domestic deposits are composed of not only columbium-tantalum ores but also euxenite, samarskite, and fergusonite, which are crystalline deposits of complex ores containing uranium, columbium, tantalum, thorium, titanium, yttrium, gadolinium, and other heavy rare earth minerals. Thus, domestic mining operations would be producing not only columbium and tantalum minerals, but also many others associated with the nuclear age, many of which are presently being imported from foreign sources. In columbium-tantalum, the United States has come from a "have not" nation to a "have" nation. We are a "have" nation because our Government was in a crisis to find these needed materials at home because of the extreme danger of trying to supply America's needs from sources as far away as Africa. We all know that during World War II 85 percent of our ships from Africa supplying strategic material to the United States were sunk and that we had to fly in the columbite-tantalite ores. I know that I don't need to labor the point with the members of this committee. You are all keenly aware of the need for developing adequate reserves of these critical materials domestically, where they won't be subject to the uncertainties of submarine-infested sealanes in time of war. It was because of these uncertainties and the vital need for columbium-tantalum in our defense effort that members of this committee and heads of departments and agencies of our Government encouraged the prospector and the miner to go out and get these minerals. The best evidence of success is the fact that in 1952 only 5,385 pounds of columbium-tantalum concentrates were shipped from domestic mines. In 1957 over 360,000 pounds were shipped. Given the proper incentives, even this figure can be improved in the years to come, because of the now-known deposits available for production. The need for these incentives was recognized last year by Secretary Seaton, when he appeared before the Senate Interior Committee. He recognized the need for incentives, but he was unrealistic as to what actually constitutes an incentive. He said: "Limited known world reserves, the strategic nature of these minerals, and the heavy dependence of the United States on distant overseas sources for supplies underscore the desirability of making every effort to develop and maintain some production of these commodities from domestic sources." He then recommended for columbium-tantalum $2.35 per pound (combined contained pentoxides) for domestically produced concentrates with a 10,000pound annual limitation on the quantity from any one producer from any one mining district. He said this program was contemplated to stimulate the production of 16,000 pounds, an increase to 25,000. Somewhat similar provisions are contained in H. R. 13280 and H. R. 13270. This is inadequate. I hope I can show you that the quantities of materials in the proposed bills are wholly insufficient to provide an incentive, not only to continue present production but to induce the mining industry to put forth time, money, and effort in search for, prospecting, and developing other sources of these materials. The $2.35 per pound is a fair figure if the schedule for materials furnished over and above the 50 percent follows the additional premium for higher grade as originally set forth in the Critical Materials Stockpiling Act. As stated before, most of the columbium-tantalum derived in this country comes from crystalline deposits of complex ores and they must be chemically purified, and while in the process of segregation and upgrading one should not be restricted |