belongs, would pass on matters other than the question of competency related solely to this business of receiving pay that might be due. Mr. KILDAY. I might say to the gentleman from Virginia, speaking from memory now at the time we passed this provision, up until that time there was no authority in the law for the payment of sums due from the Government to anyone other than the individual, except in those instances in which the incompetency had been judicially determined in accordance with the law of the State in which he was residing. My recollection is that that statute simply authorizes the payment and protects the disbursing officer in so making the payment. It would not constitute a determination of mental competency for any other purpose in my opinion. Mr. HARDY. That is the question that I wanted to be sure of: A serviceman, for instance, who might be over at Perry Point in a veterans' facilities over there, and who might have a determination of incompetency-I presume he would have when he was sent there by the service but then if he is released-that sometimes happens-and he goes off the beam again while he is out, I would have some concern if the VA were authorized to convene a board to determine competency that might have effects other than that relating to the receipt of pay which might be due. Colonel DEFRIES. It is my understanding, Mr. Hardy, that this bill will just have the primary-the primary point of the bill is that it will just have an effect on the pay involved to the member's dependents. Mr. HARDY. And it would have nothing to do with retirement? Or a finding as to whether his mental disorder was service connectedwhich sometimes affects retirement? Colonel DEFRIES. Yes, sir. In those instances if the member were on active duty, the process is somewhat different. In those instances the individual, should he become mentally incompetent, is of course hospitalized. He is brought before a medical board and subsequently a physical evaluation board, and he is retired by reason of this affliction. Mr. BLANDFORD. But the point, Colonel, is that the evaluation board must be a board made up of officers of his service. Mr. HARDY. That is the thing that I wanted to be sure of. Mr. HARDY. I want to be sure we are not empowering a board of another agency to make findings that have more far-reaching effect than merely the clearance or relieving of disbursing officers of liability for making payments to an incompetent person. Colonel DEFRIES. No, sir; that is not the purpose of this bill, and it does not do that. Mr. HARDY. I know it is not the purpose of it, but I want to be sure it is not the effect of it. Colonel DEFRIES. It is not the effect of it. Mr. KITCHIN. May I ask a question with regard to legal precedence? Although these boards determine the mental competency for the purpose of protecting the disbursing officer, what legal significance and precedence would that set for those cases wherein a determination would have had to have been made in civilian courts? Mr. KILDAY. I would imagine if a person is charged with a crime after this determination, it would be at least persuasive. Mr. BLANDFORD. If I recall in 1950, Mr. Chairman, we went into this subject matter. It would not prevent the individual from protesting a commitment, in a civil court based upon the finding of a medical board. All this really does is to permit an individual—say, a wife—to go to the head of the department and say, "My husband is a patient at the hospital. He doesn't understand money. He has been spending it. He is getting his pay. Or he has some accrued pay or retired pay, he is hospitalized and he doesn't know what he is doing, and I have got to survive and also I have to protect his interests." Now, for the purposes of the payment of money that is due him from the Government and only for that purpose, this board meets to determine his competency and they approve the appointment, say, of his wife to handle his affairs. And then the money is paid to the wife and that in turn relieves the Government of its obligation, and relieves the disbursing officer who has made the payment to the wife and not paid it to the man, so thereafter the man could not say that this money was paid to his wife but wasn't paid to him. So it protects the Government and it protects the wife. Mr. KILDAY. A very important thing in that connection is the saving of expense to the individual and the estate of judicial proceeding. Mr. BLANDFORD. It would not prevent the individual later from going to court. Mr. KILDAY. I think most cases come up from the standpoint of the officials having the patient, knowing he is mentally incompetent, and the protection of the disbursing officer in making the payment. Mr. KITCHIN. To carry it a little further, supposing the same wife under the circumstances you have mentioned, had an estate to be settled on the same basis of mental incompetency of her husband. Would the testimony or would the record of this board declaring him to be incompetent be available to her in civil court to establish the same claim that she had established before? Mr. KILDAY. I don't know, but I think the point here is that-when was it, in 1950, we passed this law which is now being amended which is in effect--this does not in any way change that except to add additional officers of the Government who can make the determination. because no longer do the services always have custody of the patient. Mr. BLANDFORD. I would say, Mr. Chairman, all it could be used for would be an allegation for a petition, and that would be as far as you could go, since this is a very privileged relationship, and I think this policy as a matter of fact, the regulation precludes disclosure of matters of this nature, so I doubt whether it could be used for any other purpose-it probably could be used as the basis for a filing of a petition but the civilian court would then make its own decision. That is a curbstone opinion. Mr. KILDAY. Is the representative of the Army present? Major GIBBS. Maj. James Gibbs, U.S. Army. We are in support of the bill. Mr. KILDAY. Who represents the Navy? Captain NADINI. Capt. John Nadini, U.S. Navy. We also support the bill. Mr. KILDAY. And the representative of the Marine Corps, I believe, the colonel said was present. Major BROOME. I am Maj. Norris Broome, U.S. Marine Corps, Office of Legislative Liaison, Department of the Navy. I can say with authority the Marine Corps supports this bill. Mr. BATES. Is anyone speaking on behalf of the Veterans' Administration or the Public Health Service? Being participants in this law, it seems there should be some representation here. Mr. KILDAY. Is there any representation for the Health, Education, and Welfare or the Veterans' Administration? (No response.) Mr. KILDAY. I hear no response. Mr. BATES. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that a statement on behalf of the Veterans' Administration and Public Health Service be inserted in the record at this point. Mr. KILDAY. Without objection, we will authorize counsel to secure a statement from those two agencies. (The information, when received, will appear in the record at this point :) Hon. CARL VINSON, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your request at the hearings held on February 25, 1959, on H.R. 3320, that the committee be advised of the views of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare on this bill, I can advise that the Department would have no objection to its enactment. We reported favorably on the bill to the Bureau of the Budget on November 4, 1955, when the legislation was still in draft form. Technical amendments which we suggested at that time have been included in H.R. 3320. Yours truly, Hon. CARL VINSON, REGINALD G. CONLEY, Assistant General Counsel, Legislative Division. VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION, Washington, D.C., February 27, 1959. Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your request for the views of the Veterans' Administration with regard to H.R. 3320, I am happy to advise you that this agency has no objection to the enactment of this bill. Sincerely, SUMNER M. WHITTIER, Administrator. Mr. KILDAY. We will take the bill up in executive session. (Whereupon, at 10:50 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded to further business.) H.R. 4068 Mr. KILDAY. We will now take up H.R. 4068, a bill to amend title 10 of the United States Code by repealing section 7475, which restricts the increasing of forces at naval activities prior to national elections. (H.R. 4068 follows:) [H.R. 4068, 86th Cong., 1st sess.] A BILL To amend title 10, United States Code, by repealing section 7475, which restricts the increasing of forces at naval activities prior to national elections Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows: (1) Section 7475 is repealed. (2) The analysis of chapter 643 is amended by striking out the following item: "7475. Force at naval activities not to be increased before elections." Mr. KILDAY. Who is the witness on this bill? Mr. KILDAY. Come around, Admiral, and have a seat. Admiral CRONIN. May I have Mr. Gerow come up with me? Admiral CRONIN. I am Rear Adm. R. E. Cronin, U.S. Navy, Chief of Industrial Relations of the Department of the Navy, and I have been designated to represent the Department of Defense at today's hearing on H.R. 4068. With me is Mr. William Gerow, who is Director of Employment for the Office of Industrial Relations. The Department appreciates this opportunity to present its views on the bill. The purpose of this bill is to repeal section 7475 of title 10, United States Code, which provides that no increase may be made in the force at a naval activity within 60 days before a national election, unless the Secretary of the Navy certifies that the needs of the service require the increase at that time. The Department of Defense strongly supports H.R. 4068 since the present law imposes a heavy administrative burden upon the Department of the Navy without serving any useful purpose to the Navy or to the public interest. No other department of the Government, to our knowledge, has a similar restriction imposed on its normal operations. The present requirement was originally enacted as part of the Naval Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1877, approved June 30, 1876 (ch. 159, 19 Stat. 69) and read: and no increase of the force at any navy yard shall be made at any time within sixty days next before any election to take place for President of the United States, or member of Congress, except when the Secretary of the Navy shall certify that the needs of the public service make such increase necessary at that time which certificate shall be immediately published when made. The Department of the Navy interpreted this provision, as originally worded, as applicable only to the 11 shipyards and the Naval Gun Factory; a navy yard in 1876. The restrictions of the law were not considered applicable to other naval or Marine Corps activities. In view of the small number of naval activities involved, there was no appreciable difficulty in making the necessary certification by the Secretary of the Navy, although it was believed to be an unnecessary expense to the Department. Records readily available to the Department indicate that certifications of necessity to increase the force at the shipyards prior to national elections have been made continually since 1934. However, in incorporating this provision as section 7475 in the codification of title 10, by Public Law 1028 on August 10, 1956, the original phrase "at any navy-yard" was reworded to read "at a naval activity." The rewording of this legislation from "at any navy-yard” to “at a naval activity" has made strict adherence to the law extremely difficult and costly. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy has advised that the provisions of the law are now applicable to every naval activity that employs civilians. This means that in over some 770 naval activities all additions of personnel must cease 60 days before a national election unless the Secretary of the Navy makes individual certification in each case that such increase is necessary. It is quite obvious that in order to accomplish this a heavy administrative burden is placed upon the Department of the Navy. Changes in and reallocation of workloads and missions among the naval installations, fleet support requirements and emergencies require a degree of flexibility in the work force at most naval activities. It is necessary to establish a procedure, and perhaps even to add additional staff, through which the various naval installations may make requests for certification. Such requests would have to be reviewed by the Secretary of the Navy, proper certification made, and published. The inability of a naval installation to increase its civilian work force without specific certification by the Secretary of the Navy that such increase is necessary can seriously hamper naval operations through the creation of unnecessary delays and expenses. A serious handicap to the Navy's ability to accomplish its industrial mission is the interpretation of when the hiring restriction is imposed. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy has advised that the civilian ceiling restriction applies to the on-board population of the installation as of the 60th day preceding the election. The normal fluctuations of the labor market can create a situation where any given installation can be as much as 10 percent below the authorized civilian ceiling which is determined by the management. bureau or office as essential to the accomplishment of the work assigned. In practical application this would require an installation to request special certification in order to fill positions already considered by competent authority to be essential to fulfilling their mission. The delay imposed by this requirement could very well adversely affect the recruitment of late summer graduate engineers and scientists by naval research and development centers. The original law was designed to prevent the hiring of personnel for the purpose of influencing an election. Under the conditions and practices prevalent at that time this precaution was fully justified. Since then the Civil Service Act of 1883, the Hatch Act of 1939, the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, civil service regulations, and |