the respective States into the Union, only such variations occurring during that entire period as naturally followed in the course of time from one side of the river to the other. But on the day just named, July 5, 1867 (which was after the admission of Nebraska into the Union), within twenty-four hours and during a time of very high water, the river, which had for years passed around what is called McKissick's Island, cut a new channel across and through the narrow neck of land at the west end of Island Precinct (of which McKissick's Island formed a part), about a half mile wide, making for itself a new channel and passing through what was admittedly, at that time, territory of Nebraska. After that change the river ceased to run around McKissick's Island. In the course of a few years, after the new channel was thus made, the old channel dried up and became tillable land, valuable for agricultural purposes, whereby the old bed of the river was vacated about fifteen miles in length. This change in the bed or channel of the river became fixed and permanent; for, at the commencement of this suit it was the same as it was immediately after the change that occurred on the fifth day of July, 1867. The result was that the land between the channel of the river as it was prior to July 5, 1867, and the channel as it was after that date and is now, was thrown on the east side of the Missouri River; whereas, prior to that date it had been on the west side.

The fundamental question in the case is, whether the sudden and permanent change in the course and channel of the river occurring on the fifth day of July, 1867, worked a change in the boundary line between the two States.

The former decisions of this court relating to boundary lines between States seem to make this case easy of solution.

In New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 717, argued elaborately by eminent lawyers, Mr. Webster among the number, this court said: "The question is well settled at common law, that the person whose land is bounded by a stream of water, which changes its course gradually by alluvial forma

tions, shall still hold by the same boundary, including the accumulated soil. No other rule can be applied on just principles. Every proprietor whose land is thus bounded is subject to loss, by the same means which may add to his territory; and as he is without remedy for his loss, in this way, he cannot be held accountable for his gain." It was added-what is pertinent to the present case—that "this rule is no less just when applied to public, than to private rights." The subject was under consideration in Missouri v. Kentucky, 11 Wall. 395, and Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479. But it again came under consideration in Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359, 361, 367, 370. In the latter case, the court, after referring to the rule announced in New Orleans v. United States, and citing prior cases in which that rule had been recognized, said: "It is equally well settled, that where a stream, which is a boundary, from any cause suddenly abandons its old and seeks a new bed, such change of channel works no change of boundary; and that the boundary remains as it was, in the center of the old channel, although no water may be flowing therein. This sudden and rapid change of channel is termed, in the law, avulsion. In Gould on Waters, sec. 159, it is said: 'But if the change is violent and visible, and arises from a known cause, such as a freshet, or a cut through which a new channel is formed, the original thread of the stream continues to mark the limits of the two estates.' 2 Bl. Com. 262; Angell on Water Courses, § 60; Trustees of Hopkins' Academy v. Dickinson, 9 Cush. 544; Buttenuth v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 123 Illinois, 535; Hagan v. Campbell, 8 Porter (Ala.), 9; Murry v. Sermon, 1 Hawks (N. C.), 56.

"These propositions, which are universally recognized as correct where the boundaries of private property touch on streams, are in like manner recognized where the boundaries between States or nations are, by prescription or treaty, found in running water. Accretion, no matter to which side it adds ground, leaves the boundary still the center of the channel. Avulsion has no effect on boundary, but leaves it in the center

of the old channel." Again, in the same case, the court, referring to the very full examination of the authorities to be found in one of the opinions of Attorney General Cushing (8 Op. Atty. Gen'l, 175), said: "The result of these authorities puts it beyond doubt that accretion on an ordinary river would leave the boundary between two States the varying center of the channel, and that avulsion would establish a fixed boundary, to wit, the center of the abandoned channel. It is contended, however, that the doctrine of accretion has no application to the Missouri River, on account of the rapid and great changes constantly going on in respect to its banks; but the contrary has already been decided by this court in Jeffries v. Land Company, 134 U. S. 178, 189." In Nebraska v. Iowa, it appeared that the Missouri River near the land there in dispute had pursued a course in the nature of an ox-bow, but it suddenly cut through the neck of the bow and made for itself a new channel. The court said: "This does not come within the law of accretion, but that of avulsion. By this selection of a new channel the boundary was not changed, and it remained as it was prior to the avulsion, the center line of the old channel; and that, unless the waters of the river returned to their former bed, became a fixed and unvarying boundary, no matter what might be the changes of the river in its new channel."

Manifestly, these observations cover the present case and make it clear that the boundary line between Missouri and Nebraska in the vicinity of Island Precinct cannot be taken to be the middle of the channel of the Missouri River, as it has been since the avulsion of 1867 and now is, but must be taken to be the middle of the channel of the river as it was prior to such avulsion. We cannot see that there are any facts or circumstances that withdraw the present case from the rule established in former adjudications.

Counsel for Missouri contend that the act admitting Missouri into the Union, the memorial sent by the Legislature of that State to Congress in 1831, and the act of June 7, 1836, with the

proclamation of the President as to the extinguishment of Indian titles to lands between Missouri, as originally bounded, and the Missouri River, show that Congress intended that, so far as the boundary of the State of Missouri was concerned, the middle of the channel of the Missouri River, wherever it may be at any particular time-and regardless of any changes, however caused or however extended, or permanent, suddenly occurring in its course or channel-was to be taken as a perpetual, natural monument fixing the boundary line. We cannot accept this view. We perceive no reason to believe that Congress intended, either by the acts of 1820 and 1836 relating to Missouri or the act admitting Nebraska into the Union, to alter the recognized rules of law which fix the rights of parties where a river changes its course by gradual, insensible accretions, or the rules that obtain in cases where, by what is called avulsion, the course of a river is materially and permanently changed. Missouri does not dispute the fact that when Nebraska was admitted into the Union the body of land described in the present record as Island Precinct was in Nebraska. It is equally clear that those lands did not cease to be within the limits of Nebraska by reason of the avulsion of July 5, 1867.

For the reason stated we adjudge, in respect of the matters involved in this suit, that the middle of the channel of the Missouri River, according to its course as it was prior to the avulsion of July 5, 1867, is the true boundary line between Missouri and Nebraska. Accordingly, the original bill must be dismissed, and a decree entered in favor of the State of Nebraska on its cross bill.

It appears from the record that about the year 1895 the county surveyors of Nemaha County, Nebraska, and Atchison County, Missouri, made surveys of the abandoned bed of the Missouri River, in the locality here in question, ascertained the location of the original banks of the river on either side, and to some extent marked the middle of the old channel. If the two States agree upon these surveys and locations as correctly

marking the original banks of the river and the middle of the old channel, the court will, by decree, give effect to that agreement; or, if either State desires a new survey the court will order one to be made and cause monuments to be placed so as to permanently mark the boundary line between the two States. The disposition of the case by final decree is postponed for forty days, in order that the court may be advised as to the wishes of the parties in respect of these details.

KEELY v. MOORE.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA.

No. 55. Argued November 9, 1904.- Decided December 19, 1904.

The signature of a resident of the District of Columbia to a will executed abroad was witnessed on the day of execution by two witnesses; on the day following an American vice consul signed, as such and under seal, a certificate that the testator had appeared before him and acknowledged the will and his signature thereto. It did not state that the testator signed in his presence. The law in the District of Columbia required three witnesses in testator's presence, but did not require the testator to sign in presence of witnesses. The will was attacked also on grounds of testator's insanity and undue influence on the testator who had, previous to the execution of the will, been for a short time in an insane asylum. In an action affecting title to real estate there were issues sent to a jury and the title under the will sustained. Held, that:

Under the circumstances in this case the jury might properly draw the inference that the vice consul executed the certificates in the ordinary course of business and in presence of the testator.

Although a notary taking an acknowledgment as required by law is not, in the absence of separate signature as such to be regarded as a witness, inasmuch as the certificate in this case was not required by law and was unnecessary, it was, together with the description appended to the vice consul's name, immaterial and could be disregarded as surplusage and the vice consul's signature regarded as that of a witness in his unofficial capacity.