STOCKHOLDERS.
See CORPORATIONS;
JURISDICTION, B 2.
Obstructions; stepping-stones as-Duty of municipality as to illumination.
An object which subserves the use of streets need not necessarily be con-
sidered an obstruction although it may occupy some part of the space
of the street. The duty of a city to specially illuminate and guard
the place where an object is depends upon whether such object is an
unlawful obstruction. Under §§ 222 and 233, Rev. Stat., District
of Columbia, the District is not prohibited from permitting a stepping-
stone on any part of the street because it is an obstruction per se nor
is the District required to specially illuminate and guard the place
where such stepping-stone is located. Wolff v. District of Columbia,
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 2.
STREET RAILWAYS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES.
See PARTIES.
SURVEYS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 6.
1. Effect of failure, by taxpayer, to present defense.
If the taxpayer be given an opportunity to test the validity of a tax at any
time before it is made final, either before a board having quasi judicial
character, or a tribunal provided by the State for that purpose, due
process is not denied, and if he does not avail himself of the opportunity
to present his defense to such board or tribunal, it is not for this court
to determine whether such defense is valid. Hodge v. Muscatine
County, 276.
2. State's right to tax cigarettes.
A State may reserve to itself the right to tax or prohibit the sale of cigarettes,
and while this court is not bound by the construction given to a statute
by the highest court of the State as to whether a tax is or is not a license
to sell it will accept it unless clearly of the opinion that it is wrong. Ib.
3. Validity of section 5007, Iowa Code.
Section 5007, Iowa Code, imposing a tax against every person and upon the
real property and the owner thereof whereon cigarettes are sold does
not give a license to sell cigarettes, nor is it invalid as depriving the
owner of the property of his property without due process of law,
because it does not provide for giving him notice of the tax, §§ 2441,
2442, Iowa Code, providing for review with power to remit by the
board of supervisors. Ib.
4. Question of validity of state statute not a Federal one.
Whether or not a state statute violates the state constitution in not stating
distinctly the tax and the object to which it is to be applied is a local
and not a Federal question. Ib.
5. Lien on realty for tax on business conducted thereon.
A tax to carry on a business may be made a lien on the property whereon
the business is carried and the owner is presumed to know the business
there carried on and to have let the property with knowledge that it
might be encumbered by a tax on such business. Ib.
6. Government bonds subject to seizure for taxes due.
There is nothing in the exemption of Government bonds from taxation
which prevents them from being seized for taxes due upon unexempt
property. Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 611.
7. Enjoining suit for collection of taxes.
Where there is no personal liability for taxes the defense can be set up
in an action at law and there is no necessity to resort to equity to
enjoin prosecution of suits therefor. It will be presumed that if the
claim of the party taxed is right no personal judgment will be entered.
Ib.
8. Ohio tax law construed-Municipal bonds owned and deposited by foreign
insurance company as prerequisite to conducting business in State, sub-
ject to taxation.
While technically municipal bonds deposited with the insurance commis-
sioner under the laws of Ohio regulating the right of foreign companies
to do business within the State are investments in bonds, they are also
a part of the capital stock of the company invested in Ohio and re-
quired to be so invested for the security of domestic policy holders,
and for the purposes of taxation to be considered as part of the capital
stock of the company and included within the statutory definition of
personal property required to be returned by foreign and domestic
corporations for taxation. Ib.
9. Ohio tax law construed-Constitutionality of law.
While no tax can be levied without express authority of law statutes are
to receive a reasonable construction with a view to carrying out their
purpose and intent, and the collection by distraint of goods to satisfy
taxes lawfully levied is one of the most ancient methods known to
the law and in this case the law of Ohio authorizing it does not violate
the constitutional right of a foreign insurance company and deprive
it of its property without due process of law. Ib.
10. Ohio tax law construed-Effect of substitution of Government bonds for
others withdrawn from deposit.
The laws of the State of Ohio as construed by the Supreme Court of that
State have conferred the right to tax bonds deposited by a foreign
insurance company with the insurance commissioner under the laws
regulating the right to do business in the State. Where municipal
bonds so deposited are withdrawn before the return day and Govern-
ment bonds substituted therefor as provided by law the company is
not liable for taxation on the bonds so withdrawn. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 6, 7;
VESSELS.
See MARITIME LAW.
1. Construction of-Legacies not subject to taxation under, prior to actual
enjoyment and possession.
Where a legacy under the will of one dying in September, 1899, was to be
held in trust by the executors, the legatee only to receive the income
until he reached a specified age, which would be subsequent to 1902,
when he was to receive the principal, §§ 29 and 30 of the war revenue
act of June 13, 1898, 30 Stat. 464, did not authorize the assessment or
collection, prior to the time when, if ever, such rights or interests
should become absolutely vested in possession and enjoyment, of any
tax with respect to any of the rights or interests of the legatee with
the exception of his present right to receive the income until the age
specified. Vanderbilt v. Eidman, 480.
2. Effect of amending and repealing acts of 1901 and 1902.
The amendatory act of March 2, 1901, 31 Stat. 946, as to the questions
involved in this suit reënacted §§ 29 and 30 of the act of 1898 and did
not enlarge them so as to embrace subjects of taxation not originally
included therein, and did not justify the new construction thereafter
placed upon the act by the Government, that death duties should
become due within one year as to legacies and distributive shares not
capable of being immediately possessed and enjoyed and therefore not
subject to taxation under the original act. The refunding act of
June 27, 1902, 32 Stat. 406, passed after §§ 29 and 30 of the act of
1898 had been repealed by the act of April 12, 1902, 32 Stat. 96, was
in a sense declaratory of the construction now given by this court to
those sections of the act of 1898 and was a legislative affirmance of
such construction of the act as it had been adopted by the Govern-
ment prior to the amendatory act of March 2, 1901, and a repudiation
of the opposite construction adopted thereafter. Ib.
1. Rights of Federal Government under agreement of September 16, 1833,
between New York and New Jersey.
The agreement of September 16, 1833, between New York and New Jersey,
confirmed by act of Congress of June 28, 1834, 4 Stat. 708, did not
vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Government over the sea
adjoining those States, neither of which abdicated any rights to the
United States. Hamburg American Steamship Co. v. Grube, 407.
2. Effect on jurisdiction over littoral waters of New Jersey of act of 1846.
The act of the legislature of New Jersey of March 12, 1846, under which
the jurisdiction of the United States over Sandy Hook is derived is
merely one of cession and does not purport to transfer jurisdiction over
the littoral waters beyond low water mark. Ib.
1. Intention of testator-Effect of devise of land without words of limitation
or description.
The policy of the law in favor of the heir yields to the intention of the
testator if clearly expressed or manifested. The rule of law that a
devise of lands without words of limitation or description gives a life
estate only, does not apply, and devises will be held to be of the fee,
where it is plain that the testator's intention was to dispose of his
whole estate equally between his heirs, and there is no residuary clause
indicating that he intended passing less than all of his estate, and all
of his heirs at law are devisees under the will. McCaffrey v. Manogue,
563.
2. Attesting witness; vice consul certifying as to acknowledgment held to be.
The signature of a resident of the District of Columbia to a will executed
abroad was witnessed on the day of execution by two witnesses; on the
day following an American vice consul signed, as such and under seal,
a certificate that the testator had appeared before him and acknowl-
edged the will and his signature thereto. It did not state that the
testator signed in his presence. The law in the District of Columbia
required three witnesses in testator's presence, but did not require the
testator to sign in presence of witnesses. The will was attacked also
on grounds of testator's insanity and undue influence on the testator
who had, previous to the will, been for a short time in an insane asylum.
In an action affecting title to real estate there were issues sent to a
jury and the title under the will sustained. Held, that under the cir-
cumstances in this case the jury might properly draw the inference
that the vice consul executed the certificates in the ordinary course
of business and in presence of the testator. Although a notary taking
an acknowledgment as required by law is not, in the absence of separate
signature as such, to be regarded as a witness, inasmuch as the certifi-
cate in this case was not required by law and was unnecessary, it was,
together with the description appended to the vice consul's name,
immaterial and could be disregarded as surplusage and the vice consul's
signature regarded as that of a witness in his unofficial capacity.
Keely v. Moore, 38.
3. Testamentary capacity-Evidence of insanity-Insanity and mental
capacity.
The application of a relative, and the certificates of physicians, for the ad-
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