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be able to move promptly to meet situations that arise in various parts of the world and which, if not handled with resolution and dispatch, can easily spread out and lead to major war. The fact that United States carrier aircraft were patrolling the Quemoy Straits within 24 hours of the time the Communist Chinese started shelling Quenoy last August in my opinion was a major factor in containing that situation. The same can be said with reference to our prompt response to the Lebanon crisis a month or so earlier.

The Army and Marines have demonstrated their readiness in limited war situations during the past year: on July 14, the President of Lebanon asked for United States help, and on July 15 the first battalion of Marines landed in Beirut. The combat-ready forces of the Army, the tactical arm of the Air Force and our highly flexible naval forces add to our confidence that we will be able to meet the kinds of limited war situations which are apt to face us.

In this year's budget, we have included a new aircraft carrier. This has important strategic uses, but as I have indicated, its primary function is to constitute a major factor in our limited war capability. As long as manned aircraft are important-and we believe this will be the situation for many years to come—these highly mobile platforms with their heavy complement of tactical aircraft have great importance as a means of moving our power to the scene of trouble

. Èssential to the strength of our limited forces and a particularly important element in our ability to meet local situations, are the forces of our allies. Our security program is based on such relationships as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the South East Asia Treaty Organization and our many bilateral agreements. With the assistance of American funds, equipment and know-how, and with the training and guidance afforded by American military personnel, many friendly nations around the world have been able to build forces which are now capable of meeting a local threat--a fact which often prevents trouble from materializing.

The rightness of this program of military assistance was demonstrated in the Taiwan situation, where the Nationalist Chinese were able to meet the Communist attack with their own forces, and win decisive victories in the air over planes with at least equal performance characteristics. Another example of the effectiveness of the military assistance program is Vietnam which a few years ago had practically no effective military forces of its own and today, with our help, has been able to achieve a significant strength with which to defend itself until additional help can be provided.

I recently visited a number of our allies in eastern and southeast Asia. I came back more convinced than ever that the dollars and the efforts we are spending on military assistance are as productive as any in our whole defense program, and are essential to our security.

Our continental air defense was the third element I mentioned in our overall program.

We recognize air defense as an important adjunct to the retaliatory capability which supports deterrence. We must make the enemy know that an attack on us would be costly to his attacking force and that he cannot obliterate our ability to retaliate.

Our capacity to defend ourselves against air attack—and this means aircraft attack- because I am sure this committee knows that we do not at this time have any defense against missile attack, any effective defense except early warning.

Our capacity to defend ourselves against air attack has progressively increased. The growing effectiveness of our early warning radar coverage, including the seaward extensions, the use of automation for more effective control, and the improved capability of groundto-air and air-to-air missiles have all stepped up our strength in this area and will continue to do so. Bomarc has had a number of highly successful tests, including tests in which the target was knocked out of the air despite violent evasive action. Nike-Hercules has intercepted supersonic targets at extremely high altitudes and at varying ranges. Nike-Zeus, the antiballistic missile, is still in the research and development stage but the program is being supported to the full extent our present knowledge indicates is prudent. We cannot expect to counter an all-out attack so completely that no hostile weapons will penetrate, but our defenses are formidable and can be recognized as such by any potential attacker.

Here again I must be sure that this is clearly understood. That is the statement with respect to attack by aircraft. There is not, I say, again, in this country and so far as we know any place in the world, a defense against missiles. I am talking about ballistic missiles.

I have mentioned also maintenance of sealanes as a primary element in our defenses. This is of key importance if we are to support our own forces overseas and those of our allies especially in local war situations. Effective antisubmarine measures are required for the protection of the striking force, the mobile logistic support force, and the ocean convoy, and for defense of continental United States against missile-launching submarines. Good progress has been made in improving our capabikties in this area. New ASW ships and nuclearpowered attack submarines with greatly improved capabilities are joining the fleet. Personnel and ships have been assigned to the antisubmarine task forces and hunter-killer groups on a more permanent basis to increase their efficiency. Programs designed to improve techniques for detection and tracking of submarines have been stepped up and expanded. Research and development on new techniques and equipment have been intensified, including work on antisubmarine missiles, homing torpedoes, drone helicopters, and special aircraft for ASW use. The nuclear depth bomb is available now to our forces.

Eight destroyers will be extensively modernized in order to extend their useful life by an estimated 8 years. This program involves the modernization of armament and electronics equipment, and the rehabilitation of hull and machinery. It is part of a larger, long-range program to extend the useful life of World War II ships and it provides a partial answer to the problem of bloc obsolescence of the fleet.

I would like really to call your attention to this particular item, because it is the beginning of a program which we will have included in succeeding years also. It has exactly what is described here, as its objective, which is to extend the useful life of certain of the elements of the fleet in the destroyer type, which if we did not apply this modernization program, would give us a serious bloc-obsolescence problem.

In all the phases of our military program, we are pushing forward our ability to wage nuclear war without losing sight of the need for maintaining a capability to use conventional weapons. No one can predict with any degree of accuracy the pattern of conflict which might develop from various tense situations. There will be many situations in which we will not want to use large nuclear weapons we now have in our arsenal; where this is the case, we have and are prepared to use conventional weapons.

In building the budget which will enable us to carry on the program I have indicated, we have followed certain principles:

On the programs which are considered to have unquestioned essentiality, the rate of development has been maintained and, where advisable technically, increased.

We have rigorously examined all other programs which, in view of current technical information may be considered marginal, could be eliminated or reduced.

Let me give some examples of how this policy has been applied to the 1960 program. The Navy, as you know, has had under active development two ship-based surface-to-surface missile programs. The older of the two programs was the intermediate range Regulus aerodynamic missile designed to be fired primarily by specially designed or modified submarines in a surfaced position. The second is the intermediate range Polaris solid propellant ballistic missile planned to be fired by specially designed submarines in a surfaced or submerged position, as I previously mentioned.

Now, the Regulus II is a good weapon and its development had progressed satisfactorily. However, the Polaris system promises to be far superior in overall effectiveness. Since this system has now reached the point where we can have confidence in its early operational availability, the Regulus II is no longer of the same importance. Considering the extremely high costs involved in developing, producing, operating, and maintaining the training and logistics support for two distinctly different missile systems, both designed for similar mission-we decided to concentrate our efforts on the Polaris, the more advanced of the two, and drop the Regulus.

The Redstone-Pershing relationship presents a similar picture. The Redstone is a liquid fuel tactical missile which has been in production for some time and which is already in the hands of Army units

. The Pershing, a solid propellant tactical missile now under development, promises to be a distinctly superior field weapon. Since the potential of this missile is so great and its success is reasonably assured, we have decided to taper off future production of the Redstone and shift the emphasis to the Pershing,

In the same way the air-to-ground Hound Dog is replacing the Rascal program, and the tactical range solid propellent Sergeant will replace the liquid fuel Corporal.

The antimissile missile offers a somewhat different example. Last year studies were being made on Vike-Zeus as well as other possible anti-missile-missile systems. Among the candidates under study was the land-based Talos which, although designed for use against manned aircraft and aerodynamic missiles, does appear to have a limited potential as an antimissile missile. There were also two studies under contract for the development of an entirely new Air Force system, Wizard. As these studies progressed, however, we found that many of the components being considered were basically similar in concept to the Nike-Zeus system. Careful weighing of all of the relevant factors led to the conclusions that the Nike-Zeus at this time offered the best promise of success and that work on the present alternative systems should be dropped. Thus, our available skills and talents in this area could be concentrated on the Nike-Zeus and on advanced research to develop an improved antimissile system in the years ahead.

A number of other projects have been dropped from the program for a variety of reasons. Because of technical difficulties and delays resulting in successive cost increases in the Navy's PM Seamaster program, it was deemed impracticable to continue production beyond the 14 required for test and tactical development of the jet seaplane concept. Because of a change in tactical concepts the Air Force decided to drop the decoy missile, Goose. Similarly, the Army dropped the Dart missile because of failure of the system to meet anticipated capabilities.

The reason for canceling the Navy F8U-3 all-weather fighter is well known to you. You will recall that in the House report which accompanied the Defense Appropriation Act for 1959, the Department of Defense was directed to make a selection between the FZU-3 and the F4H-1, both of which are all-weather fighters designed for the same mission. Concurrent development of these two aircraft has been carried through preliminary evaluations. Both aircraft demonstrated outstanding flight performance. The F4H-1 has been chosen for procurement because it demonstrated greater weapon system effectiveness, better safety of operations, greater mission versatility, and greater growth potential.

Specifically, the fiscal year 1960 budget provides increased funds for such advanced missile systems, as the Nike-Zeus, Pershing, Polaris, Titan, and Minuteman. Funds are also provided to continue production of the Atlas, Bomarc, Hawk, Nike-Hercules, Talos, Terrier, Tartar, and other missile systems. A final increment of funds is included in this budget to complete the presently planned production program for Jupiter and Thor. If an early decision is made, we can extend this production for the needs of our allies over and above the eight squadrons presently planned. In this event additional production would be financed by direct purchase or through the military assistance program.

In the fiscal year 1960 budget we are proposing to make no significant reductions in numbers of active duty military personnel. The Department of Defense has followed the policy since the end of the Korean war of reducing the number of military personnel as new and more powerful weapons were integrated into the forces. Although we shall continue the flow of new weapons to our forces in 1960, it seems prudent to keep our numbers at the level planned for the current fiscal year. Our fiscal year 1960 budget therefore provides for an active duty military personnel strength of 2,520,000 at the end of fiscal year 1960—Army 870,000; Navy 630,000; Marine Corps 175,000; and Air Force 815,000. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps strengths are the same as those planned for June 30, 193_, but the Air Force strength is 5,000 less.

I believe these levels are adequate to meet our commitments and our national objectives. They represent a realistic assessment of our manpower needs in flexible combination with other elements of our strength

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As you know, the President has asked that Congress remove the mandatory minimum strengths prescribed for the Army Reserve and National Guard by the 1959 Appropriations Act. The action of Congress in establishing minimum strengths for the Army Reserve and National Guard was contrary to previously accepted procedure under which determination of Active and Reserve Force strengths has been left to the executive branch.

Both the Active and Reserve components of our Armed Forces are indispensable, but they require balance to be effective. Their needs change with changing conditions.

Several years ago, we allowed men to join Reserve units without prior training. Under such conditions a great deal of effort and time were required to bring the individual to a minimum state of readiness. Today the reservist must accept active duty training prior to joining his Reserve unit or receiving mobilization assignment. Previously

, relatively few men with prior service in the Armed Forces went into the Reserves. Now, almost all who leave active duty must complete additional Ready Reserve obligation. These two facts have radically changed the old concept of paid drill training.

We believe the Reserve strengths provided in the fiscal year 1960 budget are appropriate to supplement the active components in furnishing the required defense structure. These numbers are a total of 1,030,000 reservists on paid status at end fiscal year 1960—Army Reserve 330,000 (270,000 in drill pay and enlisted 6-months training status, 60,000 in other paid status), Army National Guard 360,000; Navy Reserve 145,000; Marine Corps Reserve 48,000; Air Force Reserve 72,000; and Air National Guard 75,000.

In the questions which you were good enough to present to us in advance, Mr. Chairman, you asked how the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body participated in the formulation of the budget. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their individual roles as Chiefs of their respective military services, participated closely and continuously in the preparation of the fiscal year 1960 budget. Early in December, a special meeting of several hours duration was arranged in order to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the military departments an opportunity to discuss the 1960 military programs directly with the President.

Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluated the military programs for the Department of Defense as a whole, prior to the presentation of these programs to the National Security Council. As a result of these studies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally advised the Secretary of Defense that while each individual service Chief had some reservations with respect to the funding of some segment of his own service program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the fiscal year 1960 budget "adequate to provide for the essential programs necessary for the defense of the Nation for the period under consideration."

They also, I might say, included a statement to the effect that they saw no important gaps in the 1960 defense program.

Throughout the past year we have been working to put into effect the improvements in our organization made possible by the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. The implementation of this act is scheduled to be completed this month, but work will proceed for the indefin

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