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Upon analysis of these statistics we find that during the year 1957 the Reserve program produced the following results by mental groups :
In other words the overall Reserve program for 1957 produced the following results :
In the 6-month program 4.8 percent more in mental groups I and II and a like decrease in mental groups III and IV. And the Reserves on extended active duty gave to the Marine Corps 1.7 percent more in mental groups I and II, and 1.7 percent less in mental groups III and IV.
In an analysis of these same statistics for the year 1958 we find the Reserve program produced the following results by mental groups.
In other words, the overall Reserve program for 1938 produced the follow. ing results:
In the 6-month program, 11.5 percent more in mental groups I and II with a corresponding decrease in mental groups III and IV, and the Reserves on extended active duty gave to the Marine Corps 10.3 percent more in mental groups I and II and an equal percent less in mental groups III and IV in 1958.
In comparing the improvement of the Reserve program in this area between the years 1957 and 1958, we find the following within the various areas:
In other words the 6-month program showed an improvement of 6.7 percent more in mental groups I and II and a decrease of 6.7 percent in mental groups III and IV during fiscal year 1958.
In comparing the improvement of the Reserves reporting for extended active duty between the years 1957 and 1958, we find the following reports:
In other words the Reserves reporting for active duty during 1958 showed an improvement of 8.6 percent in mental groups I and II and a decrease of 8.6 percent in mental groups III and IV.
In view of the foregoing it becomes patent that the 6-months program not only benefits and improves the military efficiency of those within the training program itself but has had the effect of overall improvement of the entire Reserve structure as manifested by the improvement of those leaving the Reserve for extended active duty with the Regular Establishment.
There have been many comments as to the fiscal requirements of the 6-months program vis-a-vis other types of Reserve training now in use.
For this reason, I have made a study of the relative costs of these various enlistment programs. The pay and allowance costs of these programs are based on normal enlisted promotion patterns.
The results of this study are as follows:
Personnel cost (includes pay and allowances, travel, subsistence
$928 Enlistment cost--
None 18 months Reserve training including 15 days active duty
347 1, 275
(0) Cost of 2x6 enlistment personnel cost for 2 years.
Difference between 6 months and 2x6..
3, 616 2, 341
(c) Cost of 4-year enlistment in USMC:
Personnel cost for 4 years.-
8, 055 Cost per month of useful service (42 months)-----
192 1. The raw cost figures provided above do not consider many factors which cannot be accurately expressed in dollar costs. Some of these are:
(a) The data above shows a cost of $201 per month of useful service for a 2x6 enlistee, as compared to $192 for a 4-year enlistee. This comparison does not take into consideration the increased value of the 4-year man in that during his second 2 years we receive the benefit of his experience.
(0) Presently 98–99 percent of the recruits for the Regular Establishment are enlisted for a 4-year period. This makes possible such programs as the unit rotation system. If the 2x6 program were to be emphasized, the stability of the regular forces would be seriously weakened.
(c) If 2x6 enlistments were emphasized, the recruiting workload and training overhead of the Regular Marine Corps would increase, so that within a given Regular strength, the size of the operating forces would necessarily be decreased.
(d) If the primary emphasis on Reserve input shifted to the 2x6 program, the stability of the Organized Reserve should decrease, since the 2x6 man would presumably have a shorter period of mandatory participation. However, this disadvantage would appear to be balanced by the higher state of training of the 2x6 compared to the 6-month trainee.
2. The chief disadvantage of the 2x6 program lies in its effect on the Regular Marine Corps. A 2x6 enlistee costs more per useful month of service than a 4-year enlistee, and emphasis on 2x6 enlistment would tend to convert the Regular forces into a glorified casual company.
In conclusion, I believe that it is in the best interests of the Reserve and Regular components that the 6-month training program as now permitted in the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 be continued as therein provided.
It is believed that the foregoing facts plus the experiences of the various Reserve components have proven beyond any reasonable doubt that the 6-month training program has established the following:
(a) It has reduced the turnover of personnel, increased the stability of drill pay units as well as their efficiency as a truly Ready Reserve.
(b) It has increased the overall efficiency of the Reserve components because of the higher caliber of accessions as evidenced by the higher GCT's of those individuals entering the program.
(c) It has provided the much needed and complete unit training for our drill-pay Reserve units that has in the past been impossible under previous training programs, and that,
(d) The relative cost of the 6-month trainee versus the 2-year enlistment program is well justified, in view of present budgetary limitations and the conflicts of the 2x6 program with the requirements Regular Establishment.
Mr. RIVERS. We will next receive General Harrison's statement on behalf of the National Guard Association.
General Harrison. I am Maj. Gen. W. H. Harrison, Jr., president of the National Guard Association of the United States.
(The prepared statement of Maj. Gen. W. H. Harrison, Jr., is as follows:)
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before this committee during its consideration of H.R. 3368, a bill to extend the special enlistment programs provided by section 262 of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, as amended.
The special enlistment programs were originally developed by the Department of Defense as a part of the National Reserve plan which was ultimately translated into law as the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. These programs were included as a significant part of the then stated long-range aspects of the National Reserve plan and were designed to provide a flow of initially trained young men into the Reserve Forces without adversely affecting the rescruiting capabilities of the Active Forces.
Specifically, each young man without prior military service who enlisted in the Reserve Forces was required to enter upon 6 months of active duty training with the Active Forces, thereafter reverting to his parent Reserve component for a specified obligated period of service. While the National Guard was not, and is not, specifically embraced within the provisions of section 262 of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 which H.R. 3368 seeks to continue, by memorandum of agreement executed by the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives in March of 1957 the requirement that nonprior service enlistees in the Army National Guard perform the 6-month active duty training as a condition of enlistment therein was extended to the guard. Ac. cordingly, we of the National Guard have a real and vital interest in this bill.
Unquestionably, the popularity of the program providing for enlistment into a Reserve component or the National Guard with immediate entry upon 6month active duty training with the Active Forces was initially at low ebb. Undeniably, its popularity, at least insofar as the Army National Guard is concerned, has accelerated at such a pace that under current directives many Army National Guard units have long lists of applicants awaiting their opportunity to enlist in the guard.
That such enlistments are denied is a travesty upon the voluntary concept of military service and a monument to the colossal instability of our military programs. Just a couple of years ago the highest officials of our Government, backed up by our foremost military minds, were calling for a Ready Reserve force of 2,900,000 including an Army National Guard of some 612,000. These figures were programed on an accelerated basis to be reached by the end of fiscal 1959. Yet within the short space of 18 months we found ourselves defending an Army National Guard strength of 400,000 against a Department of Defense sponsored strength of 360,000.
Those of us who are concerned with the military manpower policies of our Nation would do well to direct our attention to the subjects of stability and equity in relation to those matters.
The Korean conflict was fought largely by veterans and those who had had prior military service while hundreds of thousands of young men were called upon to perform no military service whatsoever. Shortly thereafter, the country resolved that such a situation would not again be permitted to arise. The enactment of the Armed Forces Reserve Act in 1952 was a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, within a very short period our military planners were
again developing policies which would duplicate on an even larger scale the double jeopardy and injustices of the Korean period.
Consider, if you will, the procedures which require that a young man who has completed a minimum tour of at least 2 years of active military service to participate in a Ready Reserve unit with A-1 vulnerability for war or emergency service immediately following his release from the Active Military Forces. This notwithstanding that large number of his friends and neighbors are not called upon to serve their Nation in any military capacity.
Such policies and procedures lead us to a point where we can look upon our Reserves as an almost wholly conscript force.
Even in the mandatory assignment of such individuals to units of the Ready Reserve there exist built-in inequities, for, by accident of location or service training, many escape this Reserve participation obligation.
A few years ago officals were alarmed at the increasing average age levels of the Reserve Forces. It was stated in the hearings on the Reserve Forces Act of 1935 that the then average age of the Reserves had reached 24. Yet just a few days ago, again in hearings before the Armed Services Committee of the House, we heard that the average age at which young men were being drafted by the Selective Service System was about 23. After 2 years of active military service this young man has attained the age of 25, at which time, and upon his release from active duty, he is arbitrarily and mandatorily assigned to a Ready Reserve unit of the Army to fulfill his Reserve participation obligation.
These statements and actions obviously do not dovetail. Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to unreasonably complicate the consideration of this committee on the measure now before you. Nevertheless, the views which I have expressed represent the thinking of half a million members of the National Guard—officers and men who are devoting a major share of their leisure periods to prepare themselves for better service to their country.
H.R. 3368, if enacted by the Congress, will provide authority to continue in operation a program by which hundreds of thousands of young men can elect to serve the military requirements of their Nation. It can strengthen the Reserve Forces with initially trained men who may thereafter sharpen and increase their military skills while pursuing their civilian livelihood. It is an excellent program but its excellence and its results can be only measured by the degree of monetary support which is rendered to it. The mere enactment of this bill does not guarantee that a single young man will be permitted to enlist in a Reserve component and enter upon a period of 6 months active duty training with the Active Military Forces.
We urge your support of H.R. 3368. Concurrently, however, we urge that most serious consideration be given to a correction of the double jeopardy and inequitable corresponding and corrolary features of the basic legislation. A conscript Ready Reserve Force is better than none. A voluntary Ready Reserve is the American way.
Mr. Rivers. We will now hear from Captain Sands of the Coast Guard.
(The prepared statement of Capt. S. R. Sands, Jr., is as follows:) Mr. Chairman and members of the House Armed Service Committee, I am Capt. Simon R. Sands, Jr., Chief of the Reserve Division at Coast Guard Headquarters. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee to present the Coast Guard's position relative to the proposed extension of section 262 of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, as amended.
The Coast Guard originally elected to utilize section 261 of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, as amended, and initiated recruiting of personnel under this section on August 29, 1955. This program was, of course, somewhat similar to the former 8-year program which involved 2 years' active duty on a voluntary basis and the transition could be made without essentially changing the plan of operation, including budgetary considerations. Shortly thereafter, it was recog. nized that the Coast Guard Reserve would be unable to attain mobilization requirements with this program alone. Therefore, following a brief period of planning and the allocation of Reserve training funds for the program, recruiting of personnel under section 262 of the act was commenced on June 1, 1956, and the first class reported for training in July.
During fiscal year 1957, approximately 1,500 men were recruited under section 262 of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, as amended, and in January of that year the flow of trainees began returning to their units to commence their 742 years of inactive duty training. Shortly thereafter it became quite apparent that the proficiency of these men after 6 months' training exceeded our original expectations.
In view of the excellent results that were experienced with the new program and the anticipated difficulty of absorbing additional enlistees under section 261, due to the backlog of members awaiting call to 2 years active duty, recruiting in the latter category was limited to 700 during fiscal year 1958 and was entirely suspended in October 1957. Since that time only officer candidates and a small number of harbor pilot trainees have been enlisted in this category. We do not contemplate a full-scale reactivation of this program as long as recruiting in the 6 months active duty plan and for regular 4-year enlistments continues to be favorable.
In order to expand the 6 months training program to include young men older than 1842, the Secretary of the Treasury originated an additional enlistment program under the authority of title 10 United States Code, which is very similar to the program under section 262 of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, as amended. Under this program, men between the ages of 1812 and 21 are accepted for 6 months active duty for training followed by 742 years in the Ready Reserve. Approximately 700 were enlisted in this category during fiscal year 1958.
As of January 31, 1959, there have been 2,500 enlistments in both categories of the 6 months training program and there is little doubt that the planned total intake of 3,500 during the current fiscal year will be realized on schedule. Moreover, our advance planning contemplates 3,000 6x8 enlistees during fiscal year 1960 and a similar number each year thereafter.
In view of the excellent results enjoyed by the Coast Guard with the 6 months training program and the ever-present fact that the operating forces could not absorb 2-year active duty personnel in sufficient numbers to achieve mobilization strength on schedule, it is recommended that section 262 of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, as amended, be extended.
Mr. RIVERS. We will next hear from Mr. Ridley on behalf of the American Legion.
(The prepared statement of Mr. Granville S. Ridley is as follows:) I am Granville S. Ridley, chairman of the national security training committee. the American Legion.
Long years of effort on the part of the American Legion to secure the enactment of a universal system of training for American youth makes this appearance before the subcommittee a welcome responsibility.
At our 1958 national convention, held in Chicago, Ill., September 1-4, 1958, the following resolution was unanimously adopted :
"Whereas there is no successful way to deal with Russia or its satellites diplomatically, politically, economically, or militarily except from a posture of the greatest possible strength; and,
"Whereas no trust can be placed in any oral or written agreement made with or promised by these nations; and
"Whereas the fairest and most democratic method of sharing the staggering financial cost and heavy sacrifice of personal service is upon a universal basis; and
"Whereas we already have, through taxation, a method of universally sharing this staggering financial burden; and
"Whereas the most economical and democratic method of providing the necessary posture of military strength is through a relatively small, hard corps of professional Army, Navy, and Air Corps establishment and a large Ready Reserve of trained civilians, units, and machines prepared for instant action: Now, there fore, be it
"Resolved, by the American Legion in national convention assembled, That the traditional position of the American Legion which calls for a small professional Military Establishment and a universal compulsory system of training and service in the Ready Reserve be, and the same is hereby reaffirmed."
The manner in which the young men of our country accepted the 6-month training program strengthens the American Legion's belief that universal train. ing is not only desirable and feasible, but that it would meet with the approval of our youth.
The enactment of Public Law 305 was vital to the strength and well-being of the Reserve components. Section 262 of the Reserve Forces Act has provided the