course with foreign nations, and its powers are supreme and sovereign to the extent of its constitutional authority.

As a necessary consequence of this doctrine, no foreign State can hold any diplomatic or other governmental intercourse with any State of our Union; nor can a State law or authority impede the execution of the powers of national sovereignty.

The municipal sovereignty remains with the States and the people respectively. Though the national powers infringe occasionally in their action on slight portions of State municipal law, when the latter gives way to the supreme law of the land, the great mass of governmental powers, the municipal sovereignty reside in and are reserved to the respective States and their people. These are sovereign, and know only constitutional limitations, and those imposed by the legal effect of our treaties and acts of Congress.

Here, then, we have a national sovereignty and a State municipal sovereignty, each moving in separate orbits and producing a common harmony.

As a consequence of this arrangement, no State has any responsibility for the domestic policy or municipal law of another State, and has no right to interfere therein, and ought not to allow its citizens to do so. The principle of the law of nations, that secures entire immunity to every nation from foreign interference in their domestic polity, applies strongly among the States and territories of our Union. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts so decided in the case of Sims, April 1851. The court decided that Sims, being a fugitive slave, and having been arrested by a United States Commissioner, for delivery to his master, pursuant to the acts of Congress of 1793 and 1850, no habeas corpus could be issued by a State court to interfere with the arrest and return, authorized by the consti

tutional acts of Congress. That the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Prigg vs. Pennsylvania, (16 Pet. 539,) settled the law, and held the fugitive slave law constitutional. (See, also, to same effect, Graham vs. Strader, 5 B. Monroe's R. 173, 180-182.)

It results from the foregoing doctrines that national sovereignty, as limited by the constitution of the Union, acts upon and for the people of all the States and territories of the republic as one government, and that the States of our Union, in all respects, except so far as they have parted with authority by the constitution of the Union, are State or municipal sovereignties.

From the nature of our government, the States respectively may pass State laws, civil and criminal, to compel its citizens, and others subject to them, to respect all rights guaranteed to citizens of other States, or to residents. The case of Ells, appellant, vs. The People of Illinois, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, December term, 1852, is to that effect.

LIMITATION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY.

SEC. 18. State power is limited to its territory, except so far as the national constitution and compacts provide for extra territorial action, or State laws or acts of Congress may permit within their jurisdiction. (11 Pet. 131-137. 14 Ib. 568. 1 McLean's C. C. R. 348-351.)

EQUALITY OF THE STATES.

SEC. 19. All the States of our Union have equal municipal rights. (3 How. 224. 13 Ib. 26. 9 Ib. 235. 10 Ib. 93, 94.) All new States are admitted upon an equality with the old ones.

PERPETUITY OF THE UNION.

SEC. 20. The confederation declared itself a perpetual union of the States. (1 Calhoun's Works, 188.) The Constitution of the Union was intended to make it more perfect. (Ib. (Ib. 192.) Hamilton, Madison, Jay, Clay, Webster, and many of our statesmen and jurists, agree that there is no legal and peaceful mode of changing onr union, except as provided by the Constitution, and that forcible State secession is rebellion. (Madison's Letters to Alexander Hamilton, to Daniel Webster and to William C. Rives, and 5 Webst. W. 361-389.)

Each State has granted all national powers to the Union, and by the compact of the Constitution a perpetual union has been agreed upon, never to be changed by any acts other than those pointed out in that instrument.

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY.

SEC. 21. All law in our republic is derived from the people. Hence, all American public law reposes substantially on popular sovereignty.

MILITARY INVASION BY ONE STATE OF OUR UNION OF ANOTHER.

SEC. 22. In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Blodget et al., (12 Metcalf, 56-78,) the Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided that the march of a military party from Rhode Island, during the Dorr rebellion, and while martial law was in force in that State, by order of a military commander, into, and the arrest in Massachusetts of Rhode Island rebels, pursuant to such military order, and taking them to Rhode Island by military force, was illegal, as

the authority of Rhode Island was confined to her own territory. The Court declared that the States of our Union have no powers to make war, to contract alliances or make agreements between themselves; that they are not empowered to engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger of invasion as to admit of no delay. That no martial movement can be made from one State in aid of another, in case of rebellion, as the Constitution confides to the national government the exclusive power and duty to aid the authorities of the States. respectively to suppress domestic insurrections, as well as to protect them from foreign invasions.

The Court say, that though an officer or soldier, acting by the order of the Governor of a State, entering the territory of another State in pursuit of an enemy, or for any other purpose, may claim immunity from the criminal laws of the country, the invasion would be an act of war. That a previous order of the sovereign power of the State, or a subsequent ratification of the acts done in its name, will excuse the subordinates engaged in it. (pp. 83, 84.)

The court also held that Rhode Island had no right to send her soldiers into Massachusetts to capture her rebel citizens, "unless necessary in defence of the lives and property of the citizens of Rhode Island at the time;" and that of that necessity the jury were the judges.

The opinion given in this case by Chief Justice Shaw is distinguished by ability, learning and constitutional

accuracy.

The municipal sovereignty of the States of our Union not only entitles them to entire immunity from domestic interference by citizens of other States, as this eminent jurist so forcibly and happily illustrated in deciding upon Sims' case, but it of right exempts every State from mili

tary or naval invasion from other States of our Union, even in pursuit of fugitive rebels.

It is very clearly the duty of the President of the United States to prevent forcible or armed invasions of our States or territories by the people of other States and territories of our Union, and he is as much bound to employ the military and naval power of the republic to put down and entirely arrest such invasions as those by foreign enemies. The forcible invasion of Kansas by the Missourians, and conquest of the political, personal and property rights of the people, in 1855 and 1856, was a great wrong, that the President was slow to arrest.

SEC. 23. A State may declare martial law to put down a rebellion, but its effect is confined to its own limits. (7 How. 45.) Military officers, executing such law by arresting a party, by virtue of an order of his superior officer, pursuant, on the face of it, to such State law, and acting in good faith, are protected by it from action by any party so arrested and imprisoned. (1 Curtis C. C. R. 308.)

UNITED STATES PRIORITY.

by law, a prior It is a right of (1 Kent's Com.

SEC. 24. In the national government, right of payment exists in certain cases. sovereignty enforced by acts of Congress. 5th ed. 244-247. 1 U. S. St. L. 263, § 18, n. a. p. 518, § 5, p. 676, § 65. 1 Pet. 386. 10 Ib. 590, 611. 4 Ib. 291.)

The right of the United States to prior payment attaches, 1. In case of the death of the debtor without sufficient assets to pay his debts; 2. Of bankruptcy or legal insolvency, manifested by some act pursuant to law; 3. Of a voluntary assignment by the insolvent of all his property to pay his debts; 4. In case of an absent, concealed or