date of the grant, the survey of the land and the identification of the
sections-whether odd or even-is reserved to the Government, and
the equitable title of the railroad company and its assigns becomes a
legal title only upon the identification of the granted sections. Until
the identification of the sections by a government survey the United
States retains a special interest in the timber growing in the township
sufficient to recover the value of timber cut and removed therefrom.
In a suit brought by the United States for that purpose private surveys
made by the railroad company cannot be introduced as evidence to
show that the land from which the timber was cut were odd sections
within the grant and included in a conveyance from the railroad com-
pany to the defendants. United States v. Montana Lumber Mfg. Co.,

573.

7. Railroad grants-Purchase from railroad-Construction of act of March 3,
1887.

In a remedial statute such as § 5, act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 557, enabling
bona fide purchasers from railroad companies to perfect their titles by
purchase from the Government in case the land purchased was not
included in the grant the term "citizens," in the absence of anything
to indicate the contrary, includes state corporations. Whether a
bona fide purchaser from a railroad company acts with reasonable
promptness in availing of the provisions of the act of March 3, 1887,
is a question primarily for the Land Department and one attempting
to enter the land is charged with knowledge of the act, the railroad's
title and, if the deeds have been properly recorded, of the claims of the
railroad's grantee and subsequent assigns; and, under the circum-
stances of this case, this court will not set aside the decision of the
Land Department allowing a bona fide purchaser to avail of the privilege
of the act within ten months after the lands had been stricken from
the company's list as the result of a decision affecting that and other
lands rendered ten years after the purchase from the railroad company,
and during which period all parties had considered the full equitable
title to be in the railroad company and its grantees. Ramsey v. Ta-
coma Land Co., 360.

8. Rights acquired by wrongful settlement.
One who wrongfully settled on public land and was dispossessed by proper
authority so that the land might be used for a military post acquired
by such settlement no priority of right in the matter of purchase or
homestead entry when the post was abandoned and the land opened
to private purchase. Scott v. Carew, 100.

See MINING CLAIMS;
STATUTES, A 4.

PUBLIC OFFICERS.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 1.

1. Case removed when-Restraint of further proceedings in state court-Power
of state court where record does not show case removable.

In regard to the removal of cases the following principles have been settled:
If the case be a removable one, that is, if the suit, in its nature, be one
of which the Circuit Court could rightfully take jurisdiction, then upon
the filing of a petition for removal, in due time, with a sufficient bond,
the case is, in law, removed, and the state court in which it is pending
will lose jurisdiction to proceed further, and all subsequent proceed-
ings in that court will be void. After the presentation of a sufficient
petition and bond to the state court in a removable case, it is compe-
tent for the Circuit Court, by a proceeding ancillary in its nature-
without violating § 720, Rev. Stat., forbidding a court of the United
States from enjoining proceedings in a state court to restrain the
party against whom a cause has been legally removed from taking
further steps in the state court. If upon the face of the record, in-
cluding the petition for removal, a suit does not appear to be a re-
movable one, then the state court is not bound to surrender its juris-
diction, and may proceed as if no application for removal had been
made. Under the judiciary act of 1887, 1888, a suit cannot be re-
moved from a state court unless it could originally have been brought
in the Circuit Court of the United States. Traction Company v. Min-
ing Company, 239.

2. Power of Circuit Court to pass on all questions arising.

When a case has been removed into the Circuit Court of the United States
on the ground of diversity of citizenship, that court is entitled to pass
on all questions arising, including the question of jurisdiction over the
subject matter in the state courts or the sufficiency of mesne process
to authorize the recovery of personal judgment. Courtney v. Pradt, 89.

3. Right of removal for diversity of citizenship; not abrogable by state statute.
The right to remove for diversity of citizenship, as given by a constitu-
tional act of Congress, cannot be taken away or abridged by state
statutes and the case being removed the Circuit Court has power to

so deal with the controversy that the party will lose nothing by his
choice of tribunals. Ib.

See JURISDICTION, B 3.

REPEAL.

See STATUTES, A 2.

RESIDENCE.

See PUBLIC LANDS, 5.

RES JUDICATA.

No foundation for plea where no formal judgment entered.

Where no formal judgment has been entered the plea of res judicata has
no foundation; neither the verdict of a jury nor the findings of a court
even though in a prior action, upon the precise point involved in a sub-
sequent action and between the same parties constitutes a bar. Okla-
homa City v. McMaster, 529.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

See COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8;

STATES, 2.

RULES OF COURT.

See JURISDICTION, B 2.

SEA DUTY.

See NAVAL OFFICERS.

SENATORS OF THE UNITED STATES.
See CRIMINAL LAW;

JURISDICTION, A 6.

SERVICE OF PROCESS.

See PROCESS.

SET-OFF.

See BANKRUPTCY, 4.

SHERMAN ACT.

See COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

SHIPPING.

See CONTRACTS, 2;

MARITIME Law.

STANDARD OF CONDUCT.

See MARITIME LAW.

STATES.

1. Police power under Constitution.

The police power of the State does not give it the right to violate any
provision of the Federal Constitution. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v.
Murphey, 194.

2. Police power; extent of, where freedom of contract involved.
While there is a certain freedom of contract which the State cannot destroy
by legislative enactment, in pursuance whereof parties may seek to
further their business interests, the police power of the State extends
to, and may prohibit a secret arrangement by which, under penalties,
and without any merging of interests through partnership or incor-
poration an apparently existing competition among all the dealers in
a community in one of the necessaries of life is substantially destroyed.
Smiley v. Kansas, 447.

3. Power to withdraw suit from cognizance of Federal court.

A State cannot by any statutory provisions withdraw a suit in which there
is a controversy between citizens of different States from the cognizance
of the Federal courts. Traction Company v. Mining Company, 239.

4. Right to tax or prohibit sale of cigarettes.

A State may reserve to itself the right to tax or prohibit the sale of cigarettes,
and while this court is not bound by the construction given to a statute
by the highest court of the State as to whether a tax is or is not a license
to sell it will accept it unless clearly of the opinion that it is wrong.
Hodge v. Muscatine County, 276.
See CASES EXPLAINED, 2;

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 7;
CORPORATIONS, 2;

EMINENT DOMAIN, 2;

INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 1, 4, 5;
JURISDICTION, A 3;

LOCAL LAW;

REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 3;

WATERS, 1.

STATUTES.

A. CONSTRUCTION OF.

1. Application of state court's construction of state statutes-California license
ordinance held a revenue measure.

Whether a statute of a State is or is not a revenue measure and how rights
thereunder are affected by a repealing statute depends upon the con-
struction of the statutes, and where no Federal question exists this
court will lean to an agreement with the state court. Under the
California cases the county ordinance imposing licenses involved in
this case was a revenue and not a police measure. Flanigan v. Sierra
County, 553.

2. Repeal extinguishing power derived from statute-Doctrine applied to
other than penal statutes.

While the doctrine that powers derived wholly from a statute are extin-

guished by its repeal and no proceedings can be pursued under the
repealed statute, although begun before the repeal, unless authorized
under a special clause in the repealing act has been oftenest illustrated
in regard to penal statutes, it has been applied by the California courts
to the repeal of the power of counties to enact revenue ordinances and
will therefore in such a case be applied by this court. Ib.

3. Legislative intent, the main purpose of construction.

While the court may not add to or take from the terms of a statute, the
main purpose of construction is to give effect to the legislative intent
as expressed in the act under consideration. United States v. Crosley,
327.

4. Act of June 3, 1878, relative to use of timber on public lands.

In the act of June 3, 1878, 20 Stat. 88, c. 150, permitting the use of timber on
the public lands for "building, agricultural, mining and other domestic
purposes," the word "domestic" is not to be construed as relating
solely to household purposes omitting "other" altogether but it ap-
plies to the locality to which the statute is directed and gives per-
mission to industries there practiced to use the public timber. To
enlarge or abridge a permission given by Congress to certain specified
industries to use the public timber would not be regulation but legis-
lation and under the provisions of the statute of June 3, 1878, 20 Stat.
88, the power given by the Secretary of the Interior to make regula-
tions cannot deprive a domestic industry from using the timber.
United States v. United Verde Copper Co., 207.

5. Meaning of words-Association of words.

An apt and sensible meaning must be given to words as they are used in a
statute and the association of words must be regarded as designed and
not as accidental, nor will a word be considered an intruder if the
statute can be construed reasonably without eliminating that word. Ib.

6. Of statutes in derogation of common law and penal statutes; strictness of
construction.

Statutes in derogation of the common law and penal statutes are not to
be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of Congress
as found in the language actually used according to its true and ob-
vious meaning. Johnson v. Southern

See AUTOMATIC COUPLERS;

BANKRUPTCY;

COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT

OF TRADE;

FEDERAL QUESTION, 1;

WATERS, 2.

Pacific Co., 1.

NAVY PERSONNEL ACT;
PRACTICE, 1, 2;

PUBLIC LANDS;

TAXATION, 9;

WAR REVENUE ACT;

B. OF THE UNITED STATES.

See ACTS OF CONGRESS.

C. OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES.

See LOCAL LAW.